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The making of smart cities transforms not only infrastructures and practices but also the 
techniques of urban government and security, and economic processes. This thesis draws 
on analysis conducted in two research sites: Cape Town, in South Africa and New Town 
Rajarhat, a satellite township on the outskirts of Kolkata, to present three key arguments. 
Firstly, and as opposed to mainstream narratives that describe smart cities as seamlessly 
connected environments, this thesis suggests that urban digitalisation is linked to 
bordering processes. Whereas critical literature has comprehensively discussed the 
political implications and risks associated with smart city projects, such as corporatisation 
and technocratic governance, the specific relations between digital infrastructures and 
borders, within the urban space, have not yet been discussed. This thesis will describe 
how smart city projects graft onto existing, historically-situated borders, which then filter 
and stratify access to digital infrastructures, such as high-speed internet, smart devices, 
and Internet of Things (IoT) networks. The border techniques of identification, 
authorisation, and profiling are increasingly distributed across urban infrastructures and 
devices, and are often microscopically, invisibly, or deeply-embedded into everyday 
habits. They inscribe the city into a calculative grid and are used to collect data on the 
human and non-human components of the urban environment, to monitor and filter 
circulation, and to give access to services. 
Secondly, this thesis argues that smart cities are inherently security projects, insofar as the 
deployment of a computing infrastructure of sensing initiates a preemptive apparatus. In 
security systems, such as the Emergency Policing and Incident Command (EPIC) program 
in Cape Town, or the Xpresso software for social media monitoring in New Town, 
algorithms are continuously modelling and acting upon future scenarios; from traffic jams 
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to wildfires, from crime hotspots to citizens’ moods. In contrast to previous critical 
studies, which hitherto have mainly analysed smart cities under the categories of 
surveillance and dataveillance, my thesis draws attention to the speculative nature of 
security operations as carried out in digital platforms. I will argue that security is 
speculative in smart cities in two senses: 1) because it seeks to make the future actionable 
in the present and 2) because it relies on algorithms that are highly hypothetical, self- 
referential and, often, biased. 
My third argument is that the computing apparatus of security also serves as an 
infrastructure of value extraction. Recently, there has been much theorising and debate 
about security platforms’ economic operations, but the situated modalities in which they 
extract value from the urban environment remain to be examined. This thesis explores 
how commercial platforms, such as Uber and Zomato, use preemptive models to: predict 
and orientate consumers’ behaviour, monetise attention and emotion, discipline labour 
and maximise profit. I also suggest that, while data extractivism is a prominent process of 
urban digitalisation, it is also inextricably linked to the broader dynamics that precede and 
encompass the making of smart cities; namely, resource extraction, dispossession, and 
financialisation. I suggest that the complementary concepts of urban extractivism and 
extractive urbanism accurately encapsulate the entanglement between the digital and non- 
digital forms of value extraction that takes place in smart cities. 
Overall, this thesis points to the socio-spatial, governmental and economic relations that 
computing infrastructures are generating, or reconfiguring, in the urban environment. 
These relations articulate distinct processes, including the hierarchisation and control of 
the urban space, preemptive policies and extractive strategies. Critically analysing these 






Data, sensors, algorithms, and platforms are changing the world we live in. 
Combined, they are reshaping how people and things communicate, travel, and work; how 
money is made and exchanged, and how we engage with politics and are governed. They 
are also transforming the concentration of infrastructures, bodies, and information that we 
commonly call cities. 
The term “smart city” has become a buzzword of our time. This popular label has 
been attached to a broad and diverse range of processes of urban transformation – from 
the implementation of new infrastructures, to the creation of brand-new purpose-built 
cities. All of these different projects share the centrality of digitalisation: extensive 
broadband internet access, public services, and administration that run on digital 
platforms, and private and public infrastructures that are coordinated through Internet of 
Things (IoT) systems. 
This thesis explores how constructing smart cities creates not only new infrastructures 
and urban spaces but also new forms of government and new strategies of value 
extraction. It does this by examining two particular cases: New Town Kolkata in India 
and Cape Town in South Africa. Both cities are situated in the Global South and both are 
still coming to terms, albeit in different ways, with the legacy of their colonial pasts. In 
the case of Cape Town there is the added history of nearly fifty years of apartheid. At the 
same time, both cities are sites of intensive investment and experimentation into digital 
technology as a potential solution to urban problems and as a strategy for global 
networking. However, neither city aligns neatly with the mainstream description of smart 
cities circulated in the media and commercial documents, and neither tops the global 
rankings of urban smartness. In fact, within these cities, global models of smart 
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urbanisation, technologies, and platforms are negotiating situated sedimentations of urban 
informality, inequality, and segregation. This is generating unique configurations of 
space, government, and economies, which shed light on global dynamics, while 
presenting irreducible contingencies. 
Over the past ten years the “smart city” has emerged as a technical model and set of 
commercial solutions, based on the marketing and distribution of extensive computing 
infrastructures across the urban space. Ola Söderström, Till Paasche and Francisco 
Klauser (2014) note that the origin of the idea of smart cities, and of the narratives around 
them, is discernible in IBM’s business strategies and corporate storytelling. In a public 
speech given in 2008, Sam Palmisano, the then CEO of IBM, launched the idea of building 
a smarter planet made up of smarter cities. Soon afterwards, IBM registered the trademark 
term, “smarter cities,” and launched its campaign to sell software for urban management. 
In that campaign, contemporary cities are described as “sick.” They suffer from various 
pathologies, such as tightening budgets, growing population, pollution, and inefficient 
administration, all of which could be healed by smart technologies (Söderström et al., 
2014). Smart city narratives also present a distinct version of urban utopia where the 
perfect integration of computing systems would ensure complete efficiency. This “mild 
utopianism,” which is grounded in the imperative to sell specific products, does not 
require “the replacement of existing spaces, but its digital redoubling” (Söderström et al., 
2014, p. 316). 
The model quickly gained momentum among IBM’s competitors, such as Microsoft, 
Cisco, Intel, Oracle, SAP, and Google – each of which launched its own smart city 
solution – as well as in the public opinion. A growing number of cities around the world 
– from Singapore to Amsterdam, from Rio de Janeiro to Doha – have also embraced the 
smart vision, investing huge amounts of money into sensing technologies and software. 
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Consequently, it has become possible to identify what we might call a “global lobby” of 
smart cities, made up of IT corporations, research groups, politicians, and NGOs that 
actively promote and shape these projects. However, this thesis suggests that the making 
of smart cities is more than just a Big Tech package, travelling across the globe. On the 
contrary, I argue that urban digitalisation incorporates and is shaped by situated histories 
and tensions. As an example, the “100 Smart Cities” program that was launched by the 
Indian government in 2015 is the product of massive investment and shows the leading 
technical roles of multinational IT corporations, such as IBM and Cisco. However, it is 
also a component of the “Great India” nationalist strategy of Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi and his Hindu far-right Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). 
The Smart Cities Mission (SCM) program allocated ₹980 billion (approximately 
USD15 billion) to the improvement, redevelopment, and extension of 109 Indian cities. 
To receive funding, the cities had to compete against each other to present successful 
projects. Their applications were prepared by local municipalities with the support of 
selected global consultants. For example, the New Town Kolkata Development Authority 
(NKDA) wrote its bid together with the UK firm, Future Cities Catapult, and was among 
the winning cities, in 2016. The SCM program was a clear priority for Modi’s 
government, which had been promoting a type of nationalist neoliberalism – combining 
corporate-oriented policies with discourses about Great India and somewhat authoritarian 
methods – since it came to office in 2014. Smart urbanism appeared as a way of attracting 
foreign investors and raising India’s position in global relations, as well as fostering 
capitalist initiatives in the country. 
Both domestic and multinational corporate entities, including major Indian holdings 
Tata, Infosys, and the Mahindra Group, software colossuses Oracle, IBM, Cisco, and 
Google, and global consultants such as Accenture, have taken part in actively laying out 
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the pathway to urban digitalisation in various ways, ranging from organising business 
conferences and workshops to providing consultancies, and, most importantly, investing 
considerable amounts of money into smart projects. Many of these companies settled 
down in New Town well before the launch of smart city projects, benefiting from the 
Special Economic Zones (SEZ) policies of the past two decades. In fact, the whole 
township of New Town was planned during the 1990s, as a SEZ for the IT industry, with 
some residential and commercial developments attached, by the Left Front government 
of West Bengal then in power. Aggressively pursued, but not exactly successful, the 
zoning policy has left behind displaced farmers and destitute communities, without 
generating any of the promised results in terms of employment, development and 
collective wealth. By the time New Town applied for government funding, the place was 
an inconsistent, wretched agglomeration of unfinished flyovers and luxury hotels, 
corporate enclaves and unsold condos, upscale shopping malls and scattered bustees. 
However, and as I address in more detail in Chapter 2 of this thesis, although the smart 
city plans for New Town aim for a futuristic infrastructure they also focus on addressing 
the lack of basic facilities, such as sidewalks or sewerage. 
Similarly, the project to transform Cape Town into a smart city carries on the 
capitalist dream of a “Silicon Cape” – an African hub for tech start ups and the IT industry. 
However, at the same moment the idea of a smart Cape Town is strongly linked – at least 
on paper – to ideas of inclusion and social justice, and is framed as a strategy to deal with 
the legacy of apartheid. Nancy Odendaal (2015) observes that, in the case of Cape Town, 
the digitalisation of the city has become a field of intersection and tensions between a 
developmental agenda, which has been strongly pursued by the postapartheid 
governments, neoliberal strategies and corporate players, and digital activism which 
comes “from below.” The Smart City Strategy for Cape Town was launched in 2000 by 
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Unicity, the only-recently formed, unified city government, with a firm commitment to 
reduce the digital divide and to address social inequality through IT access. The Smart 
Cape Access project was the first stage of the project, and was launched in 2002, in 
partnership with IT companies Xerox and CableCom Ltd. provided free computer and 
internet access in public libraries in disadvantaged areas. In 2009, the City of Cape Town 
started rolling out broadband fibre networks throughout the metropolitan area and 
building a platform for e-governance, with an estimated investment of R 1.7 billion 
(approximately USD 1.3 billion). 
As the IT infrastructures developed, competition also arose among private investors. 
In 2014, the city signed lease agreements with eight private-service providers, which took 
over portions of the fibre networks, with a commitment to extend connectivity to the 
poorer areas of the city. In 2013, the City of Cape Town; business forum Accelerate Cape 
Town; Wesgro (the agency for tourism, trade and investment in Cape Town and the 
Western Cape) and global consultant PWC had released a publication, entitled Digital 
Gateway to Africa, wherein Cape Town was presented as the African Silicon Valley. The 
publication also showcased numerous reasons for investing in the local IT sector, 
including a young and thriving entrepreneurial scene, business-friendly governance, a 
strong financial sector, excellent universities and, not least, a beautiful place to live. In 
the same year, IBM included Cape Town in its Smart Cities Challenge: a consultancy 
program intended to redesign urban governance in the wake of digitalisation, and sent a 
team of consultants to advise the local administration on how to effectively manage its 
social assets and optimise service delivery. At the same time the townships, created during 
apartheid to segregate black and coloured communities, remain largely underserviced of 
both basic and digital infrastructures. Yet, digital access, albeit limited, has become an 
instrument of organisation and mobilisation for activists, such as the Social Justice 
16 
 
Coalition, that use social media to campaign for townships communities (Odendaal, 
2015). 
As this brief overview suggests, the making of smart cities reflects not only the local 
reception of a set of global techniques but also political strategies and local negotiations. 
In this sense, every smart city is, to some extent, vernacular. Consequently, more than the 
simple replica of a model, digitalisation seems to be a hegemonic terrain; one where a 
range of different and even contradictory processes come into play, overlap and mix up, 
such as new utopias, frontiers of accumulation/extraction, strategies of global placement, 




Failure is Always an Option 
 
When I started this research, it was meant to be something very different. Initially, 
my intention was to study the increasing privatisation of security in the context of urban 
transformations and how security was becoming a field of accumulation itself. This 
explains, in large measure, my choice of research sites. New Town Kolkata and Cape 
Town were both cities where the entanglement between urban remaking and the 
expansion of the security industry was remarkable. India has one of, if not the largest, 
private security industries in the world, employing around five millions guards, mostly 
from the lower strata of society. South Africa, with its tradition of apartheid-rooted 
militias and vigilantes protecting rich white communities from “the black menace,” is 
notoriously one of the places to go for anyone who is interested in researching private 
security. In both Kolkata and Cape Town, massive investments from public and private 
actors have been, and still are reshaping the urban territory and relations. In both cities, 
security was visibly a “big thing.” Barbed wire and cameras surrounded buildings. There 
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were metal detectors and x-ray scanners at the entrances to shopping malls, cinemas, 
hotels, and museums, and private guards everywhere. However, soon after starting my 
fieldwork, I began to sense that things were not working out the way I had expected. The 
more data I collected and informants I interviewed, often spending days observing, taking 
notes, and analysing documents, the more I felt that I was somehow missing the point. It 
is not that there were not relevant and interesting aspects to investigate in the security 
industry and its relationships with the city; on the contrary, my notes were full of 
intriguing clues as to the changing composition of the workforce, the patterns of 
migration, strategies of investments and speculation, and practices of territorial control. 
However, all these elements seemed to be side effects, driven by inputs that I was not yet 
able to understand, but that were clearly pushing and shaping urban relations with great 
force, including security. At a certain point I realised that nothing of what I was seeing 
and analysing made sense, without considering the huge technological, or rather, 
technopolitical transformations that were in process. 
It was not a flash of enlightenment that made my focus change, from urban security 
to smart city projects. Instead, after months of reading my notes over and again, and of 
trying to write chapters that inevitably felt weak, I finally started looking where I had to. 
However there was one moment in particular that kept coming to mind, time and time 
again, while I was struggling to make sense of my material. During an interview with a 
senior officer of a municipal agency in Kolkata, I was asking questions about the private 
security market and the major security issues in the city. At one point he said: “but soon 
we will no longer need security guards (...) we will have the cameras, the sensors, the 
software. We will no longer need guards” (Interview, June 2015). Those words clearly 
pointed towards the fact that the new technological implementations in the city were 
changing the ways in which urban security was conceived and organised. I realised, then, 
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that there was at least some reference to the new smart projects and infrastructures in a 
very large portion of the interviews and notes that I had already gathered. When I asked 
about security and urban transformation, people would inevitably mention at least one of 
the following arguments: that the city was changing (or was about to change) dramatically 
because of smart technologies; that new devices (such as cameras, smartphones, and 
wearables) were changing the ways security was enforced; that increasingly decisions 
were made on the basis of data; or that decisions were automated, or at least, largely 
informed by computational processes. So, the focus of my research shifted from the 
security providers to the processes that were changing ways of thinking about security in 
the city so dramatically. Increasingly, my attention was drawn towards the making of the 
computing infrastructures that smart city projects were generating, and towards the role 
they play in governing the city and in creating value. I started to delve into the functioning 
and logic of algorithms, to understand how knowledge is produced and decisions are made 
across urban platforms. I realised that the speculative logic that informed algorithms drew 
a fil rouge between the operations of territorial government, carried out from control 
rooms, and the profit strategies pursued by commercial players. 
Therefore, this thesis is, in some ways, a story of failure. The first iteration of this 
research turned out to be a dead end, and with it the original design, research questions, 
and methodological strategies. To be completely honest, this failure also meant throwing 
away dozens of hours of my fieldwork, as well as thousands of words of notes, and chapter 
drafts. When I realised that my focus had irreversibly changed, I found myself facing two 
major challenges related to the empirical aspects of the research. Firstly, I wanted to 
include more information, documents, and observations, as well as interviews that were 
more specifically tailored to my new aims. However, at that stage it was impossible to 
obtain extra funding to extend my fieldwork. Luckily, much of the material I needed was 
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available on websites and social networks; and some informants kindly accepted to 
answer my questions via email, Skype, Facebook or WhatsApp. Secondly, many of the 
projects I was studying were still only on paper, works-in-progress or incomplete at the 
time (some are still today). That meant that the only way I could research them was by 
analysing planning documents and advertising material, and by collecting the views of 
relevant informants. Still, I was not able to observe their materialisation or the effects they 
produced in the world. This demanded a thorough and deep reflection on methods, which 




The Making of the Digital Milieu 
 
Cities do not become sentient all at once or by some miraculous effect. They must be 
digitalised. They must undergo a process that is potentially very distant from the smooth 
and seamless ideals of the digital economy. Although “real-time” is one of the key 
principles and buzzwords of digital technologies, digitalisation is not a real-time matter, 
but rather a long, and often tormented, journey. As IBM consultants acknowledged in a 
report entitled A Vision of Smarter Cities: 
 
 
Becoming a “smarter city” is a journey, though, not an overnight transformation. 
Cities must prepare for change that will be revolutionary, rather than evolutionary, 
as they put in place next-generation systems that work in entirely new ways. City 
administrations must decide what activities are core, and, therefore, what they 
should shed, retain or expand into. (Dirks & Keeling 2009) 
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Sweat, grease, dust, excavations, and demolitions are all part of this “revolution.” 
Among other things, digitalisation means imposing an acceleration of time on the 
temporalities of economy, social relations, and mobility, which does not come without 
casualties. In the early days of fibre networks’ spread through (or better, underneath) 
major global cities, Stephen Graham (2001) countered popular ideas about the end of 
distance and about global digital interconnection by drawing attention to the “hard 
material basis for the digital revolution” (p. 405). He showed how space is heavily 
restructured to enable a digital economy and how these new material configurations bring 
about forms of hierarchisation and governance. Graham (2002) pointed to the fact that 
digital companies privileged financial city centres, such as New York, Hong Kong or 
Singapore, in the implementation of fibre optic infrastructures, thus boosting the already 
existing patterns of global inequality. He described how the network architecture also 
affected the real estate market in cities; where a close proximity to the fibre became a 
high-value plus and created digital business districts and clusters, such as fortified data 
storage centres. More recently, the diffusion of ubiquitous computing in cities has inspired 
artists and architects to imagine a range of possible scenarios for urban life, from smart 
infrastructures autonomously enforcing rules and bylaws, to multi-species interactions 
(Shepard, 2011). In 2011, Rob Kitchin and Martin Dodge called for a scholarly focus to 
be put on the specific nexus of software/space as averse to the broader topic of IT. They 
detailed the ways in which software produced our world, through its capturing of 
contingencies in sets of codes and algorithms, thus making an incalculable range of 
operations happen every day. Furthermore, the authors demonstrated how space is 
inherently and actively implicated in code development, as well as the software and socio- 
spatial practices they mutually constitute (Kitchin & Dodge, 2011). 
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In 2016, Kitchin returned to this argument, together with Sung-Yueh Perng, to amend 
it partially and to develop it further. They argue that software and code cannot be isolated, 
either theoretically or practically, nor be investigated separately from their relationships 
with data, infrastructures, interfaces, and users. Conversely, Kitchin and Perng maintain 
that code and software are always situated within a context that is economically, 
politically, and culturally articulated – what Kitchin calls “socio-technical assemblages.” 
A city consists of millions of interconnected socio-technical assemblages, “working in 
concert and contest to transduce the urban condition” (Kitchin & Perng, 2016, p. 21). The 
authors suggest that in order to understand this type of “programmable city” and the digital 
effects on the urban space, code-related issues should be taken into account, such as the 
way software is programmed, what algorithms are empolyed, and what kinds of data are 
used, and how (Kitchin & Perng, 2016). Furthermore, Armin Beverungen and Florian 
Sprenger (2017) suggest that urban computing systems should be examined as 
infrastructure of mediations that are always already logistical networks. There is a logical 
and material continuity between the logistical media that are programmed to manage the 
circulation of people, data, commodities, and capital (Rossiter, 2016) and the 
infrastructures of the smart city. Both speak the language of protocols. Both translate the 
complexity of urban life into algorithms and indicators. Both serve specific strategies of 
territorial governance and economy. 
The restructuring of space, software and code, logistics and protocols, are all lines of 
inquiry that shed light on how smart-city projects reconfigure the urban environment and 
the relations within it. The use of the notion of environment (or milieu) in this thesis draws 
upon Jennifer Gabrys’ (2015) interpretation of Michel Foucault’s (2007) unfinished 
discussion of environmentality as a mode of governance in The Birth of Biopolitics. 
Environmental governmentality, Foucault explained (2008, p. 260; quoted in Gabrys, 
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2015, p. 91), means that the regulation of the conditions of existence in the environment 
 
– “the rules of the game” – rather than individual behaviours or populations – “the 
players” – become the focus of governmental action. In line with Foucault’s arguments, 
Gabrys’ (2015) argues that environmentality suggests a shift in the focus of biopolitics 
from the management of populations, to the management of the conditions within and 
whereby life unfolds in the milieu.1 The latter is what Gabrys renamed Biopolitics. 2.0, 
referring to the role played by digital technologies, and she puts this concept to work to 
make sense of “network, techniques and relations of power” (2015, p. 92) that emerge in 
smart city environments. 
 
 
Lines of Research 
 
This thesis examines the situated tensions and contradictions through which urban 
digital environments – and the modes of life and power relations within them – take shape 
in Kolkata and Cape Town. Critical literature has broadly exposed the darkness that looms 
behind the representation of smart cities  – as smooth, harmonic, inclusive environments 
– which circulates across corporate and government discourses. For example, Stephen 
Graham (2012) draws attention to the military rationale that underpins a large number of 
the digital systems that are increasingly spreading and carrying out surveillance functions 
in urban life. In their work on the smart city project of Songdo, South Korea, Orit Halpern, 
Jesse LeCavalier, Nerea Calvillo and Wolfgang Pietsch (2013; 2015) argue that the inner 
 
 
1 In his book Feed Forward, Mark B. Hansen (2014) discusses the environmental character of 
contemporary media in dialogue with Alfred N. Whitehead’s philosophy, and proposes to situate 
human experience within a continuum of nonhuman and human relations that generates the world 
we live in. Erich Hörl (2017) also elaborates on these themes in the introduction to the edited 
volume, General Ecology: The New Ecological Paradigm, where he reflects on the co-implication 
of natural and technological elements in the making of contemporary environments. 
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logic of extensive urban computing is to monetise and manipulate life to the fullest extent, 
and to create a model of anti-political urban management that could be sold and replicated. 
The increased reliance on data-driven systems, to manage urban components, signals a 
tendency towards technocratic forms of governance, where the complexity of urban life 
and problems are standardised through software parameters (McNeill, 2015), are reduced 
to the functions of data gathering and processing, and are approached merely as technical 
problems (Mattern, 2013; Morozov, 2013). Scholars have also noted how the extensive 
infrastructures of data collection that are managed via a single control room carry the risk 
of creating a panoptic city and a “Big Brother” society, where the privacy, confidentiality 
and freedom of expression of citizens are endangered (Kitchin, 2014; Tufekci 2014; Lyon 
2018). 
In my analysis of New Town and Cape Town, I draw considerably upon the body of 
research reviewed so far, and on the critical aspects it illuminates. At the same time, I take 
up three distinct angles of research: borders, security, and value, which I briefly introduce 
in the remainder of this section. 
I begin my examination of smart city projects by looking at urban digitalisation as a 
bordering process. More specifically, I chart the ways in which the implementation of 
digital infrastructures entrenches existing borders, and creates new ones. As Ishita Dey, 
Ranabir Samaddar and Suhit K. Sen (2013) observe, New Town had turned out be a 
necropolis, a dystopian space where the past – villages and agriculture – had been 
destroyed while the future – of the hi-tech township first, then of the smart city – seemed 
indefinitely suspended. Meanwhile, in the present, most corporate employees leave the 
area as soon as their working hours are done, while local residents are split between those 
who live in the slums and make a living in the informal economy, and those who segregate 
themselves between gated communities and shopping malls. Under the new smart city 
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strategy, the digitalisation of New Town is proceeding under paradoxical conditions, 
where Internet of Things (IoT) technologies are being installed at the same time as large 
areas of the township lack basic services, and parts of the population are unable to access 
the internet on a regular basis. 
Notwithstanding substantial investment and marketing operations, the digital 
landscape of Cape Town remains deeply skewed. With a good deal of urban management 
tasks devolved to public-private partnerships, known as City Improvements Districts 
(CIDs), levels of digital access and integration of services differ remarkably between 
suburbs, depending on the economic and social capabilities of residents. Whereas the 
central city areas are provided with extensive and fast broadband networks, to date, vast 
townships such as Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain rely on only a limited number of Wi- 
Fi hotspots. The growing hubs of the African Silicon Valley coexist with a “subeconomy” 
of informal jobs and markets, townships and makeshifts settlements. 
Smart projects in New Town and Cape Town have not yet produced any cohesive 
urban development; neither economic nor spatial. On the contrary, this thesis will 
illustrate how the implementation of digital infrastructures has taken place so far through 
zoning processes. Digital infrastructures concentrate in clusters and hubs that mark the 
existing patterns of socioeconomic and spatial inequality. Borders proliferate around and 
across these smart zones, which are often highly securitised spaces. Access to digital 
infrastructures is filtered on the basis of class, race, and working positions. Both in New 
Town Kolkata and in Cape Town, large portions of the population – the informal sector 
and the townships’ residents – are kept out of the smart enclaves or only allowed in as 
service labour. In addition, computing technologies in both sites are increasingly 
distributed across the cities to manage urban infrastructures and services, from public 
transport to waste disposal, from security to healthcare. These technologies perform 
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functions such as monitoring, tracking, identification, and profiling. Thus, borders 
become ubiquitous – albeit microscopic or invisible – in the smart city and are embedded 
into everyday activities. I suggest that these ubiquitous borders have the power to affect 
and reconfigure urban dwellers’ forms of perception and engagement. 
As Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2013) argue, borders are dispositifs of 
differential inclusion (as well as exclusion) that stratify and regulate the circulation of 
people and things. Louise Amoore, Stephen Marmura and Mark Salter (2008) make it 
clear how data-driven borders are increasingly permeating social life, and Holger Pötzsch 
(2015) explains how pervasive border techniques set up a socio-technical apparatus of 
control that operates at once at the level of individual targets and of the population. 
Drawing on these lines of research – among many others, reviewed in Chapters 1 and 2 – 
I examine, in this thesis, how bordering processes are constitutive of smart city projects. 
Jennifer Gabrys (2016) argues that computing technologies have ontogenetic effects, in 
that they generate new relations between human and non-human entities, as well as new 
modes of existence. I combine this formulation with Jacques Rancière's (2004) notion of 
the partition of the sensible, which describes the boundaries and norms of perception onto 
which social order is founded, to look at the ways in which ubiquitous borders are creating 
new regimes of visibility and invisibility, licit and illicit, possibilities and limits across the 
smart city. 
Smart city projects, in both New Town Kolkata and Cape Town, include the 
implementation of platforms for urban government. The Smart City Proposal for New 
Town Kolkata presents a future city in which interconnected infrastructures and devices 
are managed via a central control room. The plan also includes the launch of Xpresso, a 
proprietary software for the monitoring and analysis of urban social media. In Cape Town, 
the Emergency Policing and Incident Command (EPIC), launched in 2017, integrates all 
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the urban emergency services into a single platform, powered by SAP HANA. These 
experiments are part of a broader trend, wherein solutions for urban government through 
big data are proliferating in different forms. Major tech companies, such as IBM, CISCO, 
Microsoft, Oracle, and Huawei are providing software for urban platforms, which are 
being installed in cities around the world, from London to Singapore, from New York to 
Dubai. At the same time, research centres, such as the MIT Senseable Lab and the Urban 
Predictive Analytics Lab (UPAL) at the University of British Columbia, are also testing 
data-driven systems, as solutions for urban problems, from mobility and health to poverty. 
Platforms for urban government inscribe the city into a calculative grid, structured by 
the sensors that gather data from the urban environment, and by the algorithms that turn 
these datasets into profiles, models, and decisions. In recent years, scholars have begun to 
examine the epistemic underpinning of data-driven governance critically, as well as the 
specific operations of algorithms. As Shannon Mattern (2015) notes, for example, urban 
platforms reduce the complexity of cities to measurable units and algorithmic 
representation. Data and algorithms are fetishised as a superior source of knowledge and 
as a guarantee of objectivity. Yet, as several authors argue (among others, Gitelman & 
Jackson, 2013; Rosenberg, 2013; Beer, 2018) what is commonly known and used as data 
is the result of specific practices of pre-selection and organisation, as well as the product 
of distinct commercial tools. At the same time, algorithms provide forms of knowledge 
that are highly exposed to bias (O’Neil, 2016; Eubanks, 2018) and which can easily 
reproduce existing patterns of prejudice and discrimination. The calculative procedures 
through which analytics discover (or obscure) patterns are also largely shaped by a 
homophilic logic – “the axiom that similarity breeds connection” (Chun, 2018, p. 60) – 
which tends to reinforce existing assumptions about reality. Louise Amoore (2013) 
observes how the algorithms used for -security decisions seek not to create an evaluation 
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of future probabilities but rather an imagining of future possibilities. In doing so, 
algorithms increasingly incorporate the imagining of the unknown and of the unexpected 
into their models of future events. I argue that the government platforms in Kolkata New 
Town and Cape Town work as apparatuses of speculative security and preemption (de 
Goede, 2012; Amoore, 2013; de Goede et al., 2014), whereby algorithmic models 
continuously seek to anticipate the unfolding of future events and to make them actionable 
in the present. 
Smart city projects redefine not only urban infrastructures, spaces, and techniques of 
government but also how value is extracted from the urban environment. The making of 
the smart city becomes a terrain for investments and speculation, and mobilises economic 
circuits at various levels, from financial players such as investment banks and private 
equity to local entrepreneurs and the service economy. In New Town Kolkata, for 
instance, the new smart city projects – albeit only recently announced – have quickly 
drawn back investors and revamped the real estate market. New, highly financialised 
developments – such as the Bengal Silicon Valley – largely follow the map of land 
grabbing and SEZs that shaped the township in its earlier stages. In Cape Town, the rapid 
growth of a tech start up sector is strongly tied to global circuits of financialisation, and 
venture capital in particular. The nexus of entrepreneurialism and financialisation has an 
impact on the urban environment, as the creation of start up districts is one of the factors 
of gentrification and leads to the expulsion of low-income residents from certain 
neighbourhoods. 
As computing infrastructures concentrate in the urban environment, the city becomes 
a site for intensive data extraction. This thesis analyses the operations of two commercial 
platforms in New Town Kolkata and Cape Town: Uber, the e-hailing app, and Zomato, a 
restaurant aggregator and food delivery service. It shows how these platforms rely on 
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preemptive modelling to maximise the extraction of value from every bit of their 
operations – from logistics and labour control, to customer profiling and tailored 
advertising. These processes are examples of what Evgeny Morozov (2017) describes as 
data extractivism. Yet data extractivism does not occur in a vacuum. To understand how 
value is extracted through data and algorithms in smart cities, it is essential to map the 
wider, deeper geographies of extraction that set up the conditions for smart cities and 
platforms to come to life and operate. In recent years, scholars have shed light on the 
connections between digital economies and extractive processes, from the mining and 
drilling industries that literally feed digital economies, to the forms in which energies, 
attention and emotions are squeezed out the bodies of workers and digital users (Mezzadra 
& Neilson, 2017; Crawford & Joler, 2018; Couldry & Mejias, 2018). Drawing on these 
and other critical accounts, I illustrate how the making of smart cities, and the forms of 
data extractivism that take place in them, are inherently and variously articulated with 




Outline of the Thesis 
 
This thesis is organised into four chapters. Chapter 1 provides a map of the conceptual 
and methodological reflections that have shaped this research. It outlines the key themes 
explored in the thesis, reviews the theoretical positions that have inspired my analysis, 
and discusses the challenges and decisions that determined my research methods. 
Each of the ensuing three chapters is dedicated to one of the key themes of my 
research into the making of smart cities: borders, security, and value. Each chapter 
contains several sections where a literature review, analysis of data, and theoretical 
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reflections are combined, to discuss critical examples and concepts. These three chapters 
are logically interconnected to develop my analysis of how smart city projects and 
computing infrastructures (seek to) inscribe the city into a speculative grid, where 
algorithmic models become the foundations of both government and value-extraction. 
Chapter 2, on borders, challenges the mainstream narrative of smart cities as 
harmonious, seamlessly interconnected environments and, instead, shows how 
digitalisation marks new borders, or intersects existing ones, within the urban space. 
Drawing on critical literature, I explain how the established “smart city” narrative is based 
on two key assumptions: 1) that with automation comes (more) efficiency, safety and 
sustainability for all; and 2) that the integration of infrastructure and data proceed 
smoothly. These narratives were first crafted by IBM in the last decade, and were quickly 
adopted by industrial competitors, governmental agencies, NGOs, the media and 
academics. The projects for turning New Town Kolkata and Cape Town into smart cities, 
albeit different in many ways, both incorporated the mainstream rhetoric at a discursive 
and visual level. In contrast to that narrative, I explore how smart cities incorporate zoning 
technologies and describe how borders regulate access to technologies and spaces, thus 
creating different regimes of citizenship and labour. Concurrently, smart infrastructures 
distribute border techniques – identification, authorisation, and profiling – pervasively, 
across every domain of urban life. 
In Chapter 3, I discuss how smart cities are governed through computing 
technologies. I examine two platforms of urban government: the Emergency Policing and 
Incident Command (EPIC) in Cape Town and the Xpresso software for social media 
monitoring in New Town. I illustrate how algorithms continuously create models of urban 
components, risks, and future events, in order to enable preemptive action. I argue that 
the notion of speculative security accounts for the modalities whereby cities are rendered 
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through algorithmic modelling, which are hypothetical and oriented to make the future 
actionable at the same time. 
In Chapter 4, I focus on the strategies of value extraction in smart cities, which rely 
on the logic and infrastructure of speculative security. Data, algorithmic models, and 
preemption are vital to business platforms, such Uber and Zomato, in order to control 
labour and (try to) steer users’ actions. I suggest that data extractivism cannot be seen as 
a stand-alone process. The complementary notions of urban extractivism and extractive 
urbanism are valuable for understanding how the extraction of value, from data and 
algorithms, in smart cities is indissociable from a broader interconnection of finance, 
gentrification, labour, and appropriation of resources. 
Across these chapters, this thesis draws attention to the ways in which computing 
infrastructures (be they already operating, under construction or still on paper) are 
generating new relations in the urban environment. These relations are of different natures 
– socio-spatial, governmental, and economic – and are shaped by the tensions between 
global tendencies and situated contingencies. In its outlining of these relations, this thesis 












This chapter presents a map of the themes, theoretical challenges, and research 
strategies that have shaped this thesis. In the Introduction, I outlined the three major lines 
of investigation that I develop across the thesis: the bordering processes that are 
constitutive of urban digitalisation; the logic and operations of platforms for urban 
government; and the dynamics of value extraction that emerge in smart city projects. I 
also recounted the serendipitous circumstances through which I decided to conduct my 
research on smart city projects in two sites, New Town Kolkata and Cape Town, which 
complicate and question the mainstream narratives of urban digitalisation. 
The chapter begins by positioning my research sites within debates on planetary 
urbanisation and postcolonial urbanism, and by reviewing how elements of the 
postcolonial and postapartheid conditions have defined my research angles. In the 
following three sections of this chapter, I reflect on the key themes that emerged in my 
research: zones and borders, data, algorithms and security, digitalisation and extractive 
strategies. I discuss the literature and debates that helped me to frame my analysis, and 
begin to delineate my conceptual positions. The last three sections present the 
methodological challenges that I encountered and the strategies that I adopted in my 
research. I had to combine different lines of research and theoretical constellations; study 
projects that were often in their speculative or experimental form; and to try to grasp the 
relations between stratified, often dispersed, or inaccessible processes. 
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The Research Sites 
 
Digitalisation is transforming urban government and value extraction on a global 
scale, albeit with different levels of concentration and intensity. Given this, cities – and 
especially smart cities in the making, such as the two cases examined in this thesis – are 
sites where the relations between computing technologies, security, and economy are 
particularly intense and tangible. I was drawn to New Town Kolkata and Cape Town 
precisely because of the visibility of these relations, even though my research later took 
an unexpected direction. I am interested in cities as political territories and as laboratories 
for processes that exceed the urban scale. 
The manner in which I look at smart cities is strongly influenced by the work of 
critical urban theorists, Neil Brenner and Christian Schmidt, among others. Brenner and 
Schmidt (2012; 2014) argue that, in the wake of the global transformations that have 
occurred over the past decades, cities can no longer be conceptualised and researched as 
discrete, bounded types of settlement; rather they need to be positioned within processes 
of planetary urbanisation that include urban sprawling, infrastructural projects and logistic 
routes, extractive practices, and environmental degradation. In agreement with Ananya 
Roy’s (2011) remarks, I believe that the perspective of planetary urbanisation must not 
prescribe a single, Western-centric narrative and should make space for the appreciation 
of the situated urban experiments and networks of infrastructures and value, that are taking 
place across the Global South. Moreover, urban environments present a concentration of 
infrastructures and social relations that become the objects of governmental techniques 
(Klauser, Paasche & Söderström 2014) and strategies of capitalist appropriation (Rossi, 
2016; 2017) that emerge in smart city projects. 
Given these perspectives, it is not my aim to provide an exhaustive account of one or 
two urban sites, as self-sufficient research objects. Whereas I am indebted to the many 
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urban ethnographies, which have accurately described how smart city projects and smart 
infrastructures develop in context, it is not the purpose of my research to conduct an urban 
ethnography or to make a comparative study of smart cities. Rather, in describing the 
making of smart cities in New Town and Cape Town, my focus is on the articulation of 
processes involving corporate strategies, border techniques, algorithmic machines, 
security apparatuses, financialisation, and extractive practices, which are happening on a 
planetary scale, but concentrate and coalesce in specific urban experiments. Smart cities 
in general – and my research sites in particular – are analytical entry points, which make 
visible the transformations in governmental rationalities and capitalist operations that are 
broader than any urban system. In this thesis, my intention is not to dismiss the importance 
of grasping situated dynamics or to automatically subsume them into abstract macro- 
categories. In fact, in my fieldwork I sought to document how site-specific factors affect 
and differentiate the progress of digitalisation as accurately as possible. In so doing, my 
focus was always aimed at illuminating relations, intersections, and disconnections on a 
global dimension, and not on saturating the information of a single site or making a 
comparison between the two. 
Jennifer Robinson (2002) warns that positioning cities within planetary networks 
poses the risk of reproducing and reinforcing global hierarchies of power and capital. As 
mentioned earlier, Ananya Roy (2011) calls for the dislocation of theoretical production, 
away from a prevailing Euro-American focus. Although there have been changes, in the 
almost ten years since Roy’s article, and although the body of literature produced in and 
on cities in the Global South has grown considerably, a focus on the Global North still 
prevails in many of the research fields I cross in this study, from security to urban 
digitalisation and data extractivism. 
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The empirical research for this thesis was conducted in cities that are not really 
“central” or “leading,” according to the mainstream classifications of smart cities. More 
precisely, Cape Town is often hailed as the digital capital of Africa, a title on which both 
the local government and corporate circles are desperately trying to capitalise. However, 
this classification is defined much more by its contrast with the assumed backwardness of 
the African continent, rather than by its similarity to “real” global capitals, such as London 
or Singapore. For its part, Kolkata is, according to common indicators1, almost a synonym 
for urban disaster, and one of the least smart cities in the world at present. Nevertheless, 
while I was completing my preliminary research, to identify suitable case studies, I was 
impressed by the amount of investment and political energy that had been given to 
transforming these cities through digital technologies. Importantly, the stories of New 
Town Kolkata and Cape Town, despite their differences, strongly challenge the popular 
narratives of smart cities as smoothly interconnected spaces, as detailed in Chapter 2. 
More exactly, they reveal how urban digitalisation proceeds through conflicts and 
contradictions, interruptions and violence, and experiments and errors, which are, at once, 
historically situated and linked to a variety of broader processes, ranging from venture 
capital investments to the commercialisation of predictive analytics software. Of course, 
these dynamics are not exclusive to my research sites, and are features of urbanisation 
that take place in different forms and levels of intensity in cities of the Global North. 
However, in Kolkata and Cape Town, digitalisation intersects elements – colonial 
legacies, structural poverty and inequality, spatial segregation and racial discrimination – 
that are specific to the postcolonial (and postapartheid, in Cape Town) conditions of these 
cities. Aihwa Ong (2011) argues that global capitalism and postcolonialism are two 
 
 
1 Here I refer to rankings produced by different sources, such as the United Nations, private research 
agencies such as the Economist Intelligence Unit and media outlets, such as Forbes. 
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specular paradigms in urban studies (one posed cities in the Global North as the site of 
capitalist accumulation, whereas the other looked at cities in the Global South merely as 
places of subaltern resistance) within which the complexity and heterogeneity of cities get 
lost. Although I follow, in part, Ong’s argument, my aim in researching two postcolonial 
cities is not to confirm or question what is postcolonial about them, or “the postcolonial” 
as a category. Instead, I am concerned with what examples from these two cities illustrate 
about a number of theoretical problems and how they help to forge new concepts At the 
same time, I believe that the postcolonial and postapartheid critique both define a set of 
problems that cannot be easily dismissed. These problems provided a starting point for 
my analysis, but not a conceptual boundary; in other words, the postcolonial and 
postapartheid angles helped me to frame the processes and conditions that I registered 
during my research, but never became an exclusive, self-sufficient interpretation of urban 
processes. 
For decades, Kolkata, on the margins of which New Town is being built, has been a 
laboratory of postcolonial thinking. The political humus, endless struggles and profound 
paradoxes of the city have fuelled – directly or indirectly – some of the most significant 
debates on capitalist development, modernity, and governmentality, among other themes. 
Dey et al. (2013) analyse the creation of New Town Kolkata, through the lens of the 
repetition of primitive accumulation, with its processes of land grabbing and the 
destruction of local communities. The centrality of the moment of primitive accumulation 
has been identified by Kanyal Sanyal (2007) as one of the defining conditions of 
postcolonial capitalism. Sanyal deconstructs the long-established narrative of capitalism 
as a linear, teleological process, focussing on at least two constitutive aporias of capitalist 
development: the continuous repetition of the moment of primitive accumulation, as 
defined by the appropriation of lands and resources and the dispossession of their previous 
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owners; and the resulting production of a surplus population that was not absorbed in the 
capitalist system as waged labour. This surplus creates circuits of informal economy – in 
Sanyal’s words, subsistence or need economy – that are at the margins of capitalist 
relations, but which are simultaneously incorporated into the market, via governmental 
techniques, such as micro-credit, which is enacted by both the private and public sector. 
Sanyal writes that the tension between the recursive violence of primitive accumulation, 
with its devastating consequences on the lives of the dispossessed mark the attempts to 
mitigate the effects of this violence, through forms of poverty management, are what 
define postcolonial governmentality (Sanyal, 2007). Only a few years before Sanyal’s 
intervention, Partha Chatterjee (2004) situated his analysis of the “the political society” 
in this same governmental terrain. Chatterjee explains that it was only through an endless 
process of negotiations and mobilisations, where the boundaries between legality and 
illegality were more than blurred, that the dispossessed were able to affirm – albeit always 
precariously – their needs and rights, which would otherwise not be granted by the legal 
framework. 
Abdoumaliq Simone (2001) argues that colonial urbanism shaped cities so they 
would act on bodies and social formations (p. 18) in order to maintain relations of 
subalternity. Today, the masses of dispossessed, which live in slums alongside corporate 
buildings and shopping malls, embody the heterogeneity of time that defines the 
postcolonial (urban) condition, where advanced capitalism and the need economy, as well 
as privilege and destitution, civil rights and political society coexist in uneasy and always 
mobile relations. Notwithstanding, and as both Ong (2011) and Roy (2011) argue, the 
analysis of postcolonial urbanism must move beyond the narrative of slums and poverty, 
to encompass the “worlding” strategies that unfold across economies and urban 
expansion, and which are remaking informal and formal networks. Over the past two 
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decades, Kolkata – together with other major Indian cities (Searle, 2016) – has been 
undergoing processes of “urban renewal”2 that aim to catch up with global models of 
infrastructures and consumption (Banerjee-Guha, 2009). The “world-class” city is, 
Banerjee-Guha argues, fundamentally a neoliberal project, where private investments 
are favoured through land deregulation and the weakening of democratic control over 
administrative processes. As a result, the fragmentation and unevenness of urban 
development is exacerbated, because the creation of world-class sites across the city is 
linked to the displacement and/or dispossession of hawkers, street dwellers, and 
informal settlements. The early stages of the development of New Town Kolkata can be 
seen through the lens of the world-class city strategy. The creation of a township of IT 
hubs, gated communities, luxury hotels, and shopping malls was meant to fulfil 
aspirations of global business and lifestyle, but at the cost of forcing local residents off 
their lands and out of their livelihoods. 
In the debate about postcolonial capitalism, governmentality and urbanism, the 
making of New Town Kolkata represents a significant case study. Both Chatterjee and 
Sanyal wrote about it, confirming their respective analytical frameworks. Chatterjee 
(2004) illustrates how some land owners were able to negotiate their resettlement and 
compensation through the mechanisms of political society, by stretching the legal 
boundaries of their counterpart through collective claims. In their account, Bhattacharya 
and Sanyal (2011) stress how the process of primitive accumulation led to the creation of 
a local need economy that needs to negotiate its conditions of existence and reproduction 
under the perennial threat of eviction. However, as Dey et al. (2013) observe, both these 
accounts fail to acknowledge the violence involved in the process of land acquisition in 
 
 




Rajarhat. In addition, they suggest that, at least in this particular case, the violence of 
accumulation was beyond management and could not be reabsorbed within the 
governmental framework that had been described by Sanyal (2007) and Chatterjee (2004) 
Rather, this violence produced an excess that manifested in various forms of struggle – 
from physical confrontation and sabotage to legal battles – and which still haunts and 
unsettles the development of the township (Dey et al., 2013). 
In the history of Cape Town, four centuries of colonial rule were followed by five 
decades of a home-grown apartheid regime. In the postapartheid context, the enduring 
legacies of colonisation merge with the effects of the systemic segregation and economic 
marginalisation of the black and coloured population. As Achille Mbembe (2015) writes, 
twenty years after the end of apartheid, formal equality before the law corresponds to 
sharp inequalities between black and whites. Moreover, “the white propertied class” has 
not lost its structural privilege. They may have lost their political power, Mbembe argues, 
but “they did not die as a class” (p. 11) and, as a class, they actively engage in relegating 
racism to the past, refusing to acknowledge racial segregation as a persisting cause of 
inequality between blacks and whites. Certainly, postapartheid politics have taken shape, 
over the past two decades, around the imperative to overcome structural inequalities, 
poverty, and racial divides. Yet this agenda has generated ambiguous instruments and 
results. Andries Du Toit (2012) notes how, after the end of apartheid, pro-poor policies, 
such as the significant redistributive expenditures for infrastructures, service provisions 
and social welfare payments, benefited from wide consensus among South African 
political forces and society. However, poverty discourses were actually articulated in 
ways that tended to depoliticise poverty by disconnecting its causes from sedimented 
inequalities and social conflicts, and by overlooking the agency of the poor. In 
postapartheid politics, Du Toit explains, the government of poverty is a political project, 
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which seeks “to ameliorate and contain its worst political and social effects, while 
stopping short of challenging the social processes and arrangements that perpetuate and 
entrench it” (Du Toit 2012, p. 6). Furthermore, pro-poor policies are part of a political 
contract whereby the provisioning of resources towards specific groups secures the 
grounds of power to political organisations. 
James Ferguson (2010; 2015) observes how distributive, pro-poor measures – such 
as cash transfers to low-income individuals – have become embedded in a neoliberal 
narrative according to which this money would empower individuals to enter the market 
as entrepreneurial actors. More generally, the promotion of entrepreneurialism, as a 
strategy to ensure economic growth and social justice, is a defining element of 
postapartheid governmentality. Various technologies of poverty management have been 
experimented with, especially in the townships, at the intersections between NGOs, 
entrepreneurial incubators, and microfinance (Roy, 2011; Pollio, 2019c). Concurrently, 
aggressive dynamics of urban accumulation have constantly manifested in the enclosure 
of public spaces and in the gentrification of former low-income neighbourhoods that mark 
Cape Town’s attempts to meet world-class standards and to position itself as a node of 
global circuits of capital (McDonald, 2012). For McDonald (2012), postapartheid Cape 
Town has been redesigned as a site of capitalist accumulation, within a neoliberal 
framework that reproduces and reinforces existing patterns of economic and racial divide. 
The transformation of Cape Town into a smart city condenses the fluctuation and tensions 
of postapartheid politics between a social justice agenda – albeit declined in 
entrepreneurial forms – and capitalist strategies. Institutional discourses present smartness 
as a solution to achieve inclusion, create jobs, improve public services and, ultimately, to 
democratise urban life. In parallel, the creation of digital infrastructures and tech hubs is 
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a catalyst for venture capital and commercial platforms, which see the smart city as a field 
for value extraction. 
The postcolonial perspectives of New Town Kolkata and Cape Town, reviewed so 
far, shed light on the ways in which the historical processes of colonisation, dispossession 
and segregation have shaped the economic dynamics, social environments, and forms of 
urbanisation that are analysed in this research. More specifically, postcolonial critiques 
frame the fundamental contradictions – between capitalist accumulation and 
dispossession, poverty relief and persistent inequality, intense urban development and 
polarisation – among which smart city projects are taking shape. In both Kolkata and Cape 
Town, digitalisation is not a linear transition from a stage of infrastructural, social, and 
economic development to a more advanced one, as commercial and political narratives 
often suggest. Rather, the making of smart cities is an uneven, disruptive process, where 
the different regimes of time, space, and urbanism, merge and collide. In this thesis, I 




Zones and Borders 
 
Smart cities are commonly presented as harmonious environments, wherein people 
and infrastructures are seamlessly interconnected. IBM presents the smart city as a mere 
combination of three layers, the three “I’s”: Instrumentation (sensing technologies) + 
Interconnection of data + Intelligence (analytics). It also assumes that the different urban 




In the past ten years, the smart city label and discourse have travelled across various 
competitors in the IT industry, as well as government agencies, NGOs, academic circles, 
and media outlets; however, the IBM model has largely remained hegemonic. The smart 
city plans of New Town and Cape Town are no exception. Albeit differently structured, 
they both subscribe to the mainstream rhetoric that equates extensive digitalisation with 
an improvement of collective conditions. I challenge this narrative in my research and 
draw attention, instead, to the ways in which digitalisation incorporates, rather than 
reverses, situated patterns of discrimination, while creating new ones. 
Several studies have already addressed the problems of urban borders; for example 
as a constitutive feature of the urban space (Breitung, 2011); as socio-spatial demarcation 
between different areas and identities: i.e. minority ethnic groups (Kokalanova, 2013); 
migrant communities versus citizens (Fauser, 2019); or wealthy versus poor (Caldeira, 
1996). In the making of smart cities, I identify borders that work alongside (and across) 
technologies and infrastructure. They are sometimes visible, but more often mobile and 
elusive; however, they can also be pervasive. As Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) make 
clear, borders largely exceed popular representations, such as walls, checkpoints or lines 
on the map. They are complex, ever-shifting configurations of infrastructures, law and 
conflicts, bodies and code(s). Borders proliferate within (as well as between) national 
territories, enforcing different regimes of citizenship, labour, temporality, and mobility. 
This thesis argues that smart cities are created through zoning technologies, enclaves, 
hubs, and clusters. Zones need borders. In New Town, the map of planned or work-in- 
progress smart infrastructures coincides largely with the existing Special Economic 
Zones, the gated business parks, and apartment complexes. It leaves out large groups of 
the population, especially the slum dwellers and the informal sector. In Cape Town, 
digitalisation concentrates in the central business districts, the wealthy (and mostly white) 
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neighbourhoods and the gentrified areas, whereas the black townships remain without 
essential services. 
These zones are demarcated by different types of borders. At the most visible level, 
typically, security guards and CCTV regulate access to these privileged precincts, keeping 
those who are not authorised (or who show obvious signs of poverty) out or under strict 
control. There are, however, other, more elusive mechanisms of filter and control at work. 
For example, the workers in the smart enclaves are subject to very different regimes of 
salary and mobility, depending on their roles and skills. A number of institutions – 
including social programs, charities and NGOs, and business incubators – de facto 
regulate and stratify access to digital technologies, such as computers, smartphones, and 
the internet, for large sectors of the population. If, as has been well-established in 
literature, borders at once connect and divide, this is very true of the smart infrastructure, 
in a literal sense. In the smart city, the extensive interconnection of objects, 
infrastructures, and people enacts mechanisms of filter and control. Activities as mundane 
as taking a bus or throwing away the garbage involve practices of screening, tracking, 
identification, authorisation, and profiling. This constitutes a more advanced level of 
pervasive bordering processes, as smart technologies continually encode, sort, 
differentiate and hierarchise the urban environment. 
As William Walters (2002) makes clear, geopolitical and national borders are being 
increasingly complemented by biopolitical borders that run within and across national 
territories and which are concerned with regulating the “movements, health and security” 
(p. 571) of populations. Thus, borders constitute a networked and diffuse apparatus of 
control that employs various technologies to acquire information about, and to codify, 
populations. For Walters, borders are sites where “power is produced” (p. 572), insofar as 
they do not only “act on a population that is already fully given” but “contribute to the 
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production of population as a knowable, governable entity” (p. 573). Although Walters’ 
analysis focuses on the European space in the wake of the Schengen agreement, its key 
arguments take into account a general tendency that has been largely echoed in literature. 
Amoore, Marmura and Salter (2008), also observe how increasingly data-driven borders 
are proliferating across different spaces and realms of society. Writing about the post-9/11 
transformations in security practices, they argue that “The contemporary border is 
constituted as much by data-flows, artificial zones and spaces of enclosure that seep into 
the city and the neighbourhood, as by older state and geographic boundaries.” More 
recently, Holger Pötzsch (2015) suggests that, as bordering processes become 
increasingly microscopic and embedded in everyday, mundane practices, they form a 
pervasive socio-technical apparatus that he calls the iBorder. The iBorder is composed of 
“technologies of biometric identification, digital tracking and algorithmic mapping that 
afford both an individualizing and a massifying trajectory” (2018, p. 102) and it combines 
targeted tracking and profiling with population-level systems of surveillance and pattern 
extraction. 
The lines of research outlined above – on zones and enclaves, biopolitical and smart 
borders – all contribute to framing my analysis of the making of digital environments. In 
sum, this thesis will show how various bordering processes – more or less visible, more 
or less material, and more or less digital – are inherent to the making of smart cities, and 
are linked to a range of social and political implications. 
 
Models, Preemption, Speculation 
 
Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier (2013) define the term, datafication, 
as the transformation of social interaction into quantified data, which allows for predictive 
analytics and modelling. In this process, dataism is emerging as an ideology of data as the 
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medium to superior knowledge (Van Dijck, 2014). However, (big) data, as Mark Burdon 
and Mark Andrejevic (2016) explain, do not actually exist outside the infrastructure that 
collects and analyses them. In other words, there is no inherent substance of data that is 
separable from the material and mathematical processes of extraction and interpretation. 
Therefore, big data should be seen, not as information, but as “a series of interconnected 
and embedded infrastructures” (2016, p. 64), including sensors, networks, servers and 
computers, software and analytics; or, in short, platforms. 
Put together, datafication and dataism define a practical and epistemic paradigm for 
understanding and predicting human and non-human behaviour, which is increasingly 
being applied to every domain of life, including cities. Dietmar Offenhuber and Carlo 
Ratti (2014), from the MIT Senseable City Lab, write: “Data allows us to model the highly 
dynamic nature of cities, their social life, and their infrastructure networks at an 
unprecedented level of detail” (2014, p. 13). The keyword here is model. Modelling is an 
algorithmic operation that processes data, to achieve several possible results, including 
classification, anomaly detection, recommendation, and prediction. Predictive analytics 
are able to model a wide range of future scenarios, to detect threats and to make decisions. 
Following the path that IBM opened, other companies, such as Oracle, Cisco, Huawei, 
Intel, and Accenture, are competing to sell their urban analytics packages on a global 
scale. Academic research groups also promote modelling as a superior way of gaining 
knowledge about cities, and address issues such as pollution, congestion and inequality. 
For example, the MIT Senseable City Lab has partnered with the government of Singapore 
and with insurer and asset management firm, Allianz, to simulate future scenarios where 
self-driving cars share parking lots, in order to reduce urban traffic (MIT Senseable City 
Lab, 2018). In Cambridge, MA, the Lab has experimented with a “smart sewage platform 
to monitor urban health,” which generates early warnings of outbreaks of disease and 
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other health risk factors (MIT Senseable City Lab, 2015). The Urban Predictive Analytics 
Lab (UPAL) at the University of British Columbia is applying deep learning techniques 
to satellite images of North American cities, to predict complex socioeconomic features, 
such as poverty.3 UPAL is also running The Neighborhood Change Project, in partnership 
with the University of Washington, which combines urban analytics with statistics, 
sociology, health, and policy research, to measure “the effects of neighborhood change 
and segregation on racial and socioeconomic differences in health, housing, migration, 
and poverty” in Seattle, Vancouver, and Surrey.4 
Whether for profit, for scientific progress or for the “social good,” predictive 
analytics are winning over cities at a very rapid pace. Despite this, algorithms are neither 
completely reliable, nor innocent. In her study on the automation of public service 
programs in the US, such as welfare benefits, homeless support, and child welfare, 
Virginia Eubanks (2018) finds that new algorithmic technologies of poverty management 
are “shaped by our nation’s fear of economic insecurity and hatred of the poor; they in 
turn shape the politics and experience of poverty” (2017, pp. 6–7). Through these 
instruments, Eubanks notes, the US is building a “digital poorhouse,” where marginalised 
groups are the object of more intensive data collection, scrutiny and surveillance, and have 
a new discipline of scoring, risk profiles and red flags imposed upon them (Eubanks, 
2018). 
Not only are analytics biased and politically performative but they are also highly 
abstract and, often, self-referential. Data scientist Cathy O’Neil (2016), is very clear that 
the predictive models that more and more govern people’s lives are nothing more than 
opinion embedded in algorithms. They reflect ideologies, prejudices, and goals. They 
 
 
3 See: https://www.urbanpredictiveanalytics.com/projects 
 
4 See: https://www.cascadiadata.org/projects/neighborhood-change-project 
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incorporate blind spots (aspects that are deliberately ignored); use data proxies to fill in 
for the lack of authentic data; and legitimate themselves via a feedback loop that, all too 
often, has no ties with the real life of people and things. O’Neil is blunt about it noting 
that frequently algorithmic systems “define their own reality and use it to justify their 
results. This type of model is self-perpetuating, highly destructive—and very common” 
(2016, p. 16). 
As algorithms and platforms are implemented into the urban environment, they 
incorporate and act upon pre-existing conditions of segregation, discrimination, and 
vulnerability. The ever-incumbent and ever present risk is for platforms to encode 
(literally) and automate marginalising and exploitative practices. Stephen Graham (2005) 
already warned us several years ago, when writing about facial recognition and 
geographical information systems (GIS), that software sorts the city and (re)configures 
social and power relations. Today, as computing systems grow in power and 
pervasiveness, the need to unpack the algorithmic operations that increasingly govern 
urban life is becoming even more pressing. 
To analyse these new modalities of algorithmic urban government, I draw upon 
Michel Foucault’s discussion of the emergence of security as a distinct technique of urban 
government. On January 25 1978, Michel Foucault concluded his introduction to the 
problem of security with these words: 
(…) it really is the problem of the town that is, I think, at the heart of these 
different examples of mechanisms of security. And if it is true that the outline of 
the very complex technology of securities appeared around the middle of the 
eighteenth century, I think that it is to the extent that the town posed new and 
specific economic and political problems of government technique.” (Foucault, 




In this, one of his most influential courses at the College de France, Foucault is trying 
to convey the shift in the articulation of space, economy, and politics in the city. In the 
wake of the industrialisation of the 19th century, the city was bringing forward a set of 
dynamic issues – overcrowding, epidemics, scarcity, etc. – that did not fit into the “static” 
model of sovereignty, which was defined by the conquering, demarcating and holding 
together of a physical space. Today, the fast pace of urban digitalisation and the 
unprecedented diffusion of computing infrastructures are generating new techniques of 
government and accumulation that are based on extensive data-mining and algorithmic 
models. In this thesis, I do not intend to dwell on improbable historical comparisons, but 
rather to take up and develop the problems (formulated by Foucault) of urban 
transformation, security, and economy in the making of smart cities. 
Foucault argues that security is the distinctive, flexible array of techniques that 
emerged together with massive urbanisation, at the beginning of industrial revolution, in 
order to govern the city as an economic and political centre. It is the complex, ambiguous 
political status of cities, in relation to other competing political spaces – the nation-state, 
above all – and economic processes that trigger the progressive materialisation of security 
as a political rationality. From the Greek polis to the Italian city states, cities were eminent 
political sites wherein different forms of organisation - republics, leagues of commune or 
city states - were elaborated and tested. The pre-modern city had a clear spatial status: it 
was a micro-cosmos, a definite unit separated from the outside (the rural areas) by neat 
borders (walls) with specific military, economic, and symbolic functions. 
How to govern the urban space, Foucault suggests, has only become a problem with 
modernity. It is a problem of openness, movement, and hybridity or, more practically, of 
sanitation, health, labour, crime, and resources. The walls of the fortified town were taken 
down, in the eighteenth century, to let in the multitudes of new industrial workers and 
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rural dispossessed. Thereafter, new strategies began to be tested and deployed to contain 
and balance the potential risks of this new urban crowd: from outbreaks to uprisings and 
from famine to fires. This apparatus of investigations, calculations, and technologies, 
when applied to the motion of people and things, defines the domain of security. Unlike 
methods of surveillance and discipline, which Foucault analysed earlier in his research 
path, this new rationality does not aim to keep subjects fixed in places, identities or roles. 
Security let people and things move; makes them move, and then moves with them. 
The emergence of a new extensive, technological framework – the digitalisation of 
the urban space – raises questions about how the domain of security is being 
comprehensively redefined. Foucault makes it clear that the development of the security 
apparatus coincided with a series of devices, artefacts, and instruments that became 
available and started producing effects of knowledge, at some point of time. How is this 
apparatus being redefined by and through computing technologies? How are the ever- 
accelerating, often paradoxical spaces of the smart city-in-the-making governed? What 
kind of security techniques are produced through digital instruments and algorithms? 
What forms of knowledge, calculation, and preemption are involved? 
Foucault teaches that the use of methods of calculation, surveillance, and control on 
the urban population is nothing new. However, the nature of the new methods of 
algorithmic calculation and digital border technologies does contain some significant 
changes. In her History of Reason and Vision since 1945, Orit Halpern (2015, p. 25) 
argued that: “cybernetics is a science of control or prediction of future events and 
actions.” Louise Amoore (2017, p. 4) comments on this, saying that this statement 
confirms that algorithmic computation is part of the (recent) history of security practices 
and contemporary modes of security calculation do not create an epistemic break with the 
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past. Nevertheless, today’s combination of sentient devices and algorithmic processes is 
able to bring computation to unprecedented levels of depth and pervasiveness. 
In my analysis of security logics and practices, I am particularly indebted to the work 
that Louise Amoore and Marieke de Goede have carried out, over the past few years, both 
separately and as co-authors. The ways in which future uncertainties and possibilities are 
calculated, represented and made available for security decisions are fundamental to the 
security framework that Amoore and de Goede explore. In her book The Politics of 
Possibility, Louise Amoore (2013) explains how security decisions, based on extensive 
data mining and algorithms, seek to draw out and anticipate an array of future possibilities 
that exceed probabilities based on past data. Amoore writes: “Risk technologies have, at 
their heart, a particular relationship to the future. They hold out the promise of managing 
uncertainty and making an unknowable and indeterminate future knowable and 
calculable” (2013, p. 6). Calculations are no longer informed by strict probability, “by the 
deductive proving or disproving of scientific and statistical data but by the inductive 
incorporation of suspicion, imagination, and preemption” (2013, p. 10). 
Within this framework, preemption emerges as a distinctive mode of government. In 
Foucauldian terms, preemption is a modality of intervention in the milieu, not meant to 
stop single events, but to (re)arrange the elements in order to influence the unfolding of 
future events. Under this perspective, “facts” (or whatever was agreed to be considered 
facts), as a basis for decisions and actions, are replaced by algorithmic models. 
One of the key concepts of this research is speculative security. It was first proposed 
by Marieke de Goede (2012) in her study of the pursuit of terrorist money following the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11. Similar to Amoore, de Goede looks at security through a 
Foucauldian lens, as a technology of the future that seeks to calculate and act upon a series 
of possible events. De Goede examines security as a technique of government that has an 
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intimate connection to, and a genealogical affiliation with, finance, going back to the 
colonial enterprises of the fifteenth century. In the domains of security and finance, the 
future is a terrain that needs to be colonised in order to gain profit, be it in the form of 
money or political control. The notion of speculative security speaks to this ambiguity, 
but it also refers to the ways in which distinct imaginaries – of threats, enemies, and 
catastrophes – need to be mobilised and incorporated into the security calculations, in 
order to set up a visual field, wherein security decisions can be taken. 
I believe this perspective encompasses the current logic of security well beyond the 
case study of terrorist money. In my research, I have appropriated the notion of speculative 
security and put it at work to make sense of the logics and practices of government that 
emerge from urban computing networks. As Amoore (2013) notes, speculation is 
somehow built into the algorithmic inferences that are increasingly entrusted to profile 
and predict urban futures. Indeed, as I explain in Chapter 3 of this thesis, the statistical 
inferences, through which the different families of algorithms operate in urban 
management software and control rooms, tend to formulate hypothesis rather than provide 
factual evidence (Aradau, 2015). At the same time, the dual meaning of speculative, 
stretching between security and finance; and the entanglement of security and economy 
that both Amoore and de Goede note, albeit from different perspectives, define important 
aspects of my research. However, the focus of my analysis is not on the relationship 
between the state and commercial actors or, as in de Goede, (supposedly) jihadist financial 
networks, but on the ways in which the computing infrastructures of smart cities 
simultaneously serve both government decisions and value extraction; and how 





Data, we read and hear everywhere, is “the new oil.” All too frequently, this metaphor 
is used as a cliché, to assert broadly the fact that data are crucial for the global economy. 
Whereas the oil metaphor draws attention to the extractive nature of the data industry, in 
this respect, it is both accurate and misleading. On one hand, data is not like oil at all, in 
that is not a natural substance that can be drilled out of its own niche in the ecosystem. In 
line with Geoffrey Bowker (2005) and Lisa Gitelman and Virginia Jackson (2013), I 
maintain that there is no such thing as “raw data.” Data do not just exist “out there,” but 
are always first imagined as data, and then generated (Manovich, 2001) through distinct 
media and practices. On the other hand, even if it is not raw material, data still need to be 
extracted from bodies, objects, social interactions, and/or – for the purpose of this research 
– cities. After that, value needs to be extracted from the data. Before becoming actionable, 
and therefore tradable and profitable, data are processed through specific algorithmic 
operations: sorting, scraping, cleaning up, clustering and modelling. Through these 
operations, supposedly “raw” data are turned into commodities that can be monetised in 
various ways. 
Jathan Sadowski (2019) combines Marx with Bourdieu’s theory of cultural capital, 
to challenge the definitions of data as mere commodities or raw materials, looking instead 
at data as capital. Similar to social and cultural capital, data capital is “distinct from, but 
has its roots in, economic capital” and “is convertible, in certain conditions, to economic 
capital.” Within this view, digital capitalism is driven by an imperative “to constantly 
collect and circulate data by producing commodities that create more data and building 
infrastructure to manage data” (2019, p. 4). 
Despite a widespread emphasis on the specificity and (relative) novelty of data 
economies, also labelled “data extractivism” (Morozov, 2017), it is important to keep the 
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broader historical conditions that have made it possible in mind. In other words, for data 
to be extracted, and for value to be extracted from that data, a number of other extractive 
processes must take place. In a fascinating and recent work, Kate Crawford and Vladan 
Joler (2018) present an anatomical map, made of human labour, data, and planetary 
resources, of one of the most popular AI devices: Amazon Echo, also known as Alexa. 
The authors build on an analysis of extractive operations, first developed by Sandro 
Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2017), to draw attention to the ways in which the capitalist 
predation of minerals and humans lies at the very core of the digital industry, at odds with 
the Silicon Valley’s imagery of friendly cooperation and minimalist design. Crawford and 
Joler’s anatomical map of Alexa unearths the several layers of operations, of immense 
scale and complexity, that converge into this small cylinder - from child labour in the 
African mines to the stack of cargo containers, from the invisible and often unpaid work 
of AI testing to the accumulation of toxic waste in China and Indonesia. The anatomical 
map of Alexa provides an insightful perspective of the millions of smart devices and 
infrastructure that compose smart cities, and gives a better understanding of the complex 
processes of value extraction in which they are immersed. Whilst keeping the broader 
picture of extraction in mind, it is also essential to pay attention to the specific modes of 
extraction through which platforms appropriate data and turn them into money. 
The notion of data colonialism, as proposed by Nick Couldry and Ulises Mejias 
(2018) retains the expansive geopolitical dimension, which is dominated by the USA and 
China alongside a few tech giants, wherein resources and bodies are appropriated; and the 
intensive practices of mining data from individuals and the population. Data relations, 
Couldry and Mejias argue, signal a reconfiguration of life in modalities that are available 
for extraction. Platforms produce “a form of “social” that is ready for appropriation and 
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exploitation for value as data” (2018, p. 4). In my research, I detail the ways in which 
cities have been/are being colonised for the purpose of data extraction. 
If life has been reconfigured by data relations, to make it available for extraction, 
cities have been transformed over time as well, to make room for digitalisation and the 
profit strategies that come with it. In the cases I examine in this thesis, smart city plans 
have not revolutionised the urban structure, but rather have grafted onto it, and intersect 
the existing urban processes of enclosure, financialisation, and gentrification. For 
example, in New Town Kolkata, the creation of SEZs for the tech industry, in the early 
2000s, as well as of business parks and gated communities, has played a key role in the 
smart city planning of the past few years, and on more than one level. It has provided 
infrastructure, a pool of digitally-educated workers and residents, and investments from 
real estate funds. Furthermore, the zoning logic is kept alive through the new smart city 
plans: for example, the West Bengal government has recently launched a new industrial 
enclave, called “Bengal Silicon Valley,” in the heart of New Town, which immediately 
triggered real estate speculations. Although it is not formally an SEZ, the new 
development still offers discounted land plots and substantial fiscal benefits to major tech 
companies, and has already fuelled the mortgage market and real estate investments in the 
area. 
In Cape Town over the past decade, the smart city geographies have been largely 
shaped by the strategies for the creation of a start up ecosystem, hailed as the ‘Silicon 
Cape’ and the “Digital Gateway to Africa.” Substantial flows of venture capital, equity 
funds, and other financial operations have impacted, not only the entrepreneurial scene, 
in which start ups proliferate and compete at an accelerating pace, but also the building 
environment. In many cases, the creation of start up hubs has coincided with the 
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requalification or redevelopment of low-income areas, with the effect of pushing out the 
former residents. 
In recent years, business platforms such as Uber, AirBnB, Deliveroo, and the like, 
have emerged as the major actors of data extraction. Platforms dominate a new market of 
services – from booking a restaurant to finding a date – as well as of digitally mediated 
precarious labour – car drivers, delivery riders, chores on demand, etc. Cities with a high 
concentration of digital infrastructure (and of people that are able and willing to use them) 
have so far been the ideal environment for platforms to test their business model and focus 
their investments. In this thesis, I examine the operations of two platforms: Uber, the e- 
hailing app, and Zomato, a restaurant aggregator and food delivery app. The strong 
protests of Uber drivers, in Cape Town and Kolkata (as well as many other cities), who 
went as far as to compare their conditions to slavery, have shone a light on the violence 
of a business model, which too often has been benignly packaged as the “sharing” or “gig” 
economy. As Nick Srnicek (2016) makes clear, platforms are not an alternative to, but a 
distinct form of, capitalism. Platforms predate on the vulnerability of workers and coerce 
them to act as independent contractors, stripped of any tutelage. Moreover, they exploit 
the users who engage with their services, as free labour to train AI programs and to feed 
targeted advertising. The immense volume of data that platforms extract from workers 
and customers is turned into value in several ways. For example, Uber algorithms allocate 
rides and optimise routes, but in so doing, they also act as forces of labour control. Zomato 
has leveraged predictive analytics to conquer larger portions of the market, evolving from 
a local restaurant locator to a food tech giant that operates a number of services, including 
search engine, reviews, reservations, and delivery. 
These capitalist platforms also have an impact on the urban environment, as they 
influence and orientate the circulation of people, things, and money. Uber has been 
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identified as a factor of urban gentrification, as it makes mobility easier and therefore 
incentivises shopping, dining out, and nightlife. Similar remarks could also be made about 
platforms, such as Zomato, which continually sort and zone the city into dining hubs. In 
this study, I borrow the concepts of urban extractivism (Massuh, 2014; Gago & Mezzadra, 
2017) and extractive urbanism (Kirshner & Power, 2015; Foote, 2016) to describe how 
cities, and especially those that are undergoing “smart” transformations, become terrains 
of extensive and intensive value extraction, at different levels. In other words, if data 
extractivism is a newer, more rampant form of capitalist operation, it has been anticipated 
and is accompanied by other operations, such as land grabbing, financialisation, and 
gentrification. 
If smart cities are sites, where new and old forms of extraction take place, they are 
concurrently fields of speculation. Earlier in this section, I pointed to the circuits of 
financial speculations that run (through) the processes of urban digitalisation at various 
levels, from venture capital funding tech start ups, to real estate operations. In the previous 
section (Model, Preemption, Speculation), I also described how the computing 
infrastructures that pervade smart cities are informed by a speculative logic. The 
algorithms at work in security platforms and commercial platforms seek to preempt future 
possibilities and to make decisions about them in the present. 
This demands more reflection on the nexus between speculation and extraction, and 
on how it manifests in smart city economies. An insightful perspective into this theme is 
offered by Lisa Adkins (2018) in her recent book The Time of Money. Drawing on a 
detailed examination of the forms in which finance has taken hold of contemporary 
economies, Adkins argues that speculation is no longer restricted to the financial sector 
but as has become, at once, a mode of capitalist accumulation and a system of social 
organisation. The financial techniques that keep money moving across the social body, by 
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indefinitely multiplying and extending mundane forms of debt, impose a distinct temporal 
regime on the lives of individuals and households. This regime is shaped by the 
(speculative) calculation of the possibilities of future repayment. On this point, Adkins 
draws on Amoore’s (2013) discussion of the politics of possibilities, which dictates 
obligations in the present. Adkins elaborates on speculation as a social logic and on 
speculative time, offering the reader inspiring material for reflection concerning the 
organisation of smart cities as environments, largely governed by speculative platforms 
and financial operations. 
However, Adkins explicitly plays the logic of speculation against extraction. She 
argues that as surplus is increasingly generated through flows of money, rather than from 
labouring bodies, the whole category of extraction is completely subsumed into the 
paradigm of speculation. Drawing on the various extractive dynamics that can be charted 
in the making of smart cities, I suggest, instead, that speculation and extraction coexist 
and feed each other in contingent, non-linear relations. If extractive practices, powered by 
data mining and predictive models, are inscribed into a broader horizon of speculation, 
then speculative operations are continuously fuelled by the maximisation of extraction 
from the urban environment. 
This thesis’s examination of security platforms, such as EPIC and Xpresso, and 
commercial platforms, such as Uber and Zomato, reveals that these are built around a 
common constellation of algorithmic techniques. Of course, the datasets in use and the 
specific modalities in which computing procedures are applied vary across the different 
platforms and tasks, but modelling and speculative calculations remain at the core of 
operations. This computational alignment calls into question the relations between 
government and economy, as both of these domains increasingly operate through the same 
logics and instruments. An interpretation of these elements comes, at least in part, from 
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Shoshana Zuboff’s (2019) recent theorisation of surveillance capitalism, which focuses 
on the “behavioural surplus” that powerful corporations, such as Google and Facebook, 
are able to extract through pervasive dataveillance and the control of personal information. 
For Zuboff, the manipulation of individual behaviours through targeted advertising and 
other data-driven marketing strategies is at the core of this new form of capitalism. 
For accuracy’s sake, however, whereas Zuboff discusses the practices of surveillance 
that enable new forms of accumulation, she is not really concerned with the fact that these 
practices circulate across corporate and security platforms at the same time. Rather, she 
argues that corporate surveillance enforces a new form of extra-state, instrumentarian 
power – the Big Other – that is de facto taking over the sphere of government. I find 
several points questionable in Zuboff’s theory, which I discuss more specifically at the 
end of Chapter 4, also drawing upon Evgeny Morozov’s critique of the author. I believe 
that it is important to stress that an emphasis on surveillance obscures other crucial 
operations that are taking place through data mining and algorithms. 
Surveillance and dataveillance are pivotal components in digital environments, but 
they are not the only ones that need attention. Between the accumulation of data and the 
information that can be used for security purposes, or monetised, there is a chain of 
calculations that Zuboff, drawing on corporate language, takes for granted as “prediction.” 
As described earlier in this introduction, these calculations are in fact shaped by a 
speculative logic, which seeks to capture the array of unknown future possibilities and 
translate them into the form of representational models and preemptive decisions. I 
suggest, again, that it is important to pay attention to relations between the speculative 
logic of algorithms and the processes of government and extraction, which these 









As outlined so far, different theoretical problems and lines of research converged into 
this thesis. Different methods were used to put them together, and not without problems. 
Gathering data and making sense of them was a constant exercise in flexibility and, to 
some extent, invention and improvisation. In their book on Critical Security Methods, 
Claudia Aradau, Jef Huysmans, Andrew W. Neal, and Nadine Voelkner (2014) propose 
an approach to methods as “experimentation” and “bricolage.” This approach challenges 
the established views of methodology as a bridge between theory and practice, and of 
methods as a consistent set of procedures, founded on specific theoretical premises. The 
authors claim that invoking methodological rigour is often a way of policing the 
boundaries of academic disciplines and the hierarchies attached to them, and of defusing 
the disruptive potential of more heterodox approaches (Aradau et al., 2014). Instead, the 
idea of viewing methods as bricolage invites the researcher to assemble concepts, 
empirical objects and methods with the aim of “relating what is usually kept apart” (2014, 
p. 7), and experimenting across theoretical and disciplinary boundaries. This differs from 
multi-method approaches that seek to multiply the collection of data, in order to gain a 
more exhaustive knowledge of a discrete research object. Rather, the point with the 
bricolage method is rather to open up angles and connections that would otherwise remain 
invisible (2014, p. 7). Given that my research roams quite serendipitously across different 
scholarly paths, it cannot help but resonate with this perspective. 
In the course of my research, it turned out, I used methods as bricolage considerably 
 
– albeit without fully subscribing to the assemblage thinking underpinning it, for reasons 
that I will explain later in this chapter. Rather than applying a pre-formed methodological 
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framework, I let my decisions on methods take form through a continuous confrontation 
with data and literature, which is still ongoing as I write. This was only partially deliberate, 
and in part imposed by the fact that the research that I conducted is oblique to several 
scholarly fields, but belongs to none. My choices about methods were determined, in the 
first place, by the type of knowledge that I sought to produce and not by an affiliation to 
any one theoretical family. My aim is to contribute to the creation of concepts and to add 
to our understanding about the relations between new technologies, government and value 
extraction. 
This research has a significant empirical component, and is the result of several 
months of fieldwork conducted in two sites. However, for me, empirical work was 
primarily a way of thinking through and with processes, both material and immaterial, 
rather than about gathering a “systemic” knowledge of discrete situations. The tension in 
producing concepts has informed all my experiments – or perhaps, survival strategies – 
with methods; from my choice of research sites, to my practices of data collection and 
analytical angles. In the next pages, I will narrate and reflect on these challenges. 
 
 
Speculations and Testbeds 
 
One major challenge that I faced in my research was that many of the smart projects 
that I am writing about did not yet exist – or better, did not yet exist in their full material 
form – at the time of writing. Therefore, I was largely investigating processes in the 
making, at different stages of implementation; some of them were only on paper, others 
were being built, and others were being tested. The effects of these infrastructures, objects, 
and systems on the urban environment were still very much indeterminate and not always 
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clearly observable. Therefore, the planned, the unfinished, and the testbed were defining 
aspects of my research methods. 
As discussed earlier, speculation is a key concept in this thesis, and defines the nature 
of security and value extraction in the making of smart cities. However, speculation(s) 
turned out to also be also a key methodological framework; one that I had not envisaged 
beforehand, but one that emerged from the empirical and theoretical problems which I 
encountered. The concept of speculation captures the tension between visions and projects 
of the future, and the operations that seek, not only to materialise those futures but also to 
make them actionable in the present. It is a tension that is immediately generative of 
effects. The security calculations and financial initiatives, examined in this thesis, are 
fuelled by precisely that imperative to appropriate unknown possibilities. Smart city 
projects seek to capture urban futures and to project onto them a distinct vision of 
environment, relations, government, and economy. As such, these projects are 
constitutively unfinished, experimental, and speculative. However, just because objects 
do not exist in their – supposedly – final form does not mean they do not actually exist. 
On the contrary, projects and plans live their own existence, which is full of economic, 
social, and political effects. As Jennifer Gabrys suggests (2016), planning documents and 
experiments are speculative, because they not only represent specific configurations of 
the future but also produce them in the present, by triggering and shaping practices, 
norms, decisions, and investments. 
Another important reference for researching objects in the making has been the notion 
of the testbed, as presented by Halpern and her colleagues (2013; 2015), in their work on 
Songdo. This greenfield smart city and SEZ, in South Korea, is a site of experimentation 
for the new big data epistemology, for new profit strategies based on data mining, and for 
a new form of urbanism based on ubiquitous computing. Importantly, Halpern et al. 
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(2013; 2015) argue that the experiment never ends. In testbed urbanism, the smart city 
and all the calculative infrastructures within it become an engine for growth that cannot 
stop; rather it is set to continually exceed its technical limits. There is no need to look at 
massive experiments, such as Songdo, however, to find testbeds. A testbed is the 
permanent condition of software, algorithms, and smart systems, which are continually 
being tuned, amended, and updated. The making of smart cities in their various 
declinations – from greenfield projects to retrofitting and all the possible combinations in 
between – can be viewed as recursive testbeds, which have no deadline and are never 
meant to move on to a definitive form. In projects, such as New Town and Cape Town, I 
found that it is not the final accomplishment of a fully formed smart city that generates 
new forms of governmentality, value, and life, but rather the continuous work in progress, 
the experiments and trials. 
These reflections on speculations and testbeds helped me to devise a heuristic setting 
within which methods for data collection and analysis could be positioned. Framing 
research objects as speculations and testbeds, means always approaching them as 
provisional configurations of materials, logics, and strategies, which are open to multiple 
outcomes and effects and which are in a state of continuous update. It also means trying 
to understand their performative effects across unstable temporalities, where the 
boundaries between present and future, facts and projections are always blurred. 
Challenges and questions remain: how can speculative processes be examined in practice 
and assessed? How can the effects of infrastructures that have not yet been fully 
materialised be documented? 
These questions shaped my research, both conceptually and practically, as I tried to 
chart the continuous echoes and links between projects, experiments, examples, 
expectations, decisions, and effects (where possible). I will argue that these non-linear 
62 
 
relations between different temporal poles are constitutive of urban processes (economic, 





Researching digitalisation, and the forms of government and value extraction that 
come with it, requires the analysis of relations that are mediated by infrastructures, 
sensors, screens, cameras, and algorithms. Over the past three decades, a number of 
ethnographic strategies have been devised to investigate relations that have a global reach, 
that bring together and are mediated by different entities of different natures, and that 
exceed sensory experience and a single-site focus. Examples of relational ethnographies 
that I found particularly relevant for my study included different declinations of the 
ethnography of circulation and of the “follow the thing” approach (among others, Marcus, 
1995; Tsing, 2011; and Parks & Starosielski, 2015): Susan Leigh Star’s (1999) reflections 
on an ethnography of infrastructure; relational ethnography (Desmond, 2014); and the 
nonlocal ethnography suggested by Gregory Feldman (2011a; 2011b) for the study of 
global apparatuses. The latter in particular questions the “empiricist anxiety” that often 
affects ethnographic research, and provides a methodological route for studying “relations 
between disconnected actors through abstract mediating agents” (2011a, p. 378). 
What I am seeking to understand in this research is a milieu which includes humans, 
machines, code, infrastructure, flora, and fauna. Herein, apparatuses of security and value 
extraction emerge, not as static, given structures but as a continuous articulation of 
elements. Therefore, my real research “objects” are in fact the processes through which 
urban computing apparatuses are discursively and materially assembled, tested, and 
updated; and through which they govern and capitalise on the city. None of the entities or 
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relations in the milieu can be granted heuristic priority over the others or identified as a 
principal ethnographic object. The processes that I examine are more than human 
interactions, more than things and more than circulation. To research these processes, I 
spent time in the field, followed objects, unearthed narratives, traced in infrastructures, 
and drew, in general, on a set of practices that belong to ethnographic tradition. At the 
same time, however, elements of the processes that I investigated continuously evaded, 
and/or exceeded the boundary of observation and personal experience. Scale, distance, 
secrecy, incompleteness, and technical impenetrability were only some of the reasons why 
the formation of urban computing apparatuses could not always – and not entirely – be 
researched through personal experience. Some nodes of these apparatuses – think of the 
offices where software engineers and data scientists set up and update platforms, such as 
SAP HANA or Uber – were physically inaccessible, but crucial to determining urban 
operations. Moreover, not all of the relations that shape the making of smart cities could 
be fully understood “in the field” – for example, the financial networks that run throughout 
smart city projects, in multiple forms – yet examining them was key to understanding the 
economic stakes in the process. To grasp these complex, stratified relations, I drew on the 
analysis of a wide range of resources – planning and policy documents, media reports, 
corporate brochures, advertising material, and technical tutorials – that are not 
immediately connected in time and space, but which contribute, in different forms, to 
articulating the processes of urban digitalisation and the operations of government and 
value extraction. 
Assemblage thinking is another source of theoretical and methodological elaboration 
towards which I am indebted and uneasy at the same time. The concept of assemblage, as 
forged by Deleuze and Guattari (1980) in their monumental work, Mille Plateaux, is an 
analytical tool (not a theory) in their ontology of relations, which gained momentum in 
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philosophy and social sciences after Brian Massumi translated the book into English in 
1987. Across a number of disciplines – including science and technology studies (STS), 
anthropology, sociology, security studies, geography, and urban studies – the concept of 
assemblage has emerged as a definite line of thinking or even an explicit theory (DeLanda, 
2006). Assemblages define the multiple, immanent, undecidable ways in which entities 
interact. In my analysis of computing networks, algorithms and platforms, I have drawn 
considerably on the work of authors such as Marieke de Goede, Louise Amoore, Jennifer 
Gabrys, Claudia Aradau and Rob Kitchin, who make use of assemblages in ways that I 
found enlightening. These scholars work with assemblages, across different contexts and 
lines of research, to chart and assess techno-political and decisional processes in the 
making of smart cities (Kitchin, 2016; Gabrys, 2016) and security operations (de Goede, 
2012; Amoore, 2013). Nevertheless, I am also aware of the limits that assemblage analysis 
often presents. In their critique of assemblage urbanism, for example, Neil Brenner, David 
J. Madden, and David Wachsmuth (2011) note how “political - economic, institutional 
and geo-ideological force fields” (p. 252) are bracketed and undertheorised as assemblage 
analysis remains focused on a grammar of contingencies and fails to engage with broader, 
intercontextual, and historical dynamics. 
More generally, as the notion of assemblage has gained popularity, it may have lost 
some of its heuristic potential. All too frequently, the word seems to be used as jargon, 
rather than as an actual critical tool, for purposes that don’t extend beyond a mere 
diagnosis of heterogeneity and messiness. Keeping in mind the critical points raised by 
Brenner and colleagues (2011), I use assemblage thinking, paying particular attention to 
the forces which make up assemblages. These forces have different historical, spatial, 
economic, and political dimensions, which must be not only listed but must also be 
weighted and accounted for. The acknowledgment of complexity and contingency can be 
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one way to open up and frame an investigation, and not merely its end point. In other 
words, I work with assemblages as analytical tools that allow me to consider the 
contingent and often paradoxical relations between elements, knowing that these relations 






The role of this chapter was to sketch the conceptual and methodological trajectories 
of this thesis, and to situate my research within the existing scholarly debates. I illustrated 
how the persistent effects of colonialism (plus apartheid in Cape Town) largely inform 
urbanisation, social relations, and economic processes in both of my research sites. Hence, 
I explained why and how some elements of postcolonial analysis – namely, the 
compresence of heterogeneous regimes of development, time and space, labour and rights 
that mark the postcolonial city – comprise the necessary starting point of my research. 
In my discussion of the different lines of research on zones and borders, I moved 
towards a way of looking at the urban borders that operates across the processes of 
digitalisation at different levels: by integrating existing patterns of socio-spatial 
discrimination and by producing new computational forms of biopolitical control. 
I then explored the problems that emerge from data-driven and algorithmic forms of 
knowledge, as these are increasingly entrusted with governmental decisions. Platforms 
for urban government enact logics of speculative security and preemption, while 
continuously seeking to model future possibilities and to act upon them in the present. 
Thereafter, I looked at the ways in which smart cities emerge as sites for intensive 
value extraction – where strategies of data extractivism are inextricably tied to extractive 
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networks, such as mining, drilling, on a planetary scale. Concurrently, commercial 
platforms rely (as do government platforms) on a computing apparatus that is informed 
by preemptive and speculative logic. Two lines of inquiry stem from this operational 
convergence: first, how the relations between speculation and extraction unfold in smart 
cities; and second, how the domains of security and value extraction are interrelated. 
Finally, I reviewed the methodological questions that arose in the course of this 
research. My approach to methods as bricolage was prompted by the need to combine 
different theoretical and practical concerns, as well as various scholarly paths, although I 
could not subscribe any of them entirely. Framing the elements and processes that I 
encountered as speculations and testbeds, I set up a heuristic setting that allowed me to 
make sense of the precarious temporal regimes – the planned, the unfinished and the 
experimental – that I experienced in my research. Nonlocal ethnography and assemblage 
thinking were two key sources I drew upon – albeit at times uneasily – to analyse the 
complex, often invisible or inaccessible relations that materialise in the processes of urban 
digitalisation. 
The next three chapters of this thesis will present the empirical research conducted in 
Kolkata and Cape Town, and will further develop the three key themes outlined so far: 











In 2017, and following several car accidents, the last of which killed a six-year-old 
child, the New Town Kolkata Development Authority (NKDA) passed a much-awaited 
bylaw, ordering the seizure of stray cattle on the streets. This happened almost two years 
after the official announcement that this unfinished, desolate, satellite township on the 
outskirts of Kolkata would be turned into a smart city. In the previous decade, farmlands 
had been expropriated to build high-rises, and farmers had been forced to become 
construction workers. However, investors subsequently pulled out and construction 
slowed down or stopped completely. Left without land or jobs, the ex-farmers let the cattle 
they couldn’t feed anymore roam loose. The cows, for their part, did not lose heart and 
found subsistence in the grass and plants that had been created for “beautification” 
purposes around the Main Arterial Road, where high-speed Wi-Fi is being installed and 
Bengal’s Silicon Valley is scheduled to rise. 
Meanwhile in Cape Town, Africa’s self-declared smartest city, people were queuing 
up to fill water jugs from a natural spring at the foot of Table Mountain. The long- 
announced water crisis had hit at last, dams were at their lowest level in a century and the 
menace of Day Zero – when taps would have to be shut off – was more real than ever. 
Over the past decades, huge investments had been made in smart infrastructure – 
broadband fibre, sensors, and software – in an effort to make the city more efficient and 
sustainable, but none of these technologies had averted the water crisis. Inside the offices 
of city managers, real-time maps of water consumption and models of dam levels ran on 
dashboards; inside the houses of Capetonians, smart meters enforced water restrictions. 
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Those who could afford it were having boreholes dug in their gardens to reach underwater 
reservoirs; those who couldn’t, prayed for the rain. 
These two shorts sketches of New Town Kolkata and Cape Town give a short glimpse 
into the conflicts and contradictions, narratives and rhetoric, public policies and 
privateinterests that shape the making of smart cities. In this chapter, I present findings 
that arebased on an examination of planning documents, ethnographic observation, 
and interviews with informants involved with the process of urban digitalisation at 
various levels. In contrast to the mainstream and commercial vision of smart cities, as 
smoothly interconnected systems, I highlight how the processes of digitalisation 
converge with the distribution of border technologies, across the urban space. In 
particular, I reveal two aspects. Firstly, I show how digitalisation often intersects and 
integrates borders, which are already embedded in the social-urban fabric. Secondly, I 
demonstrate how computing infrastructures disseminate border techniques, such as 
monitoring, tracking, identification, and profiling, across a range of everyday 
activities. In doing so, I bring together and build on different lines of research, 
including: literature on smart borders and algorithmic security (Amoore, 2006; Pötzsch, 
2015; Leese, 2016); critical approaches to smart cities and the making of 
computational environments (Kitchin & Perng, 2016; Dourish, 2016; Gabrys, 2016); 
and studies on the critical and polysemic functions of borders within the global 
articulation of power and economy (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013). 
This chapter begins by briefly overviewing of the key themes and literature explored 
in the entire chapter. It then explores how the popular narratives of smart cities – as 
harmonic, seamless systems – have been crafted through a set of assumptions and topoi, 
consistent with specific commercial strategies. The chapter then proceeds by reviewing 
the history of smart developments in Kolkata’s New Town and Cape Town, and illustrates 
how  digitalisation  has  occurred  through  the  processes  of  zoning  and  borders, often 
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incorporating existing forms of segregation and filter. In the following sections, I will 
examine the dissemination of border techniques across infrastructures and objects of 
common use. These border techniques reconfigure aesthetic categories and relations, and 
function at an ontogenetic level, i.e. they generate new types of relations between the 
human and non-human elements of the environment (Rancière, 2004; Gabrys, 2015; 
2016). In my conclusion to this chapter, I situate my analyses into a broader perspective, 




Smart Borders, Smart Cities 
 
In her work on the introduction of biometric borders, in the context of the post-9/11 
“war on terror,” Louise Amoore (2006) explains how these have become pervasive and 
are bringing profiling techniques into the realms of everyday social life. She describes 
how smart borders are informed by an anticipatory logic that seeks to identify, assess, and 
authorise (or not) individuals in such a way as “the body itself is inscribed with, and 
demarcates, a continual crossing of multiple encoded borders – social, legal, gendered, 
racialised and so on” (2006, p. 337). More recently, Holger Pötzsch (2015) describes the 
emergence of a socio-technical apparatus, what he calls the “iBorder,” which is comprised 
of biometrics, dataveillance, and AI, and which generates: 
bordering processes that disperse locally as well as across transnational space. In 
these processes, individuals become objects of governance to be analysed and 
assessed, but also serve as implicit contributors to the database enabling 
algorithm-driven mappings of patterns of behaviour and association. (p. 23) 
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In the past few years, studies into the introduction of smart borders have explored 
how digital technologies and algorithmic calculations are transforming security practices 
as well as responses to terrorism and migratory movements across Europe and North 
America (de Goede et al., 2014; Leese, 2016). Scholars have highlighted that smart 
 
borders are increasingly seeping into cities and neighbourhoods (Amoore, 2006; Amoore, 
Marmura & Salter, 2008), as part of the new military and security paradigms, which are 
emerging  in  the  US  and  UK,  and  which  problematise  urban  life  (Graham,  2012). 
 
However, space remains to chart the specific, situated ways in which smart borders 
permeate and constitute urban environments, especially in cities outside the US and the 
UK, where the topic of military urbanism is, potentially, not as relevant. 
Critiques of smart cities also abound. They have pointed out the risks of technocratic 
governance, surveillance, the perpetuation of inequality and social engineering (Crang & 
Graham, 2007; Kitchin & Dodge, 2011; Halpern et al., 2013; Marvin, Luque-Alaya & 
McFarlane, 2015). Stephen Graham (2012) specifically highlights the ways in which the 
digitalisation of urban life spreads and normalises technologies, which were originally 
developed for military purposes. Generally, however, this body of critical literature has 
rarely attempted a more punctual and comprehensive discussion on borders in smart cities. 
In this chapter, I will illustrate how, as digital infrastructures create a connected and 
sentient environment (Shepard, 2011; Crang & Graham, 2014; Thrift, 2014; Halpern et 
al., 2013), they also perform and distribute border functions across the urban space. 
Etienne Balibar (2002) and Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2013) explore the 
polysemic, heterogeneous, and dynamic nature of borders. They discuss how, today, 
borders provide a powerful entry point to investigating the articulation of global capitalist 
processes, such as expansion, accumulation, and extraction; and power assemblages, such 
as sovereignty, law, and governmentality. Borders work along, within and beyond the 
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territorial limits of the state, as instruments of differential inclusion and exclusion. In 
doing so, they continuously filter and stratify the circulation of people and things. 
Recent studies into developments in migration policies have integrated these two 
lines of research: the focus on the security techniques performed through digital borders, 
and the effort to grasp borders’ political weight in controlling the mobility of labour and 
commodities. In his essay Rezoning the Global, Walters (2011) challenges the idea of an 
overarching “global security hypothesis,” and illustrates how border and security 
practices, such as the e-passport, are the result of the situated, and often frictional, 
processes of technological work and technological zoning. Dennis Broeders and James 
Hampshire (2013) argue that the increasing digitalisation of European borders cannot be 
predominantly explained in terms of securitisation. Rather, it reflects domestic political 
logics, such as the drive to demonstrate efficiency – at least at a symbolic level – in 
fighting illegal immigration. Until now, the focus of security and border studies has rarely 
been placed on how cities are being digitalised under the promise of “smartness,” nor have 
they examined the political effects of such transformations. Literature on urban borders 
abounds; it examines how socio-economic inequalities and neoliberal politics are 
executed through the specific arrangements of space and infrastructure; such as, gated 
communities on one side and marginalised neighbourhoods on the other (see, among 
others, Grimson, 2008; Karaman & Islam, 2012; Komarova, 2014). However, these 
studies have not considered the links between urban borders and digitalisation in any 
depth. 
In their examination of the making of smart cities, Kitchin and Perng (2016) warn 
their readers that it is essential to pay attention to the situated modalities, wherein code (a 
term used by the authors to cover the multiple descriptions of software, from mobile 
applications to platform systems) is becoming increasingly embedded into urban 
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infrastructures, services and utilities, and government practices. These situated modalities 
include negotiations, frictions, strategies, fortuities, and speculations. 
I will shortly use a series of examples from my research sites, to demonstrate that – 
in contrast to corporate narratives which paint smart cities as smooth, harmonic spaces – 
digitalised cities are a patchwork of millions of socio-technical assemblages, where code, 
concurrently, is produced through and produces multiple sets of relations with other 
material and discursive elements (Kitchin, 2016; Dourish, 2016). Empirical research 
demonstrates how diverse and complex the relationship can be between code and space. 
In her examination of attempts to forge new, smart citizens, in the wake of India’s 100 
smart cities challenge, Ayona Datta (2018) identifies specific practices where the global 
imagery of smart citizenship intersects the issues and struggles of postcolonial citizenship, 
i.e. enumeration, participation, and contestation, thus generating hybrid and vernacular 
forms of digital engagement in Indian cities. Sandeep Mertia (2017) uses “ethnographic 
vignettes” of significant threads of data-driven urbanism in Delhi, to show how the 
circulation of computing technologies is reconfiguring knowledge production, forms of 
authority and identities in and about the city, and in ways that are contingent on, and 
strongly affected by, contextual factors. 
In her review of public initiatives and private interests in the making of smart Cape 
Town, Nancy Odendaal (2015) explores the various textures of “smart” that are unfolding 
within a context of deep inequality; a situation which complicates and challenges the 
mainstream discourse in many ways. Odendaal makes the observation that smart city 
discourses and technologies prove to be malleable in practice, insofar as they have been 
simultaneously appropriated by; municipal authorities, pursuing goals of social inclusion 
and digital democracy; private stakeholders and companies, seeking to expand their 
markets; and activists, leading campaigns for social rights (Odendaal, 2015). 
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The socio-technical assemblages that compose a smart city have a political 
significance that demands attention. On one hand, borders have been described as 
assemblages (Sohn, 2016; Allen & Volmer, 2018), where multiple and heterogeneous 
components establish contingent relations, and where different meanings emerge for 
different actors. The urban borders I examine in this thesis can be viewed as assemblages 
of physical elements (walls, fences, checkpoints), technologies (sensing devices and 
algorithms), and socio-economic forces, which, as this chapter will illustrate, manifest 
and interact in situated modalities. On the other hand, borders in smart cities also work 
through broader assemblages of infrastructure, government, and capital; thereby 
determining varied possibilities for access, circulation, and action. 
Given this, the thesis will focus on the frictions and barriers that occur around and 
via these assemblages, electing to examine them through the perspective of borders. In 
the first chapter of the thesis, I reflected on the risk that the heuristic potential of 
assemblage thinking weakens, as it often fails to engage with the specific dynamics of 
power that shape the relationship between heterogeneous elements. This thesis’s analysis 
of borders responds precisely to this challenge. I examine borders, in order to chart and 
weigh the historical, economic and social forces that constitute urban assemblages within 
the process of digitalisation. My intention is neither to fetishise the notion of borders, nor 
to offer a fixed spatial representation of digitalised cities. Rather, an examination of urban 
digitalisation, through the lens of borders, allows me to consider the distributed, situated, 
and often microscopic power-relations that permeate smart infrastructures. 
 
Smart City Narratives 
 
“It can be said that Smart cities of the Future will be smoother, more social, and more 
open than they are today.” 
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Alexander Vancolen, Marketing and eMobility Team Leader at Bosch Belgium1 
 
 
Arrows in vivid colours run between skyscrapers, ports, parks and highways. Footage 
of people using smartphones and tablets flows quickly. Wall-sized dashboards show 
interactive maps, graphics and figures. Smiling testimonials tell stories of success and 
profess faith in a digital future. What I am describing is not one of the commercial videos 
of smart city solutions, released by a major provider; it is virtually all of them. 
IBM’s Smarter Cities, CISCO’s Smart+Connected, Microsoft’s City Next, SAP’s 
Future Cities – these are only some of the available packages in the growing market of 
urban digitalisation. Additionally, while these, and other corporate players, are 
competing against each other to secure contracts with city governments, they are 
contributing to forge the idea of a smart city that is, to a large extent, homogeneous. 
They all resort to the same imaginary, the same jargon and the same visual style. The 
topics addressed within these commercials: efficiency, sustainability, resilience, and 
inclusiveness, are perhaps better described as topoi, given the frequency and the 
standardised manner in which they are presented. Clearly, this convergence of themes 
and style also reflects the structure of the advertised products, which rely on the same 
principles and architecture. All these systems focus on “breaking the silos” between 
various urban datasets – e.g., traffic, waste, pollution, energy, crime, social programs, 
healthcare, and education – and creating one integrated platform for data analysis – a 




1 Quote from an interview to Alexander Vancolen at the Smart City Next Event in Dordrecht, NL, on 




networks across the city, city, and by running analytics across disparate domains, from 




IBM’s Smarter Cities video 
 
 































There’s Never Been a Better Time to Build the Smart Cities of the Future 
 
 








Architecture of Cisco Kinetics for Safety and Security Solutions 
 
 





Another key feature, which recurs across all of the smart city platforms that are 
commercialised by different providers, is an interactive dashboard (or system of 
dashboards), located in a central command and control room (see Figures 4 and 5). It is 
here that the single view of the city is displayed in the form of real-time assessments and 




Central Dashboard & Command & Control Room of IBM Intelligent Operations’ Centre 
 
 
Note. From IBM. (2010). Central dashboard & command & control room of IBM Intelligent 




Dashboard in SAP Smart Cities’ Demo 
 
 





All of this commercial material presents the making of smart cities as a smooth, 
harmonic process, and is based on the assumption that more automation necessarily equals 
more efficiency, safety, and sustainability for all; Moreover, it assumes that the integration 
of systems will proceed seamlessly. 
Scholars have critically investigated the genesis and evolution of the predominant 
smart city discourse.3 Donald McNeill (2015) demonstrates how the launch of IBM’s 
Smarter Planet campaign, in 2008, signalled a substantial restructuring of the company. 
IBM sold its PC division to Lenovo, in 2004, with the intention of concentrating its 
business in the emerging sector of IT consulting. Having identified cities as a high- 
potential market, the company began to focus on aggressively promoting its solutions for 
urban management. After analysing these commercial strategies, Söderström, Paasche 
 
 
3 Research conducted by Orit Halpern and her colleagues (2013; 2015) on the smart city of Songdo 
in South Korea is also significant among critical scholarship on smart cities. I engage with this 
work elsewhere in this thesis (Chapter 1 and Chapter 4). 
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and Klauser (2014) suggest that the popular narratives of smart cities could be read as a 
form of “corporate storytelling.” The authors draw on the concept of an “obligatory 
passage point” (OPP), as proposed by Michel Callon, to show how IBM had forged 
discourses “that presents their smart technologies as the only solution for various urban 
problems and hence becomes an OPP” (2014, p. 310). 
In 2011, IBM officially registered the term “smarter cities” as a trademark, all the 
while continuing the Smarter Planet campaign’s powerful advertising strategy, comprised 
of free consultancy for municipalities, international conferences, research papers, videos, 
etc. Söderström and his colleagues (2014) observe that the city was presented as a “system 
of systems” – a clear reference to urban systems theory – across these different outlets. 
The “system of systems” is then broken down into nine “pillars,” which represent the 
relevant sectors that must be digitally integrated to optimise urban government. The same 
method has been also adopted by some of IBM major competitors, such as Microsoft and 
Cisco. Furthermore, Söderström and his colleagues note that, for IBM, the reference to a 
system of systems seems to be: 
a translation device used for the purpose of storytelling (…) a powerful metaphor 
creating a surface of equivalence. It translates very different urban phenomena into 
data that can be related together according to a classical systemic approach which 
identifies elements, interconnections, purposes, feedback loops, delays, etc. (2014, 
p. 313) 
 
Concepts of datafication and automation have been infused with numerous positive 
meanings: transparency, efficiency, cost-effectiveness, inclusiveness, sustainability, 
safety, etc., to the point where they have become synonyms for better government and 
liveability. The interconnection processes, of infrastructures and devices with data and 
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management practices, are supposed to happen linearly, and without friction, and to be 
inherently virtuous. In fact, it is largely through the junction of these discursive moves 
and the considerable economic power of a colossus such as IBM, that the mainstream 
label of smart city has taken shape. This narrative is continuously reproduced by 
technology companies, consultants, city officers, and the media, wherein the smart city is, 
often uncritically, presented as the necessary and positive evolution of the urban 
condition. 
The narratives of smart cities that have been mobilised in both Cape Town and New 
Town Kolkata do not deviate greatly from the mainstream version. However, I will soon 
show how, in practice, the actual processes of digitalisation are taking place across partial, 
delayed and often conflicting initiatives, which refuted those narratives. On the website 
of the India Smart Cities Mission – the government program of which the making of 
smart New Town is part– smart cities are defined as “clean and sustainable 
environments,” where “layers of smartness” are added onto a comprehensive 




Image from the Smart Cities Mission’s Website 
 
 





The described list of smart solutions quite closely resembles the commercial models 
released by major companies, such as Microsoft and Surbana Jurong’s “Smart City in a 
Box” (Figure 7). Both images show a stylised city, broken down into its component parts 
– administrative services, waste management, energy, water, mobility, health, and 
business – and which are equipped with digital technology and managed via analytics. 
The core idea of adding “layers of smartness” presupposes a linear development process, 
wherein technological elements and governmental practices interconnect progressively 




Smart City in a Box Model 
 
 





New Town’s municipal authorities have also perpetuated this narrative, throughout 
public campaigns and citizen engagement activities, conducted with the help of 
consultants, such as the British company, Future Cities Catapult. During 2016, workshops 
and events were organised for the middle class residents of New Town, with the purpose 
to educate participants about the benefits of the upcoming digitalisation and invite the 
contribution of ideas about how to add more smart solutions to the pre-selected areas of 
the intervention4: water and energy, transport, security, health, and administrative 
services. The outcome of this “participative” design phase is shown in the image below 
(Figure 8): a green, idyllic landscape, where the relevant components are equipped with 










4 More details on the conditions under which specific areas were selected are given later in the 




Note. From Map of the area based development, New Town (n.d.). Smart City Proposal, Annexure 




Cape Town is frequently hailed as the smartest city in, the “digital gateway” to or the 
Silicon Valley of Africa and boasts of being a significant hub of tech companies and start 
ups. Rudy Abrahams, Chief Information Officer (CIO) of the City of Cape Town, gave a 
presentation on Cape Town’s Digital Journey in 2016, at the largest tech meeting on the 
continent – a conference organised by corporate association, Accelerate Cape Town, in 
partnership with AfricaCom. Significantly, in his slideshow, he visualised this journey as 








Note. From Abrahams, R. (2016). The City of Cape Town’s digital journey towards a smarter 








This supported the perspective of urban digitalisation as a smooth and straight 
progression, where “layers of smartness” could be added on top of each other. 
Additionally, and in accordance with the recurring motifs of smart city narratives, 
examined to this point, the municipality of Cape Town has also divided their urban 
system into “pillars” (four in this case): digital government, digital inclusion, digital 
economy and digital infrastructure (Figure 10). The strategy is based on the postulate 
that more digitalisation inherently corresponds to improvements in every sector. Digital 
government will drive transparency, better services, and citizen engagement. Digital 
access and skills will enhance the quality of life. Tech start ups will create jobs and 





Slide 2 from Rudy Abrahams’ Presentation at the Big Data & Roadmap to Smart Cape Town 
Conference 
 
Note. From Abrahams, R. (2016). The City of Cape Town’s digital journey towards a smarter 
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All of the aforementioned examples reflect an established vision of smart cities that 
revolves around the idea of a holistic interconnection of urban infrastructure and data: 
“breaking the silos” of information, “connecting the dots” of data, creating a “system of 
systems.” This interconnection is presumed to be seamless and without friction. It 
automatically generates a smoother, more inclusive urban environment. Yet, we have 
already seen how smart city strategies in fact operate by dividing a city into focus areas, 
where digital developments and data-driven governance concentrate, while other 
components and issues remain neglected. The following sections examine how the 
processes of digital interconnection take place in New Town Kolkata and Cape Town, in 
detail, and demonstrate how these processes incorporate dynamics of fragmentation, 






The making of smart cities in New Town Kolkata and Cape Town is taking place 
through the formation of clusters, hubs, and enclaves, where digital implementations are 
concentrated. I shall refer to this process as digital zoning. As we have learned from a rich 
body of literature (among others, Ong, 2006; Easterling, 2008; Walters, 2011), zoning 
techniques are always infused with political effects and power relations. For example, 
much attention has been paid to the key role played by the creation of Special Economic 
Zones (SEZs) and logistical corridors. They have positioned countries, such as China and 
India – and South-East Asia in general – in the global economy and political relations and 
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have transformed the methods of accumulation and extraction, labour relations, normative 
arrangements and lifestyles (Ong, 2006; Easterling, 2008; Mezzadra & Neilson, 2013). 
There are no zones without borders. Zoning processes, both large- and small-scaled, are 
often an occasion for testing, or recalibrating, techniques for monitoring and filtering the 
movements of people and things. Existing research has largely focused on official zones, 
created through normative arrangements, as well as on their relations with national states 
and sovereignty. 
Alternatively, in this thesis, I examine processes of urban zoning. Previous 
researchers have studied this topic from a critical perspective, and within two major 
paradigms: enclavism and gentrification. The concepts of enclavism (Atkinson & Blandy, 
2005) or enclave urbanism (Angotti, 2013) have been widely used in literature to describe 
the creation of gated, securitised compounds for residential, commercial or leisure 
purposes. Increasingly, these compounds denote neoliberal urban developments and 
highlight rising inequalities between social groups. The concept of gentrification (Glass, 
1964; Zukin, 1987; Hamnett, 2003) describes how real-estate and financial strategies 
drive urban transformations, colonising low-income neighbourhoods and displacing 
former residents. Both of these analytical frameworks have the merit of positioning cities 
as sites of value extraction and political struggles (Angotti, 2013; Smith, 2005); therefore, 
I acknowledge that there are many points, where the processes of digitalisation and 
enclavism/gentrification may converge in my research sites. However, the difference, 
therein, lies in the fact that I do not use either as my main interpretative angle. 
In my examination of urban digital zoning, I draw upon a more nuanced notion of 
zones, which embraces the multiple, flexible, and informal ways in which these spaces 
emerge in the city, as well as the multifaceted effects they produce. Some of the zones 
described in this section have been formally established via legal acts, whereas others are 
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demarcated de facto, in informal – but no less effective – ways, such as the massive 
employment of private security. Importantly, these zones are never fixed or stable. 
Propelled by rapid technological developments, governmental practices, and profit 
interests, they move incessantly: both horizontally, in trying to conquer new spaces and 
vertically, in an attempt to intensify the digitalisation of urban life. In so doing, they 




The Ghost City Goes Smart 
 
In 2015, New Town Kolkata applied for the Smart Cities Challenge, a competitive 
funding scheme (worth approximately USD 15 billion overall) that had been just launched 
by the Indian Government, with the aim of transforming 100 cities into digital and 
sustainable cities. Previously, New Town’s development had progressed in a rather 
controversial manner.5 The site was planned in the early nineties as a township, and a SEZ 
for the IT industry, in the rural area of Rajarhat, on the eastern fringes of Kolkata. Strong 
protests arose as the Left Front government, then in power, forcibly expropriated lands 
from farmers and villagers; thousands faced police brutality and were jailed or killed. In 
the following years, business parks, gated communities and luxury shopping malls began 
to rise alongside wastelands, villages, and slums. 
The development of New Town, which was largely a result of speculation and was 
hampered by the financial crisis of 2008, resulted in a paradoxical landscape of unfinished 




5 For a detailed account of the history of New Town see Dey et al. (2013), Beyond Kolkata: Rajarhat 
and the Dystopia of Urban Imagination (Routledge India). 
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Ananya Roy described the township as “the ghost town of home-grown neoliberalism, 
one where the ruins of the suburban middle-class dream are starkly visible” (2011, p. 275). 
Attracted by the low cost of labour and land, IT firms, such as IBM, Tata Consultancy 
Services, Wipro, and Accenture, have established branches in New Town6, where they 
run the more basic and menial tasks of the industry, such as software beta testing and 
business process outsourcing (Rossiter, 2016). However, and despite its efforts to appeal 
to global capital, the town is, largely, kept alive by the informal economy – street vendors, 
rickshaw pullers and migrant construction workers, etc. – that persists alongside the 
corporate buildings and upscale retailers. At a point when New Town seemed to be stuck 
in a (deeply-postcolonial) condition of suspended development, and veering disturbingly 
towards urban dystopia, as Dey and her colleagues (2013) document, the Smart City 
Challenge must have appeared to local authorities and investors as a great chance to 
resurrect the fortunes of the township. 
The Smart City Proposal (SCP) for New Town (2015) was developed through 
negotiation among several public agencies, consultants, and economic stakeholders, 
including New Town Kolkata Development Authority (NKDA), the Housing 
Infrastructure Development Corporation of West Bengal (HIDCO), Future Cities 
Catapult, Cisco, the American Chamber of Commerce in India (AmCham India), the 
Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), and the National Association of Software and 
Service Companies (NASSCOM). It was centred on the Pan City Solution, a holistic 
system of digital infrastructures and centralised urban management. As reported in the 




6 Before moving to New Town, these firms already had offices in Sector V, a previously established 
tech hub in the area of Bidhannagar (Salt Lake) Kolkata. The Sector V branches are still operating. 
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approximately USD 304.6 million) was partially covered by public funding and partially 
reliant on Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). In order to make the project sustainable, 
NKDA plans to levy GIS-based property taxes and to raise the cost of building-plan and 
occupancy fees for the plots of land that are still available for development. 
The SCP document is not particularly consistent. On one hand, and in tune with the 
standard vision of a smart city that is promoted by IT firms and consultants, it aims to 
develop a sensing urban environment. Therein, infrastructures – from bus shelters to waste 
bins, from water metres to light poles – will be extensively equipped with sensors, GPS 
trackers and cameras, and services will be delivered via mobile applications. The data 
coming from the sensing infrastructures will be integrated, cross-checked, and processed, 
via analytics, in a single command and control room. On the other hand, and quite at odds 
with its claim to innovation, the plan includes very basic elements of urban development, 
such as, sidewalks, public toilets, and street lights. Overall, Pan City resembles a sort of 
vernacular version of mainstream smart city projects, where the push towards fast 
digitalisation coexists with a need to provide essential infrastructures and services. The 
contradictions emerged so far: between the aspirations towards a global model of urban 
development and the lack of basic facilities; and between corporate enclaves and 
dispossessed workers, are crucial to understanding how borders cut through the process 
of digitalisation. 
At the gates of Ecospace, a business park built by the Bengali property developer, 
Ambuja Neotia, a line of people is forming, waiting to get in. The bottleneck is caused by 
the security checks, where two private guards perform, with little excitement, the same 
set of action for every visitor. They ask to see the badge of those who work inside the 
premises, they register the names and reasons for visiting from the others, they scan the 
entrants’ bodies with a handheld metal-detector, and put their bags, if they have them, 
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inside the x-ray scanner. This security routine is a common feature of upscale commercial 
buildings in India – its major purpose it to reassure middle-class customers and to 
discourage beggars and allegedly suspect people – and it does not signal any innovation 
in itself. On the contrary, it exemplifies how new smart spaces absorb the sedimented 
practices of demarcation and filter, and the social significance attached to them. 
Inside the Ecospace enclave, smart city projects feel closer and more credible than in 
many other places in Kolkata. The buildings, which are surrounded by lush gardens and 
fountains, are managed through a Building Automation System (BAS) that controls 
ventilation, temperature, power systems, and water. A number of IT companies have their 
offices here. In the first stages of New Town’s development, which was marked by 
political tensions and social unrest, the implementation of digital technologies took place 
behind the walls of upscale, private developments, such as Ecospace, which were 
protected by with checkpoints and extensive CCTV coverage. For several years now, the 
residents, customers, and corporate employees have been able to experience a smart 
environment within the gates of business districts, shopping malls, and residential towers. 
At the same time, the informal sector and lower-income strata of the population still 
struggle to access the internet and digital devices. They are kept out of these enclaves or 
only admitted as a workforce under strict surveillance. 
According to the Internet and Mobile Association of India (IAMAI), India has 450 
million Internet users (IAMAI, 2019), slightly more than one third of the overall 
population. This indicates that, whilst digital technologies are definitely becoming more 
affordable and widespread, a large part of the population still has no access to them. In 
addition to statistics, many of my insights into the uneven distribution of digital 
technologies among the population of New Town, came from interviews and personal 
conversations that I had with informants from different social and professional groups, 
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during my fieldwork. For example, A, a thirty-six-year-old man, who worked informally 
as a (car) driver for a private company, did not own a smartphone. He kindly agreed to 
answer some questions, while he was driving me around the city, despite the fact that my 
zero knowledge of Bengali and his basic English made the conversation quite 
cumbersome. While we were stuck in traffic, between New Town and Sector V, he 
explained that buying a smartphone would be a considerable investment which would 
require months – and maybe even years of savings – or going into debt. With a precarious 
job and a large family to take care of, A could not see himself affording a smartphone in 
the near future. When I asked him whether he ever considered joining the fast-growing 
crowd of Uber drivers, he smiled and shook his head, as if I had asked something very 
naïve. Apparently, a smart upgrade was thousands of rupees away. In A’s experience, 
most Uber drivers cannot afford to buy a car, a smartphone, and the large data bundles 
that the app requires, so they have to take out loans or rent everything from middlemen.7 
Either way, A observed, it was all about debt, and too risky for someone in his position. 
A similar scenario of uneasy access to digital technologies emerged from my 
conversations with S, a woman in her late twenties, who worked as a security guard inside 
a corporate enclave. S never agreed (nor was she given permission by her supervisor) to 
give me a formal interview. However, we spoke informally several times, between the 
entrance, the visitors’ lounge and the corridors, while I was waiting to meet another of my 
interlocutors: a senior executive with his office in the building where S worked. S came 
from a rural village near Kolkata and, at the time of our conversations (May 2015), had 
been working in the private security sector for five years, for three different companies. 
She had learned some English, as part of her training as a security guard. In her current 
 
 




workplace, she had been promoted slightly upwards; from lower roles, such as screening 
and searching people at the main gate of the enclave or patrolling the premises, to her 
current position, where she receives visitors in the hall of one of the buildings and escorts 
them to their destinations. At least, she commented, she has the chance to sit down now, 
and to enjoy the air conditioning in the extreme summer weather. Similar to the 
aforementioned Ecospace, the business enclave where S works is a sort of smart outpost 
within New Town. It boasts automated infrastructures and hosts a high concentration of 
tech firms. However, S participates very little in this hi-tech world. She is not allowed to 
initiate a personal conversation with anyone who works in the offices and if she does 
speak to them – for strictly professional reasons – it must be with deference. Although she 
is in charge of surveillance, S is also subject to strict surveillance in the workplace, herself. 
She is only authorised to access certain areas of the compound, security cameras record 
everything she does, and she can be searched at any time, as part of a routine 
“trustworthiness assessment” within the company that employs her. Since the enclave’s 
security system is largely automated, and S does not own a smartphone or any digital 
device, she uses a company tablet during her working hours, to perform a number of tasks: 
recording visitors, compiling reports, and requesting authorisation, etc., but she needs to 
return it before leaving the premises. 
These conversations illuminate the huge contradictions that lie beneath the smart 
city’s veneer. Whereas technology is becoming cheaper and more accessible to a wider 
stratum of the population, smartphones, laptops, and computers remain out of reach for 
many workers in the informal sector, because of deeply-ingrained socio-economic factors. 
Beyond that, there is a gap – in income, education, and social agency – between the smart 
world of tech companies and business districts and the life of service workers, which smart 
city masterplans are not filling. 
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The first stage of the smart city is planned to be an Area Based Development (ABD). 
A digital citizen poll, on the MyGov website, selected one district of New Town to be 
transformed into a smart area, where new technologies and management systems will be 
tested and implemented first. The identified zone coincides with Action Areas 1A and 1C, 
those closest to the IT hub of Salt Lake Sector V and the most densely populated in New 
Town (Figure 11). Here, the implementation of infrastructures is more advanced than in 
the rest of the township. Urbanisation appears slightly more consistent, and informal 
settlements have been, largely, cleared out. Strategic facilities, such as a water treatment 
plant and the central bus station, are located here, as are some of New Town’s most 
important business sites and landmarks, such as the NKDA’s headquarters and the 

























Note. From Map of the area based development, New Town (n.d.). Smart City Proposal, Annexure 
2, (pp. 26–27). https://nkdamar.org/File/Smart%20City%201.pdf. 
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Meanwhile, outside the borders of the designated smart zone, large portions of New 
Town remain deprived of basic services and infrastructure. In Action Area II, just a few 
kms away, cutting-edge IT campuses are punctuated by wastelands, informal markets, and 
bustees, where running water and sewerage do not reach. The landscape is similar in the 
residential towers of Action Area III, a little further east, where the contrast between the 
inside and the outside of the new buildings is striking. Flashy corporate offices, such as 





Tata Consultancy Services Campus, Action Area II, New Town, February 2018 
 
 




Such conglomerations of intense development and deprivation are far from 
uncommon in most megacities in India; in fact, some view them as a major feature of 
Indian urbanisation (Schindler, 2014; Searle 2016). The same applies to the increasing 
securitisation of private and public spaces that has occurred over the past two decades, 
which filters interactions between the different urban worlds, while simultaneously 
introducing new forms of exploitation of the informal labour force (Gooptu, 2013). In 
New Town, digitalisation has not reversed these tendencies – at least not so far – but has 
rather grafted upon them. For the most part, smart developments have been concentrated 
within clusters of privilege, and access to them has been restricted on the basis of class and 
labour control. New Town’s smart city seems to be designed only for those who can 
afford to buy certain devices, to pay for data bundles, and to live in certain areas of the 
city. Those who remain outside of the smart developments, or on their margins, are 
allowed in but only as service workforce. The creation of this smart city seems to 
reinforce what Mezzadra and Neilson (2013) call an “internal border” (p. 151) that 
simultaneously fractures the urban space and the allegedly universal space of citizenship 
while imposing different levels of rights and mobility. 
 
 
Africa’s Smartest City 
 
In the previous pages, I described how smart city projects in the township of New 
Town Kolkata incorporate and reworke borders, informed by specific socio-economic 
processes. Now I move to my second research site, the city of Cape Town. In Chapter 1, 
I explained that my intention, in moving between these two sites, is not to conduct a 
comparative analysis, but rather to bring into focus the relations between global 
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tendencies – urban digitalisation and the mainstream smart city model – and the 
contingent, situated modalities wherein these tendencies hit the ground. 
A brief look into the recent urban history of Cape Town is enough to cast doubts on 
the idea that smart cities develop as seamless and harmonic environments. Cape Town is 
an old city with a complicated past: under the apartheid regime, its urban geography was 
aggressively rearranged to enforce racial segregation. While the central and seaside 
suburbs – nestled between the ocean and Table Mountain – became “whites only” areas, 
the black and coloured population was largely deported into overcrowded, underserviced 
townships in the Cape Flats on the south-eastern fringes of the city. More than twenty 
years after the end of apartheid, the socio-economic and infrastructural gaps between the 
townships and the former whites-only parts of the city remain huge. As one of the 
economic engines of the African continent, Cape Town contributes 9.8% of South 
Africa’s GDP. The service industry – finance, tourism, logistics, communication, media 
and IT – makes up almost 80% of the city’s gross added value (GVA), and attracts a 
significant volume of foreign direct investment, estimated at around R59 billion 
(approximately $4 billion) between 2003 and 2014 (City of Cape Town, 2016). 
Over the past two decades, the city has seen remarkable growth in the software design 
and development sector, including global success stories; such as, Mark Shuttleworth’s 
company, Thwate and the Ubuntu Project; Mxit, the most popular mobile social network 
in Africa; Fundamo, the world’s largest provider of mobile financial services; and many 
others (PWC, Wesgro & City of Cape Town 2013). In the wake of this trend, the 
environment for tech start ups has been identified as a key growth driver for both Cape 
Town and South Africa’s economy and it has become the focus of a number of support 
strategies. The University of Stellenbosch and the University of Cape Town have 
partnered with corporate funders, such as Napers and Siemens, to set up research labs in 
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new technologies; and business organisations, such as Accelerate Cape Town and the 
Silicon Cape Initiative strive to connect emerging companies with global venture capital. 
In addition, corporate and government discourses are looking at the IT sector not only as 
a priority for economic growth but also as a major factor for urban transformation. Digital 
Gateway to Africa (2013), a report compiled by consultancy firm PWC, Wesgro (the 
official tourism, trade and investment promotion agency for Cape Town and the Western 
Cape), and the City of Cape Town, is very explicit in stating that Cape Town needs to 
become a global tech hub, and the African Silicon Valley. The report suggests that tech 
companies need a smart city to expand their markets and to attract investors and skilled 
workforce. As I will soon demonstrate, there is a link between entrepreneurial strategies 
and smart city narratives and projects, and this link is reflected in the uneven distribution 
of infrastructures and the processes of digital zoning. 
Despite its thriving service and tech sectors, the city continues to battle with 
widespread poverty, high rates (around 45%) of unemployment, low access to education 
and essential services, which are strikingly higher among the black population (City of 
Cape Town, 2016). The Smart City Strategy for Cape Town includes a strong formal 
commitment to reduce the digital divide and to address the social inequality, inherited 
from apartheid, through IT access and services. The strategy was launched in 2000, by the 
city’s government. Its first stage was the Smart Cape Access project, implemented 
between 2002 and 2007, in partnership with IT companies, Xerox and CableCom Ltd, to 
provide free computers and internet access to public libraries in disadvantaged areas. In 
2009, the City began rolling out broadband fibre networks throughout the metropolitan 
area and building a platform for e-governance, with an estimated investment of R 1.7. 
billion (approximately USD 1.3 billion). 
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Notwithstanding these substantial investments from the city’s government, the digital 
landscape of the Mother City remains deeply uneven as infrastructures are concentrated, 
for the most part, in the wealthier, former whites-only areas of the city. A significant 
portion of its service delivery and urban management tasks has been decentralised to City 
Improvements Districts (CIDs): public-private partnerships that are funded through levies 
paid by property owners in a specific area. As a result, levels of digital access and the 
integration of services differ remarkably between suburbs, depending on the economic 
and social capabilities of residents. In addition, and as mentioned earlier, investment in 
smart technologies is largely driven by the private sector. In upscale suburbs, such as 
Camps Bay, Clifton, Llandudno, and Constantia, rich homeowners and tech companies 
are experimenting with the IoT, and turning oceanside mansions into domotic wonders, 
where everything from security cameras to garbage disposal is automated, and can be 
managed via voice command from anywhere in the world. The Central Business District 
(CBD) is populated with objects such as smart benches (Figure 13), which are equipped 




Smart Bench in Cape Town’s CBD 
 
 






In addition, a city initiative has recently designated four blocks of the city centre as a 
“smart zone,” where the Connect Pilot Project is going to be implemented. The project 
will deliver open-access fibre optic broadband to all the buildings in the block, and the 
smart zone will be “a confined urban living laboratory for the City to design and test smart 
device solutions such as traffic light systems, water and electricity meter management 
systems, CCTV camera and Wi-Fi/Radio technology systems” (“Cape Town CBD gets 
smart”, 2018). In central neighbourhoods, such as De Waterkant, Green Point, Sea Point, 
and Gardens, everyday life can already be managed at the touch of a button, as an 
increasing number of apps compete to cater every possible need: from car rides to meals 
and grocery delivery, and from domestic work on demand to cashless payments. Many of 
these apps originated in the business parks and co-working spaces of Woodstock. Here, a 
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myriad of start ups are working on creative software design; including, remote sensing, 
financial services, animation, AI, and M2M communication, while branding themselves, 
and Cape Town, the “Silicon Cape.” 
Advancements in digitalisation are coinciding with high levels of securitisation, 
which multiply the borders across certain portions of the city. The presence of security 
officers, CCTV, electric wires, biometric checkpoints, and private patrols on the streets is 
a typical feature of the smarter areas of Cape Town. Here, not only access to private 
buildings but also circulation in public spaces is strictly monitored, and poor black people, 
in particular, are targeted by public and private security. This is not a new phenomenon. 
Rather it fits into a tradition of governance in public spaces in Cape Town. For example, 
Tony Samara (2010) pointed out how private policing, in the regenerated areas of the city 
centre, reproduced forms of racialised governance and segregation within the 
postapartheid urban context (Samara, 2010). Rather than taking down barriers and making 
the urban environment more accessible and inclusive for all, so far the diffusion of digital 
technologies seems only to have reinforced forms of control and differential inclusion 
around the smart clusters of the city. 
The conditions of digital infrastructure are dramatically different in the townships, 
where large portions of residents still lack access to basic utilities, such as pipe water or 
sewerage. In Khayelitsha and Mitchell’s Plain, with populations of 391,749 and 310,485, 
respectively (City of Cape Town 2011), broadband penetration is weak and residents rely 
on a limited number of city-installed Wi-Fi hotspots: 69, according to the most recent 
State of Cape Town Report (City of Cape Town, 2016). The following map (Figure 14) 
is revealing, in that it shows the fibre-based internet coverage in the Cape Town 
metropolitan area. The covered zones are highlighted in purple and clearly none of them 







Map of fibre penetration in Cape Town 
 
 






No Smart Food Delivery in the Township 
 
 






The story of Z is paradigmatic of the spatial, socio-economic, and technological abyss 
between smart Cape Town and the townships. Z, twenty-eight years old, lives in the 
township of Mitchell’s Plain. She works as a cleaner, without a contract, for several 
households in central Cape Town. I met her in the oceanside suburb of Sea Point, where 
one of her clients lives. She chuckled when I mentioned the smart city; this concept clearly 
did not mean much to her. Everyday Z travels around 32 kms from her home in the 
township to the city on a collective minibus. Uber drivers will not cover her route, not 
will food couriers bring dinner or groceries to at her doorstep (Figure 15). However, even 
if they did, with her low salary Z can barely afford one or two gigabytes (GBs) of 
mobile data per month, which she needs to save to communicate with her employers; no 
data is left for leisure. At times, she has struggled to keep her precarious jobs, because 
employers expected her to reply promptly to WhatsApp messages, at any hour, and she 
could not always afford to be online. 
Z’s case is not isolated. In 2016, the #DataMustFall campaign exposed how low- 
income South Africans are basically locked out from the digital economy (Cameron, 
2017). Starting as a Twitter hashtag, the movement quickly grew to a mass protest against 
the unaffordable prices of mobile data and the oligopolistic conditions of the market. For 
around 50% of South Africans, one GB of mobile data costs between 15 and 40% of their 
income. Residents are offline in neighbourhoods where public Wi-Fi does not reach, such 
as in Z’s neighbourhood. Overall, it is estimated that less than 40% of the metropolitan 
population has access to a computer on regular basis; 29.38% of households have no 




This social/technological gap has become the terrain of intervention for NGOs, which 
provide access to the internet, as well as to computers and laptops, in their township 
outposts. For example, the Bandwidth Barn, a tech incubator based in the central start up 
district of Woodstock, operates a branch in Khayelitsha. Here, the lack of access to digital 
technologies has become an opportunity to forge a new generation of entrepreneurs, who 
are combining a developmental mission with a market-oriented pedagogical intervention 
(Pollio, 2019c). Start Up Weekends and entrepreneurial hackathons regularly take place 
at the Barn, where access to the infrastructures and skills provided is tied to specific 
requirements, such as presenting an entrepreneurial project, writing a business model or 
competing against each other. The rationale of these events is to cultivate neoliberal 
subjectivities, for which the only way out of poverty is through individual success on the 
market. Interestingly, Pollio (2019c) notes that some of the participants subvert or exceed 
this narrative, making use of the Barn’s events to acquire skills that they then use in 
service of collective, non-profit projects, rather than for individual business projects. 
Generally, the geography of digitalisation in Cape Town still reflects (disturbingly) 
the spatial organisation of the apartheid city. As in the case of New Town, we can see an 
internal border that runs through the creation of the smart city, which fragments the 
promise of holistic urban harmony into clusters of privilege versus areas of deprivation. 
Rather than helping reduce the social and technological gap, developmental interventions 
such as tech incubators are filtering and targeting the provisioning of internet and digital 
devices, in keeping with a specific agenda. The Barn’s educational initiatives make it clear 
that township residents are differentially included in the vision and technologies of the 
smart city. Only those who show (or pretend to show) commitment to entrepreneurial 
value deserve access to technologies, skills and further opportunities. Within the logic of 
tech incubators, digital infrastructures are not seen as a basic service for collective 
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emancipation, but as a tool of neoliberal pedagogy for social selection. This aligns to the 
technologies of poverty management (Ferguson, 2010 2015; Roy, 2011; Pollio, 2019) 
described earlier (Chapter 1, pp. 37- 40), where entrepreneurialism is cultivated as a 
strategy to overcome poverty, as part of a postapartheid governmentality. 
The internal border does not only mark the divide between the city centre and its 
peripheries. For example, N, a young woman in her mid-twenties, works as a receptionist 
in a co-working space in Woodstock. As mentioned earlier, this is one of the “smartest” 
area of the city, at least going by the number of tech start ups that have colonised the 
neighbourhood. N does not come from the townships; she grew up and still lives nearby, 
in the neighbourhood of Salt River. Historically Woodstock is a working-class area where 
white, black, and coloured residents have always coexisted, but which is now undergoing 
heavy gentrification. After graduating from high school, N took up her job as a 
receptionist, with an idea of putting some money aside before possibly going to university, 
although her salary does not really allow for much saving. N was also somewhat 
aesthetically attracted to the job; she liked the idea of working in a “cool” environment, 
close to young entrepreneurs, and thought that “something good might come out of it” in 
terms of contacts, knowledge, and opportunities (personal conversation, October 2015). 
N works in a building, which is a former industrial facility and which has been 
recently converted into offices and co-working spaces. Similar to many buildings in the 
area it is – needless to say – a smart building. Sensors control the doors, adjust the lights 
automatically to the level of natural light outside, regulate room temperature and the level 
of oxygen, and activate irrigation for the plants. N is required to use several of the 
applications for building management. She also has to manage the co-working space’s 
social network accounts. In fact, her job largely consists of embodying the smartness of 
her workplace on different levels – from her look to her familiarity with the automated 
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systems. However, she is not allowed to connect to the superfast Wi-Fi in the building for 
personal use or on her own devices, although the same Wi-Fi is uncapped for tenants and 
guests. The large iMac she uses at her desk is surveilled. N knows that she is under 
surveillance too; her supervisor will know if she takes too long a break, if she looks at her 
phone too often, or if she has friends visit, from the CCTV. The co-working space 
regularly hosts seminars and workshops for the tenants, on topics ranging from 
fundraising for start ups to coding. When N asked if she could attend one of those events, 
which she felt could be useful for her own future path, the reply was that she was “not in 
the position to.” Although N did not really complain about her working conditions, her 
story shows how subtle yet effective the borders around and within the smart zones of 
Cape Town can be. In this example, and similar to the earlier examples from New Town, 
the filters are activated by different labour regimes. Full access to urban smartness is only 
available to certain types of working position and to those eligible for corporate 
citizenship: in this case, start uppers and the tenants of business spaces. Service workers, 
such as N are kept on the very fringe – they can access smart zones and technologies only 
inasmuch as it is required from them as members of the workforce. 
The review of progress in the making of smart cities, presented so far, indicates that, 
far from creating the harmonic and integrated environment promised by commercial 
narratives, urban digitalisation occurs through the demarcation of zones and borders that 
incorporate and rework long-standing patterns of control and segregation. These can be 
informally established, as happens with gated communities and hyper-securitised 
enclaves, or by “soft” normative means, such as the pilot project areas. The processes of 
digital zoning reflect conditions of inequality and practices of governance that are deeply 
ingrained within the urban fabric. This is evident in New Town Kolkata, with the 
polarisation between the clusters of advanced development and wealth versus the large 
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pools of deprivation; and in Cape Town, where the legacy of the apartheid regime persists, 
with its corollary of urban segregation and inequality. Additionally, digital zoning is 
driven by processes that see government initiatives and strategies of value extraction 
aligned, or complementing each other, as in the Smart City Proposal for New Town, and 
in the semi-private management of urban spaces and the prominent role of the tech 
industry in Cape Town’s digital planning. Despite their informal or judicially “soft” 
nature, these zones mark different regimes of development, citizenship, and rights. 
The borders that enclose, and run within, the smart zones of New Town and Cape 
Town are heavily securitised, but they are not necessarily smart borders. As explained 
earlier in this chapter, smart borders entail not only the use of specific digital techniques 
but, more importantly, an anticipatory logic that is expressed through monitoring and 
profiling. At the gates of the smart enclaves, the presence of bored security guards and the 
rituals they perform suffice, in most cases, to intimidate and deter unwanted visitors. The 
physical checkpoints are little more than symbols of a more complex and deeper 
combination of socio-economic factors, which regulate access to smart infrastructures and 
zones. The cases I have presented, in the last few pages, illustrate various configurations 
of colour and class, labour conditions, and urban segregation acting as dispositifs of 
differential inclusion in the smart city. However, the relations between smart cities and 
smart borders are not limited to the processes of digital zoning or to the various barriers 
and filters that operate around smart clusters and technologies. In the following sections, 
I will illustrate how smart borders are also part of the sensing and computing 






Mr. S is enthusiastic as he describes the new infrastructure planned for New Town 
Area Based Development (ABD), the first step of the proposed smart city. As an executive 
in the public sector, Mr. S has had the opportunity to closely observe and, to some extent, 
make decisions about the creation of a smart New Town. After long email negotiations, 
he agreed to give me an “unofficial” interview. We met in the lobby of the Novotel hotel, 
not far from the NKDA’s offices in New Town. The huge square building of the luxury 
hotel looks out to an unfinished rail flyover and several more towers, under construction. 
Mr S showed me a rendering of the future city, where the surroundings looked 
dramatically different from today. Visibly thrilled, he explained how sensors would be 
installed in every house, vehicle, public area, and piece of infrastructure. “We will not spy 
on people, but we will know everything about the city,” said Mr. S fervently, “We will 
have the real data. We will know if buses run late, if garbage bins are full, if someone felt 
sick on the street, everything.” By “we,” he meant the municipal authority, the central 
control room, and the management software. Drains, garbage bins, bus stops, light poles, 
solar panels, and traffic lights turn into monitoring hubs that continuously send data to the 
management software. “This (the smart city project, a/n) is not the big brother. This is 
citizen-based. Citizen will cooperate with their data; they are very happy to, they are 
enthusiastic” (Personal conversation, May 2015). Clearly, in Mr S’s words, citizen 
cooperation coincides with a willingness to be identified, tracked and authorised in every 
step they take. What Mr. S presents as a seamless interconnection of data, infrastructure 
and living experience is, in fact, a dissemination of the logic and practices of border 
management, across several domains of urban life and often on a microscopic level, as I 
will explain shortly. 
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Mr. S’s remarks introduce a further dimension of bordering processes, which emerge 
from the making of smart cities. In the previous chapters I illustrated how digitalisation 
entails zoning processes, whereby access to the smart hubs of the city is restricted or 
filtered through various methods; including security checkpoints, different labour 
regimes, and different options to accessing digital technologies. In the following pages, I 
will look at the ways in which borders become ubiquitous across the city. Smart city 
projects rely on computing systems, which are built around the same techniques of 
monitoring, algorithmic measurement, identification, and profiling – the so-called smart 
borders – that are currently in use for the management of national borders, as well as for 
policing and crime investigation. In the smart city, the logic and techniques of the smart 
border become the grammar of urban life and management; from water supply to tax 
policies, as well as a number of everyday activities; such as getting on a bus or going to 
the doctor. I argue that these bordering processes are also active in the spheres of 
perception, cognition, and relations. 
As mentioned earlier, the formation of digital cities and the relations between code 
and space have been described in terms of socio-technical assemblages (Kitchin & Perng, 
2016). In her book Program Earth, Jennifer Gabrys (2016) examines the making of 
computing environments, from both an empirical and theoretical perspective. Drawing on 
Albert North Whitehead’s notion of “concrescence” and Gilbert Simondon’s notion of 
“concretization,” Gabrys (2016) moves beyond the idea of assemblage as a mere 
aggregation of existing elements: sensing infrastructures and ubiquitous computing 
systems, Gabrys argues, actually rewrite the relations between different entities, 
producing new forms of connection, expression, and action. Thus, computing 
environments come into being through relational processes, where computing becomes 
environmental, while simultaneously, the environment becomes computational. 
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Importantly, as Gabrys points out, this discussion of the environment strongly resonates 
with Foucault’s notion of milieu, as the setting where modes of governance unfold, and 
of environmentality “as a spatial-material distribution and relationality of power through 
environments, technologies, and ways of life” (Gabrys, 2016, p. 187). Building on this 
aspect, I focus on how power circulates and the functions that make this circulation 
visible, across the urban computing environment. In this sense, smart borders are tools 
that articulate the power relations between humans, resources, infrastructures, and 
computing systems, through distinct techniques, such as monitoring, identification, and 
profiling. 
In New Town Kolkata and Cape Town, the ways in which smart borders are 
embedded in everyday life, and restructure relationships and the cognitive/affective 
sphere, can be registered at different levels and in different forms. More precisely, the 
plans for smart New Town envision a consistent urban system, wherein an extensive 
number of services and activities carry out border functions, reshaping the patterns of 
attention and interaction between human and non-human components, citizens, and 
government. I will also show how, in Cape Town, monitoring, profiling, and other smart 
border techniques have been independently tested by different public and private actors, 
and have already created new (power) relations. 
 
 
We Will Know Everything 
 
The plans for a smart New Town (or at least, for the Area Based Development 
described earlier in this chapter) leave little to chance. Login credentials are required to 
access municipal services on the e-governance platform. Real-time data on power 
consumption is sent from smart meters and automatically cross-referenced with 
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information on housing occupancy and shared with the police, to detect potential “illegal” 
residents. The management software will be able to elaborate profiles, at both the 
individual and collective levels, of health or diseases in the city, through a network of 
telemedicine kiosks, installed on every block, and through health-related apps connected 
to the mobile governance platform. Mobility apps will record the itineraries of people 
across the city, as well as their use of public transport, cars, taxis, and other vehicles. Light 
poles and bus stops will double as surveillance spots, with CCTV performing facial 
recognition, while drones provide bird’s-eye monitoring. While most of these projects are 
still only on paper, they already allow us to grasp the logic of a future urban environment, 
where citizenship is measured through compliance with a new regime of urban borders. 
Borrowing from the vocabulary of Jacques Rancière, I suggest that these pervasive 
micro-borders will enact a new “distribution of the sensible” in individual users and 
collective urban life, which will have strong normative effects. In his book, The Politics 
of Aesthetics (2004), Rancière argues that any social order is constructed through a 
specific distribution (or partition) of the sensible. This concept illustrates how distinct 
modes of perception set the boundaries between what can be seen or not seen, said or not 
said, heard or not heard, measured or not measured and, ultimately, between what is licit 
or illicit. Rancière describes social roles and forms of participation that are defined 
through specific distributions of the sensible, which can at once include and exclude. 
Given this, every social and political system is firstly an aesthetic regime – where the term 
“aesthetic” refers to what is experienced through the senses – insofar as it is organised 
through distinct forms of perception and the sensorial relations between humans, objects, 
and nature. Whereas Rancière’s analysis engages in a detailed examination of historical 
examples of the politics of the aesthetic, herein I appropriate the notion of the distribution 
of the sensible and put it at work in a very different context. I will employ it to analyse 
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how smart technologies are reconfiguring urban life and to explore their bordering 
functions further. I argue that the distribution of the sensible is part of the same 
ontogenetic processes that is discussed by Gabrys (2016), as forms of perception shape 
the ways in which relations unfold between various environmental components. 
Examining the reconfiguration of the senses and the creation of new modes of existence, 
which connect humans and things, is essential to understanding how the computing milieu 
is governed. In other words, how do sensors and analytics produce new distributions of 
the sensible in the smart city, and what is the effect on the human and non-human elements 
involved? 
When sensors – in their various versions: trackers, beacons, cameras, wearables, etc. 
 
– are applied to distinct components of urban sensors, they enable new modalities of 
perception and interaction. They remodulate the patterns of attention towards the 
concerned object, resource or activity. They can invite and even force user’s attention or, 
conversely, they can deliberately avoid it, when they are invisible. They signal that a 
certain component is important in the urban system. They warn that what happens around 
that component is going to be scrutinised and assessed. Whether they are demanding or 
rejecting attention from humans, sensors are definitely attentive to selected dynamics, and 
at the same time, indifferent to others. In doing these things, they reconfigure the order of 
things, perception, and thoughts. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this occurs through 
specific techniques of monitoring and identification. 
The application of sensors means that situations, which previously might have gone 
unnoticed (such as the number of people concentrated in a certain area, or the quantity 
and quality of air particles, or the amount of garbage in a bin) become necessary 
application points of the urban attention. This attention is political, and it unfolds 
simultaneously on interrelated levels. Firstly, it demands the engagement of citizens, who 
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are required to take part into the sensing process, by sending data, remaining aware of the 
information available, and behaving accordingly. At the same time, sensors dictate the 
modalities in which this interaction takes place: through the mediation of digital devices, 
apps, and platforms. Secondly, while contributing to the monitoring activity, citizens 
become objects of scrutiny themselves, through the ubiquitous practices of profiling, as 
described earlier. Thirdly, the attention of sensors marks the specific targets of urban 
policies and intervention: where there are sensors, there is also government. Fourthly, 
sensing networks produce new maps and new definitions of what is to be perceived and 
lived as a urban system. 
 
 
Watching, Tracking, Scoring 
 
Differently from New Town Kolkata, where smart infrastructures are largely still on 
paper or under construction, sensing and computing systems in Cape Town have already 
been implemented. Their implementation has not followed a single masterplan, but has 
occurred through a number of public and private initiatives, at various levels. In 2003, the 
city was one of the first in the world to implement an Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) 
system, provided by software colossus, SAP, to organise various components of the 
administration into a single, integrated platform. The initiative was successful enough for 
some commentators to assert that “SAP runs Cape Town” (“Case Study”, 2013). 
Currently, the software is responsible for service delivery, human resources, logistics, and 
finance. The software also creates one single record of each citizen, by running analytics 
across different data sets, from employment history and income levels, to diseases, 
addictions, and criminal records. This personal record comprises a process of algorithmic 
scoring and profiling, which determines the citizen’s position in the system and, 
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consequently, her access to (or denial of) benefits and services. On this basis, city 
managers claim to be able to identify needs and vulnerabilities more accurately, and to 
detect potential frauds. This profiling capacity is celebrated as a game-changer for urban 
administration. In the meantime however, the rounds of micro- border- credentials, access 
to the platform, and authorisation that citizens must go through, to access municipal 
services, are multiplying. Here, the preemptive logic of the smart border – conceived, let 
us remember, to detect potential terrorists or “enemies,” whatever that means – comes 
into play, reshaping the application of social policies and poverty relief. 
Citizens are tracked, scored, and profiled with the purpose of anticipating behaviours, 
which might become a burden on the city budget, and of developing cost-effective 
strategies. For example, households, which are profiled as low-income and potentially 
unable to pay for services, are offered discounts on their bills. This is less expensive for 
the city than enforcing debt collection. Making people feel that the municipal government 
has an accurate, comprehensive view of them is also described as a preemptive strategy 
for discouraging fraudulent behaviour (“Case Study”, 2013). Under this system, citizens’ 
rights and entitlements become subject to a continuous process of scrutiny and validation. 
Households or individuals who fail to pay their bills or to comply with legislation can be 
flagged and thereafter punished through the reduction of services or the denial of social 
benefits. 
The securitisation of private property is another field where monitoring and profiling 
have caught on significantly. On a clear winter’s day in Cape Town, I sat with AV, a 
senior officer in a private security company, in a sun-filled room with a stunning view of 
the ocean. We were in one of the most exclusive suburbs of the city, where the houses are 
architectural (and domotic) masterpieces hovering above the ocean and where every non- 
white person in sight is a driver, a housekeeper, a garbage-picker or a guard. Here, the 
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whites-only doctrine is de facto still in place and residents join forces to hire private 
security companies to “look after property and personal safety.” Signs on the walls advise 
visitors that they are in a zero-crime/zero-tolerance neighbourhood. CCTV systems, 
enabled with facial recognition software, are everywhere to identify suspicious presences. 
AV only agreed to speak to me, after some hard pressing and repeated promises of 
anonymity. A white, middle-aged man of chivalrous manners, AV was proud of his past 
in the South African Special Forces. He described how their job as “security providers” 
has changed over the past few years, with the introduction of smart technologies. Facial 
recognition, he explained, has made their operations easier and more efficient as it has 
reduced field officers’ responsibility. Before facial recognition, “it was entirely up to the 
single officer, the single patrol to detect the threat” (Interview, October 2015). This 
entailed the risk of mistakes, distraction, physical incidents or collusion. 
In South African security companies, senior officers and managers are often white, 
whereas field officers are mostly black and from a poor background. According to AV, 
this could have meant that “sometimes the guard and the bad guy know each other; maybe 
they come from the same part of the city, maybe they have friends in common; our guy 
doesn’t make much money on the job … you know.” The new software prevents all that. 
When a camera detects a suspect profile on the street, it sends a warning to the officers in 
the local control room: “No more mistakes, no more collusion, less risks for the staff,” 
said AV. The software in use is proprietary and is not connected to the South African 
Police’s database. It creates its own database of risk profiles, to which all the companies 
that purchase the software have access. I asked AV what criteria the software uses to 
decide whether a presence was suspect, and whether there might be bias towards the black 
population. AV looked at me candidly as he explained that facial recognition “obviously 
(sic)” targeted young black individuals “who have no properties, and therefore no business 
116 
 
in the area, except causing troubles (sic) (...) there is no bias in that; we are not racist, it is 
just a matter of fact” (Interview, October 2015). 
The above conversation shows that the deployment of sensing networks across the 
city contributes to the circulation of logics and practices of profiling that embed patterns 
of discrimination, which have been consolidated and naturalised across the deeply-divided 
Capetonian urban society. AV firmly denied that the facial recognition software was 
biased or racist, because, in his view, it is only obvious that black people are “trouble”; it 
is merely a fact. These kinds of assumption are shared by a considerable portion of the 
white, wealthy residents, who install facial recognition and, thus, are literally encoded in 
these technologies. 
Whereas this association of border techniques and instruments of digital surveillance 
might not come as a complete surprise, it shows that practices of identification and 
profiling are at work well beyond the field of security, and in more innocent and even 
“virtuous” fields. Since 2015, Cape Town has faced long droughts and the worst water 
crisis in its history. As the levels of dams and reservoir continued to go down, severe 
restrictions were enforced on water consumptions. These included smart water meters; 
officially called Water Management Devices (WMDs). These devices were originally 
conceived of as disciplinary instruments for unruly households – typically low-income 
black families – that consumed more water than they could pay for. However, as the water 
crisis escalated, smart meters were also made available to assist the non-indigent 
households to save water. The smart meters are connected through IoT networks and 
managed via mobile platforms. They monitor real-time water usage for each user, 
detecting and reporting anomalous events, such as leakage, and creating profiles of 
consumption. They even switch the water off when users reach their daily limit. Once 
again, and similar to what happened with the SAP municipal platform, growing number 
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of households’ access to an essential service, such as water, has become dependent on 
algorithmic scrutiny, scoring, and validation. Now that the crisis seems to have been 
contained, or at least postponed (Chutel, 2018), smart meters are also being celebrated as 
game-changers (“Smart water solutions”, 2017). Planning documents (De Sousa-Alves, 
2016) illustrate how the city is working towards an increased automation of the water 
system: introducing the control and reading of meters via IoT devices and the use of 
analytics to develop proactive strategies. 
The proliferation of mobile apps for managing more and more aspects of urban life – 
at least in some areas of the city – is another massive engine of data sourcing and 
processing in Cape Town. Simply by logging in and allowing access to personal data, and 
though accessing services, from workouts to maps, users are continuously undergoing the 
micro-processes of identification and tracking. Of course, the proliferation of apps is not 
exclusive to Cape Town, and can be observed as a symptom of digitalisation across 
several domains, on a global level. However, within the context of Cape Town, the growth 
of app-based services is directly linked to the development of the local tech sector, which 
in turn is registered as an indicator of urban smartness and a key factor in the 
transformation of the city into the digital capital of Africa.1 Moreover, the concentration 
of app-based services in only the wealthiest and whiter areas of the city, signals, once 
again, the uneven and bordered distribution of digital infrastructures across the urban 
population. 
In the absence of a single, holistic smart-city masterplan, the control of sensing 
technologies and computational processes in Cape Town is dispersed amidst a number of 
actors, many of which are private companies. Via its SAP platform, the city government 
 
 
1 A more detailed analysis of the app landscape and of the tech sector in Cape Town will be provided 
in Chapter 4. 
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uses predictive analytics to re-calibrate the delivery of services and governance, while 
also hosting an Open Data portal. The fact that the city government relies so crucially on 
private software, designed to run firms and to maximise cost-effectiveness as their key 
priorities, raises questions about the nature and the implications of this relationship. In an 
interview with an online magazine, Andre Stelzner, Chief Information Officer (CIO) of 
the City of Cape Town, declared that “SAP's core value is that it provides a set of 
procedures that the council and its employees follow to run the city” and that “from a 
political perspective, there is not much scope for radical change, since the way the city 
operates is encoded into the SAP system” (“Case Study”, 2013). Managing a city by using 
procedures that are encoded in private software, Stelzner suggests, makes politics 
irrelevant. 
The adoption of the SAP platform for urban management in Cape Town resonates 
with a trend in the modalities of governance that scholars have observed in the field of 
logistics (Neilson, 2012; Cowen, 2014; Easterling, 2014; Rossiter, 2016). In the global 
logistics industry, the movement of labour and commodities across roads, railways, 
warehouses, ships, and ports, has been increasingly inscribed into, and governed through, 
ERP software and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs). These instruments seek to 
anticipate and neutralise contingencies, be they labour unruliness or technical incidents, 
in order to maximise efficiency and cost-effectiveness. A similar logic seems to be active 
in the operation of Cape Town’s SAP platform, which translates the city’s political 
problems, such as households that are too poor to pay their bills, into algorithmic-powered 
“politics of parameters” (Rossiter, 2016). This tendency towards the logistification of 
urban government raises questions about the friction between a political agenda that is 
committed, at least formally, towards social justice, and the procedures of automated 
platforms that are built around the imperative of cost-effectiveness. 
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In parallel, massive amounts of urban data are being harvested and algorithmically 
processed, privately, by an ever-growing number of commercial platforms and devices as 
part of corporate business operations. As I will illustrate in Chapter 4, the smart city in 
the making and its flows of data have become a field of intense speculation and extractive 
operations, led by capitalist actors. Once again, another line of tension emerges here, 
between digitalisation as a path towards urban justice – as the city government presents it 
– and capitalist strategies. As these processes and friction emerge, smart borders become 
increasingly embedded and routinised in a growing number of public and private 
procedures, and constitutive of the very fabric of urban life. 
 
 
Quantification and Blackboxing 
 
The examples from New Town Kolkata and Cape Town, presented so far, indicate 
how the distribution of the sensible operates across sensors and analytics processes, where 
the performances of urban components are algorithmically broken down into factors of 
normality, deviation, and risk, and then re-assembled into predictive models. The work of 
sensors and algorithms sets out distinct boundaries between what can/must be seen or not 
seen, allowed or not, made actionable or not. In Kolkata, we saw how infrastructures for 
extensive quantification are being set up through the proliferation of micro-borders. In 
Cape Town, we saw that policies and practices of quantification are already restructuring 
urban administration and security. Moreover, wearables and apps that monitor and 
measure features of the human body and the urban environment (heart activity, calories 
burnt, quality of sleep, the intensity of traffic, water consumption, the presence of sharks 
in the ocean, etc.) are burgeoning. 
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In the next sections of this thesis, more space will be given to an analysis of the 
algorithmic inferences used in analytics and modelling, and their consequences on urban 
politics. For now, however, it is important to stress that the ways in which analytics and 
modelling render urban elements determines what is worth paying attention to, and what 
is worth measuring. I argue that this is a significant epistemic step, where the very practice 
of measuring becomes the measure of worth itself. In practice, if something is not 
inscribed in the computational grid, if it is not quantified, it does not matter in the smart 
urban system. 
The processes of quantification and the distribution of the sensible, which I observed 
in my case studies, are clearly not local instances only, but are part of a global trend that 
has drawn critical attention. In a recent article, media scholar, Shannon Mattern (2018), 
critically reviews projects such as Human Understanding through Measurement and 
Analytics (HUMAN), a partnership between the Interdisciplinary Study of Decision 
Making and the Centre for Urban Science and Progress at New York University. The 
project will collect data from around 10,000 volunteers, chosen as representative samples 
of 100 micro-neighbourhoods, which, according to the project leaders, embody New York 
City’s diversity. The project will measure a wide range of data from urban residents – 
from their genomes, to where they go, what they eat and what they buy, etc. The city and 
its inhabitants are quantified simultaneously and to the greatest possible extent. Mattern 
points out the cultural and political biases, silent assumptions and potential risks that are 
attached to these types of project. More broadly, she notes the uncritical algorithmic 
enthusiasm that large parts of the scientific community and city managers share. More 
than any potential insight that might be gained from the data, it is the prospect of 
unprecedented quantification as such that seems to drive the research strategy. The 
possibility of breaking down lives and environments into measurable components and 
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letting algorithms glean figures from of them, is itself the purpose and the legitimation of 
the project. 
The example of the HUMAN project is relevant to my discussion on the distribution 
of the sensible and digital ontogenesis; i.e. how forms of perception, forms of life and 
relations are created and reshaped within computing environments. In the HUMAN 
project, not only the researchers but also the researched are invited to distribute their 
sensations and aesthetic categories according to specific computing requirements. 
Participants have to rethink themselves and the world they live in as discrete datasets, and 
their experiences as performances that must be measured. To date, the HUMAN project 
is quite a unique example, where faith in intensive quantification is associated with a 
definitive scientific mission. In parallel, however, and as my examples from Kolkata and 
Cape Town demonstrate, processes of quantification are taking hold of and reshaping 
cities and citizens in ways that might be informal and dispersed, but which are very 
effective nevertheless. 
Quantification, through data and analytics, partitions the sensible and generates new 
definitions of people and things, and new interactions between them. In Cape Town, 
complex problems, such as social vulnerability, crime, and water scarcity are being broken 
down into discrete pieces of information and patterns, whose only form of intelligibility 
is a risk alert. In Kolkata, the imminent smart city will measure citizens and citizenship 
through practices of sensing and computing as well as micro-bordering processes, 
embedded in all sorts of ordinary objects and activities. Quantification is a political 
practice. Counting, measuring, and scoring create hierarchies between physical features, 
identities, and social positions, which directly impact one’s potential to move around the 
city or to access certain services. In the quantified/quantifying cities, and to paraphrase 
what Louise Amoore (2006) writes about biometric security; borders become a “condition 
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of being”; everything and every interaction bring with it the possibility of monitoring, 
measuring and a “constant demand for proof of status and legitimacy” (2006, p. 348). 
Algorithms are creating new regimes of visibility and worth, which are politically 
charged. At the same time, a new regime of invisibility is being created; one of code strings 
and operative systems that process urban data. These crucial components remain largely 
invisible and inaccessible, not only to citizens but also to the city agencies that are 
expected to act upon their data. I suggest that this constitutes yet another aspect of 
bordering processes in the making of smart cities; one that increasingly separates 
administrative and political decisions from the sphere of democratic representation – with 
all of its limits – and hands them over to computing programs, which are unintelligible 
for most of the people. Famously, Bruno Latour (1999) describes a process where the 
more efficient technological processes become, the more invisible they become. He called 
this “blackboxing” – a term that is almost a synonym for algorithmic power, in recent 
research (Pasquale, 2015; Intotheblackbox, 2018). Apart from any rhetorical use, the 
“black box” metaphor effectively points to the radical asymmetry of the relations between 
computing systems and users. It is not dissimilar to what happens at physical, territorial 
borders, where one side has much more control over information and decisions than the 
other. In fact, it is this asymmetry of knowledge/power that creates the border. 
There is no mention in any available documents – in either the case of New Town or 
of Cape Town – of what rules and settings are used in the software that run the cities’ 
systems. Nor do they mention what types of inference are made (using the data), or on 
what datasets algorithms are trained. Are the algorithms in use always supervised by 
human programmers? Or, are they part of Machine Learning (ML) applications which 
generate their own logic and rules? Which pools of data do they elaborate, and across 
what time range? These formulae remain undisclosed; protected by copyright and 
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corporate policies, as well as by sophisticated cyber-security programs. This is even more 
true in the case of private companies. Consequently, it is impossible for ordinary citizens 
to know which criteria are being used to analyse urban information, and which are used 
for making decisions that have public consequences. Even the city officers and agencies 
that authorise the interventions and that elaborate the policies, based on analytics, might 
not be able to access the raw data or the algorithmic settings. The manner in which the 
profit strategies, of software providers and consultants, might have informed the sourcing 
and processing of data is withheld from public discussion and critique; as is the potential 
for silently embedding biases and specific understandings of social and environmental 
categories into the calculative framework. 
The following chapter will examine how urban software works and how algorithms 
make decisions more closely. For now, it is important to stress that despite promises of 
transparency and objectivity, the operational core of smart urban management remains 
opaque and hidden beneath the layers of digital barriers, protocols and private agreements 





The picture that emerges from the examination of the smart projects in New Town 
and Cape Town is of an urban landscape, where borders multiply together with the new 
infrastructures and developments. This is in direct contrast to the popular narratives of 
smart cities as seamless, smoothly-interconnected spaces. Borders operate at different, 
yet, interrelated levels. 
The first level is spatial and political, and considers the processes of digital zoning 
whereby smart technologies are introduced and tested in the urban territory. These zones 
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– SEZs and IT hubs, start up districts and business enclaves – often reflect the patterns of 
filtering, discrimination, and segregation that have shaped the urban fabric over time. 
Rather than connecting the urban environment seamlessly and inclusively, as the 
mainstream narratives promise, the processes of digitalisation embed and re-enact borders 
along the lines of class, race, and social positioning. 
The second level of borders concerns the fact that practices of identification and 
filters are pervasively attached to the objects, devices, and software that are in use in 
everyday activities. Therefore, the city becomes a constellation of borders that operate in 
microscopic and often invisible forms. As smart borders become ubiquitous, they have 
ontogenetic effects in reconfiguring the order of the cognitive, aesthetic, and relational 
processes. 
Finally, a third level of borders can be found in the secrecy of the code strings that 
process urban data sets. This indicates an asymmetric relationship of knowledge/power 
between smart technologies and users, wherein crucial decisions remain hidden from the 
political debate. In essence, border techniques are active around, across, and within the 
sensing and computing environments. At once, access to digital infrastructure becomes 
compulsory, in order to receive essential services and information, and conditional to the 
requirements embedded in the computing systems. The promise of a harmonic, seamless, 
smart city breaks apart – into a landscape of ubiquitous border techniques, which are often 
microscopic or invisible, incorporated into the sensing systems, and which are incessantly 
scrutinising and filtering bodies, identities, and movements. 
How do we make sense of this dissemination of micro-borders? What is their purpose 
 
– if there is one? Drawing on the notions of distribution of the sensible (Rancière, 2004) 
and computational ontogenesis (Gabrys, 2016), I have argued that ubiquitous borders are 
actively redefining patterns of perception, social norms and the modes of existence for the 
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human and non-human inhabitants of a city. Accordingly, the ubiquitous distribution of 
borders across the urban environment represents what Amoore, Marmura and Salter 
(2008) define as “a technology of limits – a means of defining what is possible in the 
governing of life itself” (p. 96). 
In practical terms, borders deliver an extensive infrastructure for data extraction at 
the urban level. Credentials, cameras, smart meters, and trackers, are only some of the 
tools through which smart city residents are increasingly induced, or forced, to disclose 
data about themselves and the environment they live in. Today, it is essential to understand 
how these data are made actionable or profitable; how they are turned into practical 
decisions, policies, and/or money. This requires a close examination of the algorithmic 
practices in both the government and the commercial domains. We need to be able to 
understand how programs quantify, identify, profile, and authorise (or not) urban 
elements; and what is the underpinning logic of these omnivorous computing systems. 











In the previous chapter, I examined how smart city projects disseminate border 
techniques – identification, authorisation, and profiling – across urban infrastructures and 
devices. In this chapter, I will explore how these (often microscopic or invisible) borders 
become part of an urban dispositif of security. To do this, I move from the definition of 
security given by Michel Foucault (2007), as a set of techniques for governing the 
uncertain – a series of possibilities, events, and elements that might unfold in time and 
space, in a milieu. For Foucault, the specific problem of security is how to organise the 
milieu and the circulation of elements across it. In his lectures at the College de France, 
in 1977—1978, Foucault (2007) also makes it clear that the problem of security is 
distinctively urban, i.e. “of the town” (pp. 13—20), and describes how it has emerged in 
history along with other specific issues of urban government, such as the outbreak of 
disease, food scarcity, and unrest. In this chapter, I look at a new range of issues of urban 
government, and investigate the forms of security that emerge from, and through urban, 
digitalisation. 
To do this, I will first look at how platforms for urban security are set up and work in 
my two research sites, New Town Kolkata and Cape Town. I will analyse computational 
systems composed of various elements, including IoT networks, mobile applications, 
software for data analysis, and dashboards. I consider two programs in particular: the 
Xpresso software for sentiment analysis of social media, which is being tested in New 
Town; and the Emergency Policing and Incident Command (EPIC), which has been 
launched in Cape Town in 2017. Following that I will discuss the operational logic of 
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these platforms, and argue that the categories of surveillance and dataveillance that have 
often been employed to make sense of digital governance only provide limited 
explanations. Instead, and drawing on the previous research conducted by scholars across 
different disciplines, from computer science, to critical data studies and security studies, 
I will examine the ways in which algorithms operate and shape specific forms of 
knowledge, security, and governmentality. I pay particular attention to the modelling 
techniques that are at the core of predictive analytics and automated decisions. 
I will suggest that modelling defines a very specific relation between security, time, 
and actions, which involves the future as well as the present. In doing so, I borrow and 
build upon the notion of speculative security, developed by Marieke de Goede (2012) in 
her study of the prosecution of terrorist money. Security, for de Goede, is made 
speculative by the hypothetical, self-referential, and politically charged nature of the 
algorithmic calculations on which security decisions are based. At the same time, security 
is speculative, as it seeks to make the indefinite configurations of future events available 
for action in the present. Thus, the notion of speculative security reveals two key elements: 
anticipation, the attempt to calculate future scenarios; and investment, making the future 
operable in the present. 
Significantly, Jennifer Gabrys (2016) also defines smart cities as speculative, albeit 
within a different context of analysis: in her work on the making of computing 
environments. Gabrys explains that in the experimentation and implementation of new 
technologies, speculation is a practice that makes the future present by shaping the 
modalities in which cities are lived and evolve. In this argument, the same two elements 
of anticipation and investment, which define speculative security, can be observed. 
Speculation is simultaneously a calculative logic performed by algorithms and a practice 
through which infrastructure and cities are created and governed. As such, speculation 
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will be the practical and conceptual thread through which I read security operations in 
smart cities. 
In examining how systems such as EPIC and Xpresso process urban data and make 
security decisions, I will consider three principal aspects. Firstly, I will point out the 
numerous flaws and mistakes that are commonly incorporated into algorithmic models, 
and which are magnified by their self-referential logic, with significant political effects. I 
will then examine how algorithms manage time and, specifically, the relationship between 
real-time and preemption. To conclude, I will discuss the notions of environmental 
governmentality (Gabrys, 2016) and targeted governance (Valverde & Mopas, 2004), in 
order to define more accurately how algorithmic models render the conditions, within 
which life unfolds in the milieu, construct distinct targets of governmental intervention, 





According to the New Town Smart City Proposal (SCP) (2015), all the sensing 
infrastructures implemented across the city and related data will converge in a single 
command and control centre, which will also host a data-centre facility. As briefly 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the components that will be integrated in the control 
room include: 
• Air pollution monitoring: sensors for air quality monitoring will be installed on light 
poles and will display real-time readings on LED display boards in strategic 
locations in the area. 
• Smart parking: The SCP includes the creation of nine smart parking areas, with 
parking sensors installed in light poles to collect data from cars. At least four have 
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been introduced already, in partnership with Park24x7, a mobile app that allows 
users to book and pay for their parking in advance online. 
• Sewerage and drainage monitoring: Sensor-equipped drainage covers will send 
signals to the control room about the quantity of rainfall in the area and will activate 
pumps to avoid water logging. More sensors will be installed to monitor the 
sewerage and drainage and transmit the quality data to the Pan City control centre. 
• Project Zero – solid waste management. All waste collection vehicles will be 
equipped with GPS and tracked by the command centre. Sensor-equipped e-bins 
will be installed in public areas and tracked through off-site real-time monitoring 
(OSRT). The disposal of construction waste will be monitored via a dedicated 
mobile app. 
• Smart Metering: All conventional meters for water and electricity will be replaced 
with smart meters. This will allow remote meter reading, and the monitoring of load 
profiles and consumer tampering, from the control room. Real-time data analysis of 
power consumption will be shared with the police “to keep special attention on 
vacant houses” (Smart City Proposal, 2015, p. 88). 
• The water distribution pipes will be equipped with a supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) system, including sensor-based transducers and flow meters. 
Sensors will monitor the water quality and transmit the data to the Pan City control 
centre. 
• Safety and Security: CCTV cameras will be set up on light poles for 24/7 
surveillance, with real-time video content analysis being performed in the control 
room. Two thousand intelligent street lights will also be installed, as panic buttons 
at key points, connected to the control room for emergency response. 
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• Mobility: Public vehicles including Electric buses, autos, and totos will be 
monitored from the control room, via GPS, and information on routes and timetable 
will be available on a mobile app. 
 
Most of these projects are currently underway, in partnerships with companies such 
as Intel and HP, and their completion is estimated for between June 2018 and June 2021. 
In line with many other smart city projects around the world, the central control room is 
where the processed data will be visualised, in order to monitor and manage all of the 
critical components of the smart city, in a holistic manner. 
The Smart City Proposal for New Town Kolkata also evidences a negotiation with 
Abzooba, an Indian Artificial Intelligence (AI) company, for the adoption of Xpresso – 
the company’s proprietary natural language processing (NLP) software – to process data 
about New Town coming from social media (Smart City Proposal, 2015, p. 98). 
NLP is a specific segment of Machine Learning (ML), which makes it possible for 
computers to read and understand human language as well as to process large volumes of 
unstructured data, such as social media content. Xpresso was originally developed to help 
companies analyse customer feedback, in order to improve their commercial strategies 
accordingly. In the customised version for urban management, Xpresso will help urban 
authorities exploit large volume of unstructured data, such as social media content, to gain 
“a structured birds-eye view about different aspects (Police, Transportation, Healthcare, 
Water, Road etc.) of city and citizen sentiment (positive, negative, neutral) about each of 
these aspects” (2016, p. 98). The application runs cognitive bots that are able to translate 
“text into context,” to understand the nuances of human expression, and to classify the 
intentions of those who write. By generating actionable information, Xpresso provides 
real-time monitoring and an early warning system for anticipating potential problems. 
When the system registers high percentages of, or temporal or spatial spikes in, negative 
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sentiment – such as, anger and fear – or a large number of complaints on selected topics 
 
– the dashboard displays specific alerts (Abzooba, n.d.). Authorities are supposedly then 
able to “drill down,” to view complaints in details, and take “corrective measures” (Smart 
City Proposal, 2015, p. 98). A case study, published on the Abzooba website, describes 
how Xpresso has been tested before, within the domain of urban data management. The 
structure of the application is represented in Figure 16, overleaf. 
According to the case study, Xpresso generated several “benefits” in urban 
management, including the capability to measure public opinion, make more informed 
decisions on new policies and better evaluate existing policies. It made it possible to 
“safeguard the country’s reputation” by monitoring social media conversations and how 
these might affect overseas investors and tourists’ opinion of the country. It anticipated 
outbreaks of disease, by correlating searches for specific symptoms, and improved 
disaster response by understanding the situation on the ground. It prevented and mitigated 
potential crises through “active listening.” And finally, it “transform[ed the] security 
clearance process” by leveraging social media data for “national security, background 




Xpresso Application for Social Media for Urban Monitoring 
 
 






Abzooba is not a pioneer in this field. Opinion mining and sentiment analysis are 
standard methods of organising social media content and its related commercial strategies. 
A number of systems are being developed, not only by IT corporations but also by 
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academic research groups, to perform a real-time sentiment analysis of discrete social 
media streams. These experiments have assessed, for example, how urgent a specific 
urban issue was, as perceived by citizens (Masdeval & Veloso, 2015); the spatial 
distribution of intolerant discourses in Italy; community feelings about recovery from an 
earthquake, in the city of L’Aquila (Musto, Semeraro, Lops & Gemmis, 2015); or they 
monitor, more generally, the “situation” of specific urban areas, which emerges from 
topics and emotions on social media (Weiler, Grossniklaus & Scholl, 2016). Some 
scholars suggest that geo-located urban social media data might provide a bottom-up 
alternative to “panopticon” systems such as dashboards and control rooms. They might 
also guarantee objectivity, by multiplying the points of observation, as they emerge from 
social media conversations (Ciuccarelli, Lupi & Simeone, 2014). 
 
In 2017, the City of Cape Town has launched an integrated solution, called EPIC, 
that incorporates nine departments: metro police, law enforcement, traffic services, 
emergency services, fire and rescue, disaster management, special investigations unity, 
social development services. and even the Stompi hotline – which shows where people 
have been throwing their cigarette butts – into a single control platform. In the near future, 
authorities aim to also include neighbourhood watches, citizen apps, and contraventions 
in the system (Buckle, 2017). EPIC has been developed by software colossus, SAP, in 
partnership with the South African company EOH. EPIC runs on SAP’s High- 
Performance Analytics Appliance (HANA), SAP’s signature platform for data 
management. SAP was founded in 1972, by a group of engineers, who left IBM when it 
discontinued the research program they were working on. SAP has been developing 
automated solutions for business management for decades now, and lately has also begun 
to target the public sector, including cities. HANA was originally developed to improve 
SAP’s ERP applications for large companies. It integrates in-memory database services, 
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analytics processing, and application development, and is highly flexible and 
customisable. Within the custom-built EPIC platform, HANA supports SAP’s 
Investigative Case Management, a package that has been specifically created for the 
public security sector. It features analytics, designed to unearth large and complex patterns 
of “crime” across large volumes of data, and modules from EOH, such as their Computer 
Aided Dispatch with GIS system and their Emergency and Incident Management 
Solution. 
 
HANA’s Business Intelligence comprises several types of analytics, which can be 
launched simultaneously on a single dataset. The core of the platform’s intelligence lies 
in its machine learning predictive analytics, which consist of SAP’s proprietary, 
automated algorithms. These provide a number of functions, including classification, 
regression, clustering, time series, key influencers, recommendations, and link analysis. 
EPIC’s analytics are fed data through an IoT network composed of GPS trackers, cameras, 
mobile apps, and fire detectors, etc., and which connect the human and non-human 
components of the emergency services, from ambulances to smoke sensors, and from 
policemen to fire hydrants. In the central command and control room, dashboards and 
interactive maps display real-time data, such as livestream images of the city, and the 
position of incidents and response units (Figure 17). Symbols indicate the types of 
emergencies that are taking place, as well as the number of people involved, etc. This is 
“the big picture”; the supposedly holistic view over the city’s security status. Officers in 
the control room are able to contact, deploy, and redirect resources, simply by moving 
icons on the displays (Figure 18). Policemen, firefighters, medical staff, and other 
emergency workers are provided with mobile devices and apps that track their 
movements, and which allow them to upload content, such as pictures and videos, while 
giving them access to relevant incident-related information. As Armin Beverungen (2019) 
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observes in his study of SAP HANA executive dashboards – on which EPIC’s dashboard 
is modelled – HANA is presented as a single source of truth, where truth coincides with 
data and algorithmic analysis. Within this context, human decision making is subsumed 












EPIC Interactive Map 
 






Central dashboards for the management of emergencies, traffic, and urban services, 
have become a landmark of smart city projects across the globe. The Operation Centre of 
Rio de Janeiro (COR), which is powered by IBM and was launched for the Olympic 
Games in 2016, has been described as a global template for a new form of urban 
governmentality that incorporates digital and corporate rationalities, while embracing a 
logic of perpetual emergency (Marvin et al., 2015, p. 15). In his study on the COR, Donald 
McNeill (2015) shows how the smart dashboard mobilises specific techniques of 
visualisation – introspection, synopsis, supervision/inspection, and foresight – which have 
been instrumental for urban government over the past two centuries. As city dashboards 
increase and flourish – from Baltimore and Chicago, to London, Dublin and Singapore – 
Shannon Mattern (2015) observes that they fetishise data as a “monetisable” resource. 
They also ontologically reduce cities to widgets; they decide what a city is or is not, as 
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the complexity of the elements and relations that make up the urban environments, are 
forced into mathematical representations and operational tools. 
 
 
Surveillance, Dataveillance and Beyond 
 
The rise of control rooms and the proliferation of infrastructures devoted to data 
sourcing, identification, and profiling, throughout cities has often been catalogued under 
the concepts of surveillance and dataveillance (Kitchin, 2014; Tufeckci, 2014). Smart 
cities, David Lyon (2018) argues, foster the normalisation of surveillance. Metaphors such 
as “the new panopticon” (McMullan, 2015) or “the big brother city” (King, 2016) have 
been used in the media to describe cities that are governed from dashboards, where data 
about everyone and everything are tracked all the time, and where anonymity becomes 
impossible. However, whereas ubiquitous surveillance or dataveillance may be a fast- 
approaching goal (for some) or a growing paranoia (for others), as of now, sensors and 
algorithms do not really see or hear, everything and everybody at the same time or in the 
same way. In fact, the examples of EPIC and Abzooba indicate that computing 
infrastructures select and hierarchise objects of attention within the urban environment. 
Before New Town, Xpresso had already been implemented in another, anonymous smart 
city, to “listen to the voice of citizens” (Abzooba, n.d.). In the context of New Town, this 
benign description takes on a much stronger political significance than intended – and not 
primarily for dataveillance or privacy concerns. 
The previous chapter described how, despite the smart rhetoric, access to digital 
technologies remains far from universal in New Town, because large portions of the local 
population simply cannot afford smartphones, laptops, IoT devices or a fast internet 
connection. Therefore, the association of social media activity and citizenship alludes to 
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an urban environment where only the voices which are able to express themselves on 
digital platforms are taken into account, even if it is only for monitoring purposes. This is 
another example of the bordering processes that intersect digitalisation (see Chapter 2), 
filtering or preventing access to digital technologies along the lines of class and social 
position. The example of Xpresso, in New Town, subverts the usual concerns about mass 
dataveillance: whereas most of us worry about being tracked, spied on and manipulated, 
there exist groups of people, who are not subject to dataveillance because they are 
economically and socially positioned below even that. Ned Rossiter (2016) uses the term 
“post-population” to describe those who escape algorithmic controls on their labour or 
social life, but who pay the price for this anonymity with extreme precariousness and 
vulnerable conditions, such as the dispossessed farmers and slum dwellers of Rajarhat. 
In Cape Town, EPIC sanctions a similarly differential view. Although the security 
platform claims to have “the big picture” of the city, it does not actually watch the entire 
city or every part of it, in the same way, all the time. The supposedly holistic gaze of EPIC 
is in fact structured by the distribution of IoT networks and smart devices across the city, 
as well as by the dislocation of the security operators. As described earlier in this thesis, 
the geography of digital infrastructures in Cape Town is shaped by the uneven, racialised 
concentration of wealth and power. Townships have very limited – if any – access to the 
internet, which makes it difficult, for example, to install an extensive network of fire 
sensors, smart traffic lights or street CCTV. In contrast, in white, affluent neighbourhoods, 
all of these infrastructures are widely present, making the private and public space 
heavily-monitored. Additionally, incidents and people are subject to different conditions 
of surveillance, depending on their position within the urban space. For example, 
township residents have long lamented a lack of security and law enforcement with 
respect to drug dealing, robberies, sexual assaults, and gang shootings, which take place 
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on regular basis in their neighbourhoods. At the same time, however, black people 
(especially young black males), who move around in the central areas of the city and the 
mostly white neighbourhoods are (as is seen in Chapter 2) the privileged objects of 
surveillance and security interventions. 
For some time now, the panopticon/big brother paradigms have been challenged 
within and beyond surveillance studies. David Murakami Wood (2013) expanded on 
Bruno Latour’s (2005) concept of “oligoptic” surveillance, which is intense but partial 
rather than totalising as in the panopticon, to define systems of surveillance that are broad 
and unfocused. The implementation of smart urban projects can make cities oligoptic 
(Murakami Wood & McKinnon, 2019) insofar as there is no total view or necessary points 
of view that add up. Rather, some elements of the urban collective or assemblage (people, 
places, things, itineraries, and feelings, etc.) are subject to intense surveillance, whereas 
for other elements it is much less so and even not at all (Murakami Wood & McKinnon, 
2019, p. 180). 
Another significant critique of the panopticon paradigm comes from philosopher 
Manuel DeLanda (1991) who argues, in his book War in the Age of Intelligent Machines, 
that surveillance becomes increasingly distributed and decentralised. DeLanda writes: 
Instead of positioning some human bodies around a central sensor, a multiplicity 
of sensors is deployed around all bodies: its antenna farms, spy satellites and 
cable-traffic intercepts feed into its computers all the information that can be 
gathered. This is then processed through a series of “filters” or key-word watch 
lists. The Panspectron does not merely select certain bodies and certain (visual) 
data about them. Rather, it compiles information about all at the same time, using 
computers to select the segments of data relevant to its surveillance tasks. 




In recent years, surveillance has been defined not only as a danger or degeneration 
but also as a constitutive aspect of the data mining systems that are increasingly organising 
every aspect of life. In his recent book, The Culture of Surveillance, David Lyon (2018) 
explains the emergence of a surveillance culture, where the engagement and the 
participation of both the surveillance actors and the surveillance subjects are vital. 
Surveillance has become user-generated and horizontal, and is performed through social 
media and distributed across and throughout society. Lyon argues that since the 
development of ubiquitous IT infrastructures, surveillance has become a way of life and 
a mode of societal organisation, from credit ratings and no-fly lists, to self-monitoring 
through wearables and social media engagement. Surveillance today is, literally, part of 
the furniture, as smart meters, smartphones, and all sorts of smart devices log our location, 
measure our activities, and register our “likes” and our contacts (Lyon, 2018, p. 84). 
In literature, surveillance and dataveillance are often assumed to be a conceptual and 
practical continuum. Dataveillance is defined as ubiquitous surveillance through 
meta(data) (Raley, 2013). In this sense, dataveillance appears as the mere technological 
evolution of surveillance, from which it differs only in terms of scale and efficiency, in 
the age of big data. This is intuitively and loosely true, as key features of surveillance, 
such as monitoring and scrutinising, define dataveillance as well. However, as José Van 
Djick (2014) notes, dataveillance differs from surveillance in at least one important 
aspect: whereas surveillance presumes monitoring for specific purposes, dataveillance 
entails the continuous tracking of (meta)data for unstated purposes. It does not limit itself 
to scrutinising individuals, but penetrates multiple, dispersed aspects of the social fabric 
(2014, p. 205), including objects, animals, plants, and natural resources. In addition to 
this, I believe that dataveillance differs from surveillance in other, relevant, qualitative 
aspects. Notoriously, surveillance comes from the French word, surveiller, literally, to 
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watch over. The term implies a gaze from above, which is clearly identifiable (albeit often 
not visible) as linked to a recognised authority – the eye of the prison guards, of the spy 
or Big Brother. The identity of the surveillant might remain unknown (as in the panopticon 
or with the secret police), but the diagram of power becomes evident expressly through 
the practice of surveillance. This does not necessarily happen in the landscape of big data 
and computing infrastructures. 
Unlike surveillance, dataveillance does not only, or primarily, watch from above. It 
also observes from beside, through apparently horizontal connections, such as Facebook 
friends, Instagram and Twitter followers, Uber rides, and the peer-to-peer architecture in 
general; and from within, as we all take part in the monitoring of ourselves and others by 
using smartphones, search engines, wearables, and IoT devices, etc. In most cases, even 
if we know that our (meta)data are being collected, analysed, and probably sold on by 
someone or something, we don’t know exactly by whom or what, when, and why. The 
dozens of terms and conditions, which we accept every day, in order to navigate the web 
and to use mobile apps, do not tell us what will actually happen to our personal 
information. This does not mean, of course, that big data is an anarchic or anomic territory. 
Obviously, Google and Facebook, national security agencies and any owner of 
commercial software have more power over data than the average user. There are norms 
and regulations, albeit already obsolete the second after they are issued. There are 
hierarchies and strategies, and roles and procedures, but these are largely obscure or – to 
use a fashionable word – blackboxed. In essence, notwithstanding the veneer of a legal 
framework, the actual diagram(s) of powers(s) that operate through dataveillance 
remain(s) opaque. 
Dataveillance is clearly a powerful phenomenon of our age, and smart cities are the 
terrains where it is particularly concentrated. Nevertheless, I argue that dataveillance is 
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not an adequate framework for making sense of systems, such as EPIC and Xpresso or 
indeed, more broadly, of data-driven urban governmentality. This is so, for two reasons. 
Firstly, despite the efforts of smart city planners, there may be not a direct correlation 
between the infinite amount of data that is gathered through intelligent infrastructures, 
social media, etc., and government actions. Data are often dispersed among several 
different actors (states, municipalities, private firms, academic or non academic 
researchers, NGOs, activists, and hackers, etc.), all of whom pursue different and often 
conflicting agendas. As my examination of smart projects in New Town and Cape Town 
indicated, a number of commercial players are able to access urban data, and this creates 
wide zones of opacity as to how data are handled and for which purposes. Urban data can 
be so immense and fragmented that their potential, in terms of actual, actionable 
knowledge, remains largely under-exploited. Paradoxically, there may well be so much 
dataveillance that it makes complete dataveillance impossible. In short, data could be 
wasted, or perhaps, big data as such is waste, until it is dissected by algorithms and 
reassembled into forms of actionable information. This is one of the problems that smart 
city projects are trying to address, by creating single control platforms. 
Secondly, even if dataveillance is applied to the fullest extent, and no data is wasted, 
it still does not define the logic of urban government. Dataveillance is a notion that 
empirically accounts for some important aspects of data-driven environments. It is a 
disposition of the socio-technical assemblages that we live in; that is, and according to 
Keller Easterling (2010), a latent potential or action that unfolds in the relations between 
elements (2010, p. 250). However, as such, dataveillance does not explain how decisions 
are taken or strategies take form. Contrary to the common emphasis on the big of big data 
– and that is usually synthesised into the four Vs that exceed human capabilities: volume, 
variety, velocity,  and  veracity  –  Louise Amoore  and  Volha Piotukh  (2015)  demand 
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attention to be focussed on the work of the little analytics in contemporary forms of 
knowledge production and government. The heterogeneity of life is flattened and reduced 
to patterns of data that are tractable for commercial or security decisions, through specific 
practices of data ingestion, partitioning, and memory. This is exactly what happens in 
platforms such as EPIC and Xpresso: their contribution to urban security does not merely 
consist of augmented monitoring, but in translating what is monitored into models, such 
as risk alerts and possible actions. 
Paradoxically, the data scientists and officers in the urban control rooms might be 
able to operate better with less data and sharper analytics, than with more data that is not 
supported by the right algorithmic tools. Dataveillance does not explain new forms of 
urban government, because it merely keeps its focus on the aspect of watching, while 
overlooking the key operations – counting, scraping, skinning, connecting, drawing, and, 





Systems, such as EPIC and Xpresso, do not just watch the city; they make decisions 
about it. As we will see in the following pages, they produce configurations of the future 
that are full of political meanings and implications. To understand how these platforms 
operate and inform urban government, it is vital to take a closer look at the logic and 
procedures of the algorithms that support them. In SAP HANA – the platform on which 
EPIC runs – engineers set the parameters for analysis and provide users with a range of 
customisable options. For example, users can choose the datasets on which algorithms are 
trained, or which specific algorithmic procedure to use for a specific task. Automated 
performance-tuning capabilities ensure that models are able to adjust as data changes with 
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time. Users can try out many different scenarios, and “incorporate any improvement that 
they discover back into models in real-time. They can also schedule model refreshes, 
manage models by exception, and deploy scores instantly to use results in applications 
and real-time analysis (SAP, 2018). In data streaming analysis, where immense volumes 
of data are incessantly processed, algorithms identify meaningful patterns, create alerts, 
generate automated responses, and apply predictive models, in order to anticipate what is 
coming. They also measure data over time, to unearth historical trends, which in turn feed 
into decision models and forecasts. Analytics apply KPIs to emergency responses, such 
as measuring the single interventions of the Fire & Rescue Department against an average 
response time; or classifying the geographical distribution of different types of incidents. 
Algorithmic modelling is key to understanding how contemporary security operates. 
Modelling is, by definition, the representation of a phenomenon that cannot be observed 
or acted upon directly. Modelling practices are informed by existing theories and involve 
making decisions about which relevant aspects need to be represented, and which can be 
neglected. Modelling is a much less straightforward process than it may appear to be in 
commercial narratives. As Michael Weisberg (2013) explained, models stand in 
relationships of similarity with their targets. In other words, they represent their targets in 
the real world, by sharing some important features of them. Models are similar to their 
targets insofar as they do not lack too many of these features nor do they have too many 
extra features. However, maximum similarity between models and targets is not 
necessarily a goal that modellers pursue, as they often introduce idealisation into their 
practice; i.e. they deliberately distort their models for the sake of simplifying or isolating 
certain components. 
As is evident from computer science literature (Cormen, Leiserson, Rivest & Stein, 
2009; Larose & Larose, 2015; Garcìa, Luengo & Herrera, 2015), modelling is largely a 
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matter of attempts, trials, failures, and corrections. It involves creativity, intuition and luck 
as much as it does mathematical knowledge and rigour. As authors frequently remind their 
readers, the choice of the specific task (association, clustering or regression, etc.) to be 
undertaken to extract knowledge from data, and of the specific algorithm(s) to be used for 
that same task, is highly contingent and is determined by a wide range of factors. These 
can include, for example, the type of datasets available and the level of tolerance of the 
algorithm to data flaws, such as missing values and noise; the calculative speed of the 
algorithm compared to the computational power (and, more broadly, the money) 
available; the storage available, and the volume of data required for a given algorithm to 
perform adequately; the background and specific skills of the professionals involved; and 
potentially countless other factors linked to hardware, funding, deadlines, personal 
inclinations, etc. It is for these reasons that Nick Seaver (2014) invites his readers to pay 
attention, not only to algorithms as computational procedures but also to the algorithmic 
systems’ “intricate, dynamic arrangements of people and code” (p. 9), through which the 
formulae come to life and impact the world. Algorithms are trained, tested, and amended, 
over wide and complex networks of professionals, machine, and algorithmic systems. It 
is in these networks that ideas are translated into code, and that code, in turn translates life 
into models. 
In the aftermath of 9/11, security agencies and governments were compelled to focus 
on “low-probability, high-impact” events that challenged the forms of risk calculation that 
had been in use until that time, and to incorporate an increased degree of imagination into 
their procedures (Amoore, 2013). As Benedict Anderson (2010) writes in a seminal paper 
on the governance of the future, government in our time is informed by anticipatory action 
– the logics of preemption, precaution, and preparedness – whose specificity is that it 
works on undetermined, potential future scenarios. The nature of security practices has 
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thus become speculative, as it no longer settles for probabilistic evidence, but increasingly 
looks for the unknown and the improbable, while trying to draw the multiplicity of 
possible futures into present decisions. As de Goede, Simon and Hojitnik (2014) note, 
security is speculative, not because it is imaginative or unreal but because it deploys 
notions of futurity that parallel the technologies of financial speculation. As in financial 
speculation, preemption is not as much about predicting the future as it is about acting on 
multiple potential futures that are rendered actionable (or liquid) in the present (de Goede 
et al., 2014, p. 13, drawing on Cooper, 2010; Amoore, 2013; de Goede, 2012). This 
twofold meaning of speculation, spanning hypothesis and capitalisation, is closely linked 
to the operational logic of modelling that support security decisions. 
The specific algorithms at work in platforms, such as EPIC or Xpresso, are 
proprietary and secret, as are most of the algorithms in use for commercial or government 
purposes (Pasquale, 2015; O’Neil, 2016). Nonetheless, it is possible to discuss their 
operations, as Claudia Aradau and Tobias Blanke (2015) suggest, drawing on the state- 
of-the-art knowledge, demos, tutorials, users guides, and blogs on data science, which 
abound online. In order to bridge the gap between the study of the “outside” of algorithms 
– their social life and effects – and their “inside” – code, maths, and concrete applications 
 
– Bernhard Rieder (2017) proposes focussing on what he defines as algorithmic 
techniques, or “the finite set of well-known approaches to information filtering and 
classification that underpin most running systems” (p. 101). 
If there is no way, then, to know the exact formulae that operate in platforms like EPIC 
or Xpresso, it is still helpful to scrutinise the type of algorithms in use and how they are 
combined to perform specific operations. The Predictive Analysis Library (PAL) of 
SAP/HANA suggests nine categories of functions: clustering, classification, association, 
regression, time series, pre-progressing, statistics, social network analysis, and 
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miscellaneous. (SAP, 2018). Each category comprises several different algorithms, which 
can be combined to generate the desired models. While the specific procedures in use 
remain blackboxed, it is still possible, and helpful, to examine their basic rules and logics 
or, in line with Rieder (2017), the algorithmic techniques they put to work. 
 
Cleaning up the Data 
 
Among the numerous analytic algorithms that HANA’s PAL offers to its customers, 
the pre-processing family requires some initial attention. Pre-processing algorithms’ role 
in the platform is to prepare datasets for the predictive analysis. Data needs to be stripped 
of all those elements that algorithms cannot read, and to be translated into a set of 
parameters. Computer scientists García et al. (2015) identify six principal problems that 
can emerge with datasets: dirtiness, inaccuracy, fragmentation, different measurement 
units, missing values, and noise; and the related techniques to fix them: cleaning, 
transformation, integration, normalisation, missing data imputation, and noise 
identification. Whereas the notion of data cleaning is often used to describe pre-processing 
in general and comprises techniques such as noise identification and missing values 
imputation, it also concerns the “detection of discrepancies and dirty data (fragments of 
the original data which do not make sense)” that typically requires human supervision (p. 
11). 
Data transformation is another broad family of pre-processing techniques, which 
includes smoothing, feature construction, aggregation, and summarisation, and which 
converts and consolidates data to enable and/or facilitate the mining process. Data 
integration concerns merging data from different sources, while avoiding redundancies 
and inconsistencies. Data normalisation attempts to assign the same measurement unit and 
equal weight to all attributes, so that the data can be scaled. Data reduction is a further 
process that can become essential depending on the size of the datasets and the type of 
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algorithm chosen to mine them. If the algorithm is not able to run – if it would take a 
prohibitive amount of time over the original amount of data – then this needs to be 
downsized. 
As for data preparation, according to García et al. (2015), a few key problems and 
solutions can be identified. Namely, the dimensionality of data can be reduced via a 
technique known as Feature Selection; redundant and/or conflictive examples are 
removed through Instance Selection; Discretisation simplifies the domain of an attribute 
while Feature Extraction and/or Instance Generation help filling gaps in data (pp. 13-16). 
In essence, pre-processing procedures decide which data can be mined and which are not, 
and are thus discarded as noise, dirt or excess. “Recognizing the ways in which data must 
be “cleaned up” writes Tarleton Gillespie (2014) “is an important counter to the seeming 
automaticity of algorithms” (p. 170). Yet it is also important to note that data preparation 
and reduction can also be automated and are, in fact, more and more entrusted to machine 
learning procedures. In that case, the critical focus might have to shift from the contrast 
between the supposed automaticity of algorithms and the human decisions that actually 
make them work, to the kind of decisions and assumptions that become embedded into 
automated procedures. 
Consistent with Rieder’s (2017) observations on algorithmic techniques, each of the 
techniques for data preparation and reduction mentioned above can be performed in 
different ways. The various approaches available and their advantages or disadvantages 
are continuously discussed and compared in technical literature. Take, for example, the 
very frequent problem of missing values in datasets. A common approach to the resolution 
of this problem is simply to discard the incomplete data or to ignore the missing values. 
This can lead to biased results: “For example when low income individuals are less likely 
to report their income level, the resulting mean is biased in favor of higher incomes” 
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(Garcia et al., 2015, p. 63). Alternatively, missing values are often replaced with the most 
common among the other values if nominal, or the average of all values if numerical. 
Other significant methods of dealing with missing values include algorithms that calculate 
the estimates of the missing values, called imputations. 
Statistical methods such as maximum likelihood estimation (Little & Rubin, 2002; 
Enders, 2010) calculate the parameters of data distribution, which are then sampled for 
the imputation of missing values; whereas in multiple imputation (Enders, 2010), multiple 
versions of the same data sets, with different estimates for the missing values, are 
combined to detect the most likely imputations. Increasingly, the unknown relationships 
between attributes, from which imputations can be inferred, have been calculated using 
ML models (Lakshminarayan, Harp, Goldman & Samad, 1996). Scholars have also found 
that the techniques commonly used for predictive analysis, such as regression, clustering, 
and classification, can be applied to determine missing values. 
It would be impossible and counter-productive, in this thesis, to review all of the 
numerous algorithms that have been tested to achieve missing value imputation. What 
does matter for this analysis is that the question of how missing values are replaced from 
incomplete data sets – a very frequent circumstance when dealing with data “from the real 
world – is still very much a work in progress and remains a topic of debate between 
scholars and professionals. No single technique is universally acknowledged as superior 
to another and the decision about which one to use depends on a number of contextual 
factors and assumptions. Additionally, scholars recognise that each technique for 
imputing missing values – which is only one among many techniques for data preparation 
– involves some degree of loss or corruption of the information, especially when data are 
missing. This is particularly true when data are not missing randomly, rather their absence 
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is linked to one or more specific reasons, which may remain neglected in the subsequent 
analysis of data (Hughes, Heron, Sterne, & Tilling, 2019; Baraldi & Enders, 2010). 
What HANA’S PAL presents, then, is a set of pre-processing algorithms, selected by 
SAP computer scientists on the basis of three criteria; that the algorithms are: 1) suitable 
for executing the SAP HANA applications; 2) the most commonly-used, based on market 
surveys and 3) “generally available in other database products” (SAP, 2018, p. 6). Unlike 
the technical text reviewed above, in PAL the challenges with databases are reduced to 
three: too large an amount of data, which may “exceed the capacity of an algorithm”; 
noisy observations, which may compromise the accuracy of an algorithm; and bad scaling 
of attributes, “which can make an algorithm unstable” (2018, p. 549). To handle these 
issues, PAL offers a set of procedures that, as with all algorithms in SAP HANA, can be 
activated via coded instructions. For example, binning algorithms are used to smooth and 
discretise data. Discretisation transforms quantitative data into qualitative data, i.e. 
numerical attributes into discrete or nominal attributes, with a finite number of intervals. 
Note, algorithms are often designed only to learn from nominal attributes, whereas real- 
world applications usually involve continuous features which have to be discretised before 
algorithms can be applied (Garcìa et al., 2015, pp. 245 - 246). Binning algorithms assign 
each numeric value to a certain bin (or bucket), which becomes a category, in order to 
reduce the complexity of the data set and to enable, for example, a decision tree to work. 
When datasets are too large, sampling algorithms extract (supposedly) representative 
portions of them, onto which models are projected. In PAL, missing values imputation 
are calculated with a matrix completion model that is trained using Alternating Least 
Squares (SAP, 2018, p. 612) – an algorithm frequently used to build recommendation 
engines and which predicts results (e.g., which item a user will buy) by comparing two 
different datasets (Koren, Bell & Volinsky, 2009). 
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Sampled, smoothed, and normalised, algorithm-ready data do not retain a great deal 
of the living world they came from. Pre-processing algorithms are a first layer of 
mediation between so-called “raw” data and analytics, and help to reframe “real world” 
problems into computable terms. Because urban platforms, such as EPIC, promise to 
deliver deep and accurate insights and a holistic view of the city, it is important to consider 
the multiplicity of elements that actually make up a city, and in light of the filtering 
techniques described above, to consider and imagine what might be discarded and with 
what effect. By selecting what to calculate – and here I am reiterating Shannon Mattern’s 
remarks about urban dashboards (2015) – algorithms make normative decisions about 
what matters and what doesn’t matter in the city and, ultimately, what the city is or is not. 
Given this, algorithms perform an epistemic and ontological reduction of cities to their 
data derivatives – models – which begins with pre-processing functions. 
In her research on the pursuit of terrorist money, Marieke de Goede (2012) explains 
that security is speculative insofar as material security interventions – including analytics 
and risk modelling – only become possible once a visual field is created, that inevitably 
includes assumptions, ideas, emotions, and objectives, which render it politically charged. 
Algorithms, in short, “need instructions concerning risk appetites, patterns, and 
thresholds” (de Goede, 2017, p. 40). I would add that even unsupervised ML algorithms, 
which technically do not receive instructions from programmers but train themselves, still 
receive instructions from the environment in which they are designed and tested; from the 
choice and preparation of datasets to the broader strategies they serve. In a similar vein, 
danah boyd and Kate Crawford (2012) deconstructed what they called the mythology of 
big data, i.e. the promise that the algorithmic analysis of large data sets would deliver a 
superior form of knowledge, “with the aura of truth, objectivity and accuracy” (p. 663); 
one that would make all other forms of knowledge obsolete, and any debate useless. 
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In response to this powerful narrative that still circulates between academic circles, 
commercial outlets, political announcements, and clichés, a substantial body of scholarly 
work draws attention to the mystifications and biases that big data mythology relies upon. 
To start, there is no intrinsic connection between data and truth. “Data has no truth,” writes 
Daniel Rosenberg (2013, p. 37). 
“It may be that the data we collect and transmit has no relation to truth or reality 
whatsoever beyond the reality that data helps us to construct. (...) it is this rhetorical aspect 
of the term ‘data’ that has made it indispensable.” Data are not facts, but rather a basis for 
rhetorical arguments. As Lisa Gitelman and Virginia Jackson (2013) make clear, drawing 
on Bowker (2005), there is no such thing as raw data. Data are neither neutral, nor 
innocent; they are always inscribed in a set of discursive and material coordinates; they 
are imagined, selected, presented, and organised. An interpretative framework and, in 





Once data has been prepared – cleaned up, transformed, normalised, and integrated – 
they are ready to be “mined”: dissected by algorithms in search of meaningful 
information, from which predictive models can be generated. Clustering, for example, is 
key function of the predictive library, largely employed in unsupervised learning and 
applied to tasks, such as pattern recognition and anomaly detection. As Larose and Larose 
(2015) explained, “clustering algorithms seek to segment the entire data set into relatively 
homogeneous subgroups or clusters, where the similarity of the records within the cluster 
is maximised, and the similarity to records outside this cluster is minimised” (p. 523). In 
other words, clustering algorithms operate under the assumption that all the elements in 
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the same cluster will have more in common with each other than with the elements of 
another cluster. 
Clustering is frequently employed in the early stages of data mining as a way of 
reducing and simplifying information, especially when dealing with large volumes of 
data. Clusters are then used as input into other algorithmic techniques (Larose & Larose, 
2015, p. 524). There are various mathematical approaches to clustering – including K- 
means, affinity propagation, and neural networks – however, all these work by measuring 
the distance between data points and assume that proximity means a stronger similarity. 
Classification techniques combine different variables associated with a certain class of 
objects (the training dataset) to determine further possible associations in new datasets. 
Well-known examples of these techniques include predicting the credit risk associated 
with a mortgage application, or whether certain behaviours indicate a potential terrorist 
threat (Larose & Larose, 2015). 
Bayesian classifiers, as Rieder (2017) commented, are an influential classification 
technique that infers the probability of a hypothesis – e.g., that an email is spam – based 
on existing knowledge. Decision trees, for example, seek to decrease the entropy, i.e. the 
amount of information, generated by each data point. Entropy is a definition of disorder 
and uncertainty, hence reducing the entropy of a tree node means higher probability and 
accuracy. Regression algorithms are also widely used to make predictions. They estimate 
relationships among variables, i.e. they measure how dependent variables change, when 
any independent variable, known as a predictor, changes. Association techniques, 
including algorithms such as a-priori, FP growth, K-optimal rule discovering, and 




Claudia Aradau (2015) comments that the logic embedded in data mining algorithms 
claims superior accuracy and objectivity, but seems to have more in common with 
divination than with the methods of investigation that are generally established as 
scientific. Rather than detecting signs of deviation, from an established order, clustering 
analytics associate elements and define standards of normality and deviation through a 
logic of resemblance and correspondence. As security investigations are increasingly 
conducted through pattern recognition (or its algorithmic alter-ego, anomaly detection) 
proximity, imitation, analogy, and sympathy become the criteria through which data 
signatures are drawn together into suspect patterns. As Louise Amoore noted, a 
speculative logic is mathematically built into the Bayesian inferences that underpin many 
predictive algorithms, wherein a set of unknown values become visible and meaningful 
only when associated with each other, and where formulae resemble “if *** and ***, in 
association with ****, then ***.” (Amoore, 2013, p. 59). The asterisks are replaced with 
events, names, and possible threats based not on facts but on inner rules. This speculative 
logic is also, simultaneously, inherently normative, as it is led and informed by the 
purpose of decision-making. As Rieder (2017) writes, Bayesian classifiers are “a form of 
description that is built, from the ground up, on a prescriptive horizon. We no longer 
(only) decide based on what we know; we know based on the decision we have to make” 
(p. 111). Although it is based on a specific form of algorithm, this remark grasps the 
heuristic tendency of algorithmic systems generally, where the entire chain of knowledge 
production – from the preparation of data to the training and fine-tuning of models – is 
led by targets that are grounded in specific interests, be they the selection of new 
customers, the detection of cancer risk factors or the identification of suspect criminals. 
Xpresso, the software for social media monitoring in New Town Kolkata, is based on 
NLP, which analyses human expressions on social networks. NLP can be performed using 
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several techniques, including the aforementioned Bayesian and neural networks. Artificial 
neural networks are sets of algorithms designed to (loosely) imitate the human brain, and 
one of the most common ML applications. Beyond NLP, neural networks can be used to 
carry out a number of tasks and, therefore, they are transversal to each of the modelling 
categories described above. Neural networks can be developed within extremely complex 
structures – as in Deep Learning models – but, in essence, they are made up of a set of 
interconnected computing nodes (neurons) which receive inputs from both the outside and 
from other nodes, communicating with each other. They learn through iterative processes, 
adapting to mistakes – for example, when the network gives a wrong output, or fails to 
classify the semantic domain of a word, the connections that led to failure are weakened, 
while those that led to success are reinforced, until the right output is achieved (Fausett, 
1994). As Matteo Pasquinelli (2017) observes, neural networks turn information into 
logic, as “the logic gates of neural networks compute information in order to affect the 
way they will compute future information” (2017, p. 7). Proximity and distance, entropy, 
and feedback loops are instruments of a “statistics of pure relation” (Bolin & Andersson 
Schwarz, 2015, p. 2), where information becomes logic, but logic does not permeate 
information. In other words, there is no necessary relation between the mathematical 
indicators of proximity or distance within a cluster, entropy in a decision tree, feedback 
in a neural network, etc. or causality in the “real” outside world. Even given the fact that 
algorithms succeed in finding correlations, it does not follow that these correlations are of 
any consequence outside the model, let alone that they predict future actions. 
The examination of the algorithms in HANA PAL and Xpresso indicate that what are 
commonly labelled as predictions are actually suggestions about possible links among sets 
of data that have been previously filtered to fit into the model, and not the other way 
round. Models are closed systems, with no logical or practical relationship with the 
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outside except for what is assigned to them by a broader context. In fact, technically 
speaking, algorithms do not discover patterns (or other models of information) but they 
fabricate them (Perrotta and Williamson, 2018, p. 10). Pre-processing and iteration are 
two clear examples of the procedures through which algorithms are made productive. 
Under the right conditions, algorithms may use their capabilities not to find, but to create 
results. As we have seen in the description above, clustering, decision trees, and regression 
models iterate their calculation several times in order to reduce margins of confusion or 
error. 
David Beer (2018) argues that algorithms are the core product of a rampant and 
increasingly powerful industry, which aggressively crafts an imaginary wherein data (and) 
analytics are presented as vital to the future of knowledge, business, and the human 
condition at large. The affirmation of this rationality, along with pervasive marketing 
strategies and commercial deals, establishes data analytics as the ultimate source of 
heuristic authority. The gaze on the world – the forms and boundaries of visualisation and 
sense-making – that this imaginary dictates is highly performative, as it has the power to 
shape and manifest the trajectories of the future that it anticipates. “Clearly data 
analytics,” Beer writes “are complicit in such imagined futures, meaning that there is a 
politics to the anticipation they are said to afford. (...) here we see anticipation being 
ramped up and reactivity being folded into imagined futures” (2018, p. 32). We see the 
convergence between the two meanings of speculative in this generative quality of 
algorithms: the theoretical and the financial – on one hand the creation of hypothesis and 
on the other the attempt to make those hypotheses actionable. 
The purpose of my review of the predictive analytics methods, employed by EPIC and 
Xpresso, was to unearth the speculative logic that is embedded in the algorithmic 
procedures. The type of knowledge that these algorithms produce is one of mere – albeit 
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automated – statistical induction, where algorithms learn from what they calculate and 
then turn this into rules for further actions or predictions. As we have seen, these 
operations require a great deal of preparation – pre-processing algorithms – and fine- 
tuning attempts, in order to give acceptable results. In other words, despite giving the 
pretence of superior efficacy, algorithms are not tools that plastically capture data. In fact, 
it appears to be the other way round: data are groomed and refined so they can fit the 
algorithms. 
Pasquinelli (2017, p. 13) points out that algorithms generate hypotheses in the form 
of inductive inferences, or at best examples of weak abduction (such as medical 
diagnoses). However, they are certainly not able to think causally or elaborate dirty data 
(except, as we will shortly see, for cases of apophenia, i.e. when algorithms create patterns 
from dirty data). These weak forms of speculations are not predictions, but they do offer 
material for preemption: i.e. a selected range of possibilities over which anticipatory 
action can be taken. However, it does not follow from this that models are purely arbitrary, 
or that preemption is the only logic around which models are constructed. As Weisberg 
(2013) suggests, the model-world relationship, that is the degree of actual similarity 
between them, ultimately depends on how modelling is practiced, i.e. how interests, 
decisions and practical factors shape the construal of a distinct model. Within the context 
of this analysis, however, preemption emerges as a central axis for the elaboration of 
models, grounded in the strategies and objectives for urban government that underpin the 
deployment of platforms such as EPIC and Xpresso. 
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Futures and Failures 
 
Having explored the inner rationality of security systems, such as EPIC and Xpresso, 
that is, the specific logics of the algorithms that support their functions, I now move on to 
discussing how these systems relate to the “world out there”: data, time, and the urban 
environment around them. 
According to the Foucauldian formulation, security is a technique of government and 
a technology of the future or, in other words, a mode of governing “through a probabilistic 
comprehension, calculation, and colonisation of uncertain futures” (de Goede, 2012, p. 
22). As discussed so far in this chapter, security decisions that are based on algorithmic 
models are speculative, because they merge the two dimensions of anticipation – trying 
to foresee future possibilities – and investment – acting on future possibilities in the 
present (de Goede 2012, p. 21). In parallel, Jennifer Gabrys (2016) defines computing 
infrastructures and smart cities as speculative, because they create urban practices and 
modalities of inhabiting the city which also form the conditions for future modalities of 
urban development. Therefore, my focus to this point, has been to understand how 
systems, such as EPIC and Xpresso, appropriate the future practically, and to unpack what 
are the practices, mistakes, objects, and political effects of these speculations. 
Chances are that while I am writing this dissertation, a beta version of the Xpresso 
engine is already processing social media posts in New Town Kolkata. As explained 
earlier, Xpresso cognitive bots are designed to detect the emotions and intentions of social 
media users, and to predict potential risks for the city. Agnieszka Leszczynski (2016) 
analyses a similar application, British sentiment analytics’ engine EMOTIVE (Extracting 
the Meaning of Terse Information in a Geo–Visualisation of Emotion), as an example of 
urban security speculation. Developed after the protests and riots in the summer of 2011 
in the UK, where mobile social networks played a key role, EMOTIVE generates “mood 
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maps” of UK cities and serves them to security agencies, to prevent “potentially harmful 
events” (EMOTIVE, n.d.). As Leszczynski notes, EMOTIVE seeks to securitise the city 
against social unrest and political protests, “even where such risks exist only in 
speculative form as codified urban derivatives” (2016, p. 1700). EMOTIVE also 
reinforces a political agenda – political protests need to be stopped from spreading – as 
well as classist and racist urban topoi, i.e. that riots only happen in certain 
neighbourhoods, inhabited by specific ethnic groups, etc. 
The design and previous application of the Xpresso engine resemble EMOTIVE 
closely. Xpresso is able to generate early warnings for generic undesired situations, by 
sorting social media texts into different types of emotion – anger, disgust, fear, joy, 
sadness, and surprise – and expressions – advocacy, complaint, suggestion, and opinion; 
allegedly detecting the intentions of writers. The scope of the application is intended to 
enable urban authorities to act before threats materialise in reality, be they social protests, 
outbreaks of disease or traffic jams. In Cape Town, the EPIC software generates risk 
models from a wider network of sources, including sensors, GPS trackers, CCTV, and 
emergency staff. Data streaming analytics seek to decipher disquieting patterns across 
volumes of urban data and to configure decision models. The parameters of risk and 
emergencies that are embedded in the algorithmic settings are, of course, informed by 
historical patterns and contingent factors, such as a propensity for fire hazards, the scarcity 
of water, the limited budget available for emergency management or the frequent police 
interventions in the black areas of the city. One of the business requirements that guided 
the creation of EPIC was to “drive proactive policing as opposed to reactive (...) to gain 
insights into trends and what if Capability to aid in proactive policing based on past 
offences in a particular local or area,” that is, to identify crime hotspots in the city in 
collaboration with private security (Smith & Mortimer, 2017). 
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Over the past few years, the algorithmic platforms that have been applied to the 
management of public services – such as policing or healthcare – have raised strong 
concerns about their biased and often inaccurate results. EPIC and Xpresso can be viewed, 
respectively, as an expanded and a narrow version of predictive policing software. 
Recently, around fifty police departments in the US, including Philadelphia, Chicago, St. 
Louis, Santa Cruz and New Orleans, adopted software for crime prevention such as 
Hunchlab and PredPol (Chammah & Hansen, 2016; Benbouzid, 2019). The development 
of Hunchlab began in 2008, following collaboration between tech start up Azavea and the 
Philadelphia Police Department (PD). The final version of the product was 
commercialised in 2015, and was welcomed by several police departments across the US 
and in Europe. PredPol too, was created through a partnership, this time between UCLA 
and the Los Angeles PD, between 2009 and 2012. The two products do not differ a great 
deal. Both use analytics to “predict” – i.e. to model – when and where a crime will occur, 
combining police data with other datasets such as maps and temporal data (school 
holidays, social events, and weather, etc.). Both generate risk maps that show boxes in the 
areas of the city where a crime is predicted to occur within a given time-frame. Both 
incorporate specific assumptions into their algorithms, i.e. the near-repeat victimisation 
theory, which postulates that if a house has been broken into once, the risk that it will be 
broken into again goes up and includes all the houses in the same neighbourhoods, 
because offenders tend to repeat their crimes along the same script. Both companies insist 
that their algorithms only model where and when a crime will take place, and not who will 
commit it, thus off-setting accusations that they might be profiling people (Hunchlab, 
2015; Rey, n.d.). Nonetheless, a recent study (Richardson, Schultz & Crawford, 2019) 
highlights that police data, based on historical records, are often “dirty.” Importantly, in 
common data mining jargon, “dirty” refers to datasets that have not yet been cleaned up 
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for the algorithms; however, Richardson and colleagues use the term to describe datasets 
that are incomplete, manipulated, and racially biased. Predictive models that are trained 
on these datasets will only reproduce partial and biased results, and will reinforce police 
attention onto impoverished, often black or Hispanic neighbourhoods, thus feeding a 
vicious feedback loop of targeting and criminalising communities that are already 
marginalised (Chammah & Hansen, 2016; O’Neil, 2016). 
Predictive policing systems claim to be race-blind, as they do not compute individual 
backgrounds, but geographical areas. However, Cathy O’Neil (2016) points out that urban 
geography is not neutral, especially in highly-segregated North American cities, where 
urban areas are often proxies for race and class (p. 76). In Cape Town, the apartheid laws 
are in the recent past, while de facto segregation persists, along with mistrust and tensions 
between poor black communities and the South African Police (SAP). Cape Town’s 
townships, such as Nyanga, Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain regularly feature in the top 
ranks of criminal statistics. As mentioned earlier, township residents lament a twofold 
discrimination from law enforcement: on one hand, the lack of protection against serious 
crimes in their communities, and on the other, the systematic targeting of black male 
youth, found in white(r), wealthy areas of the city. In such a context, a system of predictive 
policing that is based on geographical crime records is likely to reinforce patterns of racial 
abuse. Moreover, O’Neil notes (2016) that predictive policing systems are designed to 
target street crime only, and remain blind to so-called “white collar” crime – infractions, 
corruption, and fraud committed in the financial and political circles. EPIC too, seems to 
share this blind spot: its parameters are defined by patrolling, emergency calls, and CCTV, 
none of which is able to see, left alone investigate, violations that might be perpetrated 
from bank headquarters and the like. Hence, the regime of visibility of policing and crime 
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(per)formed by these platforms shows a tendency to crystallise, and “techwash” long 
settled politics of race and class into mathematical objectivity. 
I suggest that dirty data, human bias, political underpinnings, and socio-economic 
borders are some of the reasons why policing models enhance racism and oppressive 
practices, or why public service algorithms persecute poor communities, instead of 
helping them. I argue that the other reasons are entrenched in the inner logic of algorithms. 
A recent book (Apprich, Chun, Cramer & Steyerl, 2018) investigates how pattern 
recognition performs and reinforces racism, sexism, and classism across social media, 
search engines and other fields of application. This happens, Wendy Chun states, 
particularly because network science works through homophily, “the axiom that similarity 
breeds connection” and that “love is always love of the same” (2018, p. 60); hence it 
applies conservative identity politics to data analysis. Homophilic algorithms generate 
filter bubbles and echo chambers on social media and search engines, which will feed you 
what you have seen before and (supposedly) want to see again. For example, this explains 
why white supremacists, on social media, have come to believe they are the majority of 
people – they live in a filter bubble of southern crosses and communist conspiracies, 
where Jesus is white and rapists are black. Furthermore, I suggest, homophily is also built 
into predictive models which assume that parents with a past history of domestic violence 
are likely to abuse their children, hence signal them to social services; or that high crime 
records in black communities means black people love crime, hence agents are continually 
directed to black neighbourhoods. Homophily makes biased algorithms powerfully 
performative, and turns deficient models into discriminating politics. 
Two common flaws that exist in models, which make the tautological, self-referential 
nature of algorithmic knowledge particularly visible, are overfitting and apophenia. In the 
case of “over-fitting,” a model learns so much, and so well, from training data that it can 
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only recognise a very specific pattern and is not able to generalise on new data. Facial 
recognition models that have been trained only with white faces, and which label black 
faces as “gorillas” – as in Google’s infamous case – are a striking example of overfitting. 
Conversely, apophenia occurs when models recognise patterns that do not exist or, better, 
create patterns from dirty data, i.e. datasets that have not been pre-processed. As Hito 
Steyerl (2018) provocatively suggested, the incorrect targeting of aerial strikes could be 
examples of apophenic models. Overfitting and apophenia clearly point to the socio- 
political production of algorithms, where human mistakes and prejudice in the choice of 
biased training datasets, or in the poor tuning of the model, can produce results that are 
completely unobjective, and potentially lethal. Overfitting and apophenia also indicate, as 
Pasquinelli (2017) put it, the “intrinsic limits in neural computation: they show how neural 
networks can paranoically spiral around embedded patterns rather than helping to reveal 
new correlations” (2017, p. 9). In essence, it is the tautological inner rationality of 
algorithms, and not only human errors, that make algorithms prone to bias and mistake. 
Platforms, such as EPIC and Xpresso, attempt to translate the city into the language 
of predictive algorithms. Although different in size, architecture, and scope, they both are 
preemptive systems, which seek to model possible future scenarios and to act upon them. 
Agnieszka Leszczynski (2016) describes urban algorithmic governmentality as an 
assemblage of futuring projects, where the future city is filtered through a speculative 
security calculus. Yet, the liability of models to bias, inaccuracy, and even delirium makes 
their political relevance manifest. Inequalities, exploitation, racism, sexism, frauds, and 
lies, are often built into the mathematical instruments that transform immense, chaotic 
volumes of digital traces into knowledge that can be used and monetised. Algorithms are 
shaped by the cultural environments in which they are created and trained, and similarly, 
their calculative logics – homophily, tautology, overfitting, and apophenia – are bound to 
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normalise, reproduce, and magnify biases and mistakes across correlations, inferences, 
and decisions. In other words, the speculative nature of analytics has strong political 
implications. 
Algorithms are a highly effective, yet self-referential form of knowledge that is 
commonly presented as intelligence. For algorithms to make sense of the “world out 
there,” the world needs to be packaged to fit into them, in the form of datasets, samples, 
bins, etc. Essentially, saying that algorithms, and therefore algorithm-based security, are 
speculative denotes two things. Firstly, it means that algorithms speculate on data, as 
Aradau (2015) suggested, because they elaborate theoretical constructs rather than 
producing demonstrable evidence. Secondly, algorithms speculate insofar as they are 
designed to extract as much content as possible from data and to return preemptive 
elements – an actionable version of the future – at any cost. 
 
 
Realtimeness and Preemption 
 
“The whole idea of things having to be real-time, having to be super fast, was key,” 
says Mehboob Foflonker, Chief Technology Officer of the City of Cape Town, in the 
EPIC promotional video, while dramatic images of wildfires run in the background (SAP, 
2017). If preemption is a key factor of smart city platforms, real-time is the buzzword. 
Emergency services in Cape Town have improved because EPIC is able to gather and 
share more information in real-time. Urban governance will improve as Xpresso provides 
real-time insights into citizen’s moods and concerns. Dashboards, control rooms and 




the most critical to the logics and operations of smart urbanism, I propose, 
concerns “present present” and the ability to be able to monitor, analyse and react 
in real-time (...) (to achieve) the instantaneous control of space and spatial 
relations in real-time. (p. 21) 
 
However, the studies that have critically engaged with real-time all conclude that, in 
fact, there is no such thing. By definition, real-time is the suppression of any latency 
between the occurrence of an event, and the reporting or recording of it, or between an 
action and its effects. In his analysis of the early developments of the global internet, 
Adrian Mackenzie (1997) explains that: 
realtime concerns the rate at which computational processing takes place in 
relation to the time of lived audio-visual experience. It entails the progressive 
elimination of any perceptible delay between the time of machine processing and 
the time of conscious perception. (1997, p. 60) 
 
In essence, McKenzie (1997) is saying that real-time is just machine-time; it 
coincides with computation. More recently, Esther Weltevrede, Anne Helmond and 
Caroline Gerlitz (2014) have drawn attention to the making of real-time across digital 
media; that is, to the multiple ways in which real-time is fabricated across the plethora of 
digital devices and platforms that we use every day. Thus, real-time is always device- 
specific, as it depends on the different computational processes that are used by the 
different machines and software. Hence, the authors use the notion of realtimeness to 
describe how so-called real-time events are not actually happening in the now, but that 
they emerge from the continuous movement of data, the user’s engagement, and the 
filtering of information based on specific algorithmic settings. In sum, “realtimeness 
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refers to an understanding of time that is embedded in and immanent to platforms, engines 
and their cultures” (2014, p. 143). 
Kitchin (2017) argues that after closer examination, no real-time system actually 
works in real-time; they always include some degree of latency. Each system must make 
choices about the temporal rate of data sampling – every few milliseconds, or every ten 
seconds, or every five minutes, or any other interval. Furthermore, the timing of data 
analysis can take place instantly or over time, as can the timing of data sharing with the 
public, which can be close to immediate or delayed or might never happen. Latencies can 
also occur, because of the speed of the network technology that is used – broadband, Wi- 
Fi, 3G, 4G, Bluetooth, etc. – and also because of the system components and architecture. 
Realtimeness, Kitchin (2017) concludes, is a precarious and fabricated condition; it 
requires continuous maintenance, patching and repair, as it is exposed to all sorts of faults, 
from software crashes to hacking. It is relational, heterogeneous, and contingent. 
My own research indicates that, in computing systems, present-present and 
realtimeness are not only equally as critical as preemption and modelling of the future, 
but also inseparable. In fact, the capability to be effective in real-time depends on some 
degree of anticipation of events. Algorithms that are used for real-time decisions are 
trained with historical datasets; thus realtimeness is, in practice, a form of quasi- 
instantaneous preemption. Let us consider the practice of now-casting – the forecasting 
of now. Now-casting has been used in meteorology for a long time, and more recently it 
has been used in economics and data analysis in general. Now-casting is defined as “the 
prediction of the present, the very near future and the recent past” (Bańbura, Giannone, 
Modugno & Reichlin, 2013, p. 2) and “the exercise of reading, through the lenses of a 
model, the flow of data releases in real time” (Bańbura et al., 2013, p. 5). This tool has 
already been used to evaluate “the mood of the nation” from tweets, in the UK (Lansdall‐ 
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Welfare, Lampos & Cristianini, 2012). When the Xpresso engine classifies New Town’s 
urban emotions, and generates early warnings from social media streams of data in real- 
time, or when EPIC’s analytics signal an emergency, both tools are practicing now-casting 
– projecting a model on the present. In synthesis, the logic of modelling that informs urban 
government platforms compresses past, present, and future into a single mode of 
calculation. So-called realtimeness is actually a form of very short-term modelling. 
Significantly, Antoinette Rouvroy and Bernard Stiegler (2016) define preemption as: 
“an augmented actuality of the possible. (...) This is a specific actuality that takes the form 
of a vortex aspiring both the past and the future. Everything becomes actual” (2016, p. 
15). Their definition illuminates how operations of preemption and realtimeness/now- 
casting deconstruct the boundaries, not only between past, present, and future but also 
between possibility and reality. The two key criteria of modelling – speculation and 
actionability – become the foundation for governmental action. Now-casting models quite 
literally make the future present, in forms that can be handled immediately and which can 
potentially codify response protocols for the future. So, now-casting also performs the 
future (Anderson, 2010), insomuch as it shapes the ways in which future possibilities can 
be understood and attended to. 
 
 
Milieu and Targets 
 
How do we make sense of the operations and logics of urban security – computing 
platforms, speculative algorithms, preemptive models, and now-casting – described so 
far? What strategies do these techniques and procedures use to intervene in the city as an 
environment, as well as on its singular components? 
The scope of security, as Foucault (2007) defines it, is to: 
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fabricate, organise, and plan a milieu even before the notion was formed and 
isolated. The milieu, then, will be that in which circulation is carried out. The 
milieu is a set of natural givens – rivers, marshes, hills – and a set of artificial 
givens – an agglomeration of individuals, of houses, etcetera. The milieu is a 
certain number of combined, overall effects bearing on all who live in it. (2007, 
pp. 20–21) 
 
Foucault (1979) developed this line of thinking further, at the end of his lectures on 
The Birth of Biopolitics in 1979, and sketched out the notion of environmental 
governmentality, to define the ways in which biopolitical techniques and modes of 
regulation were increasingly shifting from subjects and population to the broader 
conditions of life. The focus of government was no longer as much on “players” – 
individual or collective behaviours – as it was on the “rules of the game” – the “milieu,” 
or the environmental setting – that make behaviours possible or impossible. In her book 
Program Earth, Jennifer Gabrys (2016) advances this formulation (which Foucault did 
not develop any further) to engage with the increasing implementation of computational 
technologies within urban environments, and their effects in terms of government. To 
contend with environments that are becoming more and more computational, Gabrys 
introduces the notion of “biopolitics 2.0”, as an analytical tool “to examine specific ways 
of life that unfolds within the smart city” (2016, p. 190–92). In Foucauldian terms, 
however, biopolitics and security are two indissociable notions. They share the same 
focus: to manage and ensure circulation, and the unfolding of life. Biopolitics always 
operates through a set of security techniques (the dispositif of security) which attempt to 
regulate contingencies and uncertainties (Dillon & Lobo-Guerrero, 2008). I argue that 
biopolitics 2.0 and speculative security are somehow coextensive notions. Both unfold 
through a preemptive logic, which consists, as Rouvroy and Stiegler (2016) write, “in 
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acting not on the causes but on the informational and physical environment so that certain 
things can or cannot be actualised, so that they can or cannot be possible” (2016, p. 15). 
Sensing infrastructures, analytics, and models inscribe the smart city into a dispositif of 
security, which is constantly calculating the elements in the milieu/environment – traffic, 
crime, emotions, and quality of the air, etc. – and in doing so, defines the politics of life 
in our time. 
Seemingly in contrast to the idea of environmental governance, speculative 
security/preemption can also be linked to the idea of targeted governance. Mariana 
Valverde and Michael Mopas (2004) describe this as a burgeoning shift in governmental 
practices across different fields – from criminal justice and policing to healthcare, 
insurances and social security, immigration and border security – where interventions in 
individuals, or categories of people, are based on accurate risk calculations and are 
presented as smart and free from side-effects. Targeted governance breaks up its objects 
“into a set of measurable risk factors” (2004, p. 240), which are then recombined into 
patterns of security interventions. As Amoore and de Goede (2005) remark, this 
framework has become particularly influential in the “war on terror” after 9/11, where 
mathematical techniques of risk assessments began to be applied extensively to border 
management, mobility, and financial transactions, in an attempt to identify potential 
terrorists. Twenty years later, targeted governance and risk-profiling regulate a wide range 
of domains, from advertising campaigns to the job market. Smart city platforms apply 
these logics to every urban component – individuals and groups of people, resources or 
infrastructures indifferently – and they are categorised, not as distinct subjects or objects 
but as KPIs or risk scores. 
Earlier in this thesis I described how the ERP software for urban management in Cape 
Town generates profiles and targets policies of various natures, from tax inspections to 
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police controls and social benefits. The EPIC platform automatically profiles urban 
incidents, as well as emergency responders and their performances. It then generates 
automated protocols for each type of incident, and also for the workforce management 
and allocation of resources. A sentiment analysis software, such as Xpresso, is able to 
detect the feelings and opinions of unique social media users and thereafter, to target them 
with specific content and feed them ads, as well as to obscure their profile, and report 
them to the police. The capacity to target specific issues faster and more accurately, as in 
the real-time narrative, is indeed one of the most emphasised achievements of the smart 
city. This may seem to contradict the politics of the milieu described above, where the 
focus is on the conditions of life rather than on the specific forms of life, but I suggest it 
does not. In fact, targeted governance does not care about the specific qualities of those 
targets. It is indifferent to identities. Targets are not persons, animals, plants, cars or other 
singular entities; they are data derivatives, algorithmic aggregations of factors. Given this, 
targets and environment are not antithetic, but rather complementary strategies of 
governance and governmentality. 
As Valverde and Mopas (2004) observe: “Risks are often best minimised through 
impersonal techniques acting on the environment so as to lower the opportunities for 
wrongdoing” (2004, p. 243). Within the context of smart urban government, wrongdoing 
can be translated into incidents or low performance. Conversely, the opposite might also 
be true: targeting is a way to organise the environment. A system is created through a 
chain of risk calculations. The milieu – the (attempted) smart city for the purpose of this 
discussion – is no longer what Foucault would describe as a set of natural/artificial givens. 
Instead, it is a continuous series of models. The objects of governmental action only exist 




I conclude that, in smart cities, the real domain of security and government is not 
technologies and not people, but speculation. Speculation, as enacted by extensive 
computing systems, actually makes the city, because it is “a practice of constructing 
particular trajectories of urban practice and inhabitation. Construction occurs here in 
at least two senses: of being built, and of forming the conditions in which new 
speculative urbanisms (and modes of withness) may unfold” (Gabrys, 2016, p. 244). It 
is in these continuous practices of production of the future, in the mathematical 





Urban computing environments – smart cities – are intrinsically security projects. 
This is not because they work as massive surveillance, or better, dataveillance systems, as 
argued by some smart city critics (Kitchin, 2014; King, 2016; Lyon, 2018). Obviously, 
dataveillance is embedded in computing networks and has reached unprecedented 
pervasiveness and scale; but it does not define a governmental strategy in itself and, more 
importantly, it does not grasp the productive character of computing infrastructures. I 
suggest that smart cities are security projects, because they are informed by a preemptive 
logic that operates through mathematical modelling. The ubiquitous dissemination of 
border techniques, throughout urban infrastructures and mundane objects and as examined 
in Chapter 2, provides a widespread measurement grid, onto which models can be 
projected and over which speculative security can operate. 
The urban platforms of Cape Town and New Town, examined in this chapter, 
automate security analysis and decisions on the basis of patterns, risk scoring, and alerts. 
Nevertheless, predictive analytics do not actually predict anything; they generate models 
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of threats through methods of calculation that, as Aradau (2015) has suggested, are closer 
to divination than to detection. Even so-called real-time operations are based on quasi- 
instantaneous models, known as now-casting. Thus, security is speculative because it 
works with multiple configurations of the future that are made actionable in the present; 
and it does this through algorithmic procedures that are based on abstractions, hypotheses, 
and tautologies. Speculative security seeks to act upon the conditions of life and the 
unfolding of events in the city. Speculative security is, to borrow Gabrys’ (2016) 
perspective of the Foucauldian formulation, a form of environmental governmentality, 
which seeks to redefine how life and relationships, between human and non human 
components, unfold in the city. At the same time, speculative security operates by 
targeting processes (Valverde & Mopas, 2004), which break up urban components – 
human, natural and artificial, indifferently – into risk indicators and re-aggregate the data 
into specific procedures or policies. I argue that rather than pointing to their being 
alternative regimes, targeting and environmental governmentality are actually two 
simultaneous and enmeshed strategies, which operate through data mining and the 
modelling of future(s). 
Speculative security is, I suggest, the distinct technique of government that is 
emerging from smart city projects. The algorithms which process urban data through 
biases, flaws, ideologies, hypothesis, and obscure mathematical alchemies, make 
speculations. The intention of making risks and possibilities as exploitable as possible, in 
terms of governmental action and politics, is speculative. Security can also be speculative 
in another common meaning of the word – playing with risks to maximise profit. This 











In a letter from December 2015, the head of public policy of Uber India (Smart City 
Proposal Annex 4, n.d., p 101) proposed an agreement between Uber and the Government 
of West Bengal, where Uber would contribute to making New Town a smart city in several 
ways: creating up to 40,000 jobs; giving opportunities to unemployed youth, women, and 
marginalised groups; providing the local government with predictive analytics; 
cooperating with local authorities to provide last-mile connectivity and integrating the 
existing routes of transport. In return, Uber would expect “favourable treatment” from the 
government of West Bengal, concerning taxes, real estate, and local policies. This 
negotiation is a good indicator of the entanglement between strategies of value extraction 
and smart city projects. As I will explain later in this chapter, it is an entanglement that 
goes far beyond the level of contracts and fiscal leniency. 
In the previous chapters I have illustrated how the sensing and data-driven networks 
of smart city projects carry bordering functions with them and (tend to) set up an urban 
dispositif of algorithmic modelling and preemption. However, and at the same time, they 
create an infrastructure for value extraction. This chapter charts the ways in which the 
extraction of value intersects with border techniques and speculative security, and 
illustrates how government platforms and commercial platforms operate with the same 
sensing and algorithmic tools, generating the same kind of speculative models and 
preemptive interventions. The point here is not to postulate the uniformisation of 
government and economy, neither to reduce one to the other. The platforms for urban 
government, explored in the previous chapter and the commercial platforms described in 
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the following pages, have (at least for now) different legal profiles, different missions and 
different agendas. However, increasingly they rely on the same calculative apparatus to 
inscribe urban life into an incessant series of projections of the future. 
In order to understand how value is extracted through data and algorithms in smart 
cities, it is essential to map the wider, deeper geographies of extraction, which set up the 
conditions for smart cities and platforms to come to life and work. For this reason, in this 
chapter I will explore how the making of smart cities and the forms of data extraction that 
take place within them are inherently interconnected with the processes of mining and 
drilling, logistics, land grabbing, gentrification, and financialisation. 
I begin by looking at how zoning policies, dispossession, and financial ventures 
preceded and accompanied the making of smart cities, in Kolkata and Cape Town. Then 
I will examine the struggles of Uber drivers and the ways in which capitalist platforms are 
aligned and intertwined with smart city systems of modelling. Following that I will 
analyse how influential food tech platform, Zomato, extracts data from users through a 
range of micro-border techniques; and then derives value from that data through different 
strategies of algorithmic modelling. I then discuss how the categories of extractive 
urbanism and urban extractivism can be applied productively to define smart city projects 
and to grasp the combined effects of digital and non-digital extractivism on the urban 
environment. Finally, I point out the alignment and complicity between value extraction 
and security in the smart city, whereby government and commercial platforms share the 






Smart cities are sites of intensive data mining. In the age of what has been variously 
defined as digital/algorithmic/platform/surveillance capitalism, it is generally agreed that 
data is an immense source of value. Evgeny Morozov (2017) suggested that data 
extractivism is the logic that drives the industry of digital technology, where users are the 
“valuable stocks of data” that companies seek to drain: 
either to fuel their advertising-heavy business models — more and better data 
yields higher advertising earnings per user — or they need it in order to develop 
advanced modes of artificial intelligence centred around the principle of “deep 
learning”; here, the diversity of data inputs —and the ability to leverage millions 
of users to teach different behaviours to the machine — comes in handy. (2017, p. 
2) 
 
Almost twenty years ago, while examining an internet still made up of portals and 
communities, Tiziana Terranova (2000) drew attention to the centrality of users’ free 
labour – accessing websites, writing posts, chatting, developing code – in the valorisation 
of websites and in the open source movement. More recently, Terranova’s argument for 
free labour has been largely echoed by Christian Fuchs (2015; 2017). Reading through 
the lens of the Marxist labour theory of value, Fuchs emphasises the role of digital labour 
in the creation of value. He argues that internet and social media users are productive 
workers, as they are continuously creating data commodities, which capitalist companies 
– such as Facebook, Google, and YouTube, etc. – sell in the advertising market. Under 
this perspective, the exchange-value of data commodities is created through the transport 
and communication labour of users, who circulate commodity ideology across the 
platform. However, datafication is  an  expansive process  that extends far beyond social 
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media and, especially in cities, tends to colonise the human and non-human environment 
at large. Accordingly, the ways in which data generate value are broader than digital 
labour on social media. 
Jan Sadowski (2019) identifies six principal ways in which data generates value, and 
not always in monetary form. These include using data to profile and target people; to 
optimise systems; to manage and control things; to model probabilities; to build stuff; and 
to grow the value of assets. As we will shortly see, all of these modalities of value 
extraction are represented in smart cities – although modelling is particularly relevant for 
the purpose of this analysis – and are crucial in linking the monetisation of data to the 
broader forms of extraction from the urban environment. In agreement with Sadowski 
(2019), I maintain that not all of the value extracted from data is necessarily monetary or, 
at least, not immediately. However, as I explained earlier, the valorisation of data in smart 
cities is inscribed in relations that are inherently speculative. Therefore, I will argue 
further, later in this section, that what is not turned into money immediately becomes part 
of a strategy for the creation of future money. 
The convergence between data mining and value-extraction strategies goes back a 
long way. Louise Amoore (2013) describes how the first systems of data mining were 
developed in the early nineties for marketing purposes, when an IBM researcher, Rakesh 
Agrawal, provided British retailer, Marks & Spencer, with algorithms that were capable 
of unearthing patterns among large volumes of commercial transactions (pp. 39–43). 
Unlike the statistical techniques that had been in use up until that point, the algorithmic 
inferences deployed by Agrawal looked for association rules between different sets of 
data, seeking to recognise a range of possible consumer choices and behaviours in the 
future and to translate them into commercial decisions in the present. Significantly, these 
algorithms were adopted by security agencies in the USA and Europe after 9/11, in an 
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attempt to detect potential, unexpected threats, which had no continuity with past patterns 
and which could not be predicted by statistical means. Later in this chapter, more will be 
said about the intimate connection between security and profit strategies via analytics. 
Today, Agrawal’s algorithms are the lifeblood of business processes. In many 
commercial strategies, the performative effects of ubiquitous dataveillance, combined 
with analytics intervention at different levels – from marketing strategies to the 
“optimisation” of the workforce – can extend to the point of behavioural manipulation 
(Degli Esposti, 2014). By now it must be patently obvious to many of us that our latest 
searches on Google come back to haunt us on the web for days, in the form of ads, but 
this is also not innocent. Cathy O’Neill (2016) provides a well-documented and disturbing 
account of algorithmic manipulation for profit purposes. She explains how targeted 
advertising is often a deliberate predatory strategy that seeks to exploit the vulnerabilities 
of its targets (2016). For example, for-profit colleges and loan companies spend millions 
of dollars every year on Facebook and Google ads. Here, they target specific profiles such 
as the poorest zip codes, low education, low-wage jobs, single mothers and recent trauma, 
to sell their products. Methods such as “lead generation” use misleading ads to attract 
suitable profiles – typically uneducated people in need of financial aid – and sell their data 
to predatory industries. Prospective students are lured into taking out government loans 
to buy overpriced courses that are worth nothing on the job market. Desperate people 
apply for short-term loans with impossible interest rates. This perpetuates a cycle of 
indebtedness and marginalisation that is algorithmically engineered with great precision. 
A recent teachers’ strike in West Virginia offers another unsettling insight into 
algorithmic biopower and value-extraction. In 2018, 34,000 teachers shut down public 
schools for nine days, to protest against low salaries and rising health insurance costs. 
Among their claims, was their rejection of a new health insurance program that would 
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require customers to wear a Fitbit or Garmin fitness tracker and subscribe to a wellness 
app called Go365. The app would set wellness goals for teachers and track their activities, 
progress, and lifestyle, through the wearables. On the basis of these data, the insurance 
company would reward “healthy” teachers, and penalise the “lazy” ones. Teachers who 
failed to comply with the fitness goals, faced increases in their premiums as well as 
penalties. Eventually, after days of pickets and demonstrations, the teachers won the fight 
and set themselves free from the trackers. However, health insurance plans based on 
wearables, are only on the rise in the United States, and the compulsory monitoring and 
profiling of fitness are emerging as new frontiers of value-extraction for insurance 
companies. 
These examples can be understood as manifestations of – and, at least in the case of 
the teachers’ strike, struggles against – what Andrea Fumagalli (2011; 2015) defined as 
the full subsumption of life in biocognitive capitalism. For roughly the past three decades, 
critical Marxist scholars have observed a tendency, in the restructuring of production and 
the transformation of labour, to knock down the boundaries between productive and 
reproductive time/space and to exploit the whole range of human resources, and even of 
life itself, from biological information to emotions and fun. (Lazzarato, 1997; Morini & 
Fumagalli, 2010). Sensing devices and behavioural manipulation via algorithms become, 
in this perspective, instruments of social subjugation and/or enslavement whereby 
personal information, hopes, desires, and vulnerabilities are captured and then exploited 
to the fullest extent. 
If data extractivism is clearly a vital domain of value extraction in smart cities, 
because of its concentration of data-mining infrastructures and platforms, it is not the only 
one. More importantly, it is not independent of other extractive processes. In their work, 
Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2017), Kate Crawford and Vladan Joler (2018), have 
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made it clear that data extractivism is part of a historical legacy of extraction, which has 
shaped colonialism and the globalisation of capitalism over the last four centuries – at 
least. In fact, Nick Couldry and Ulises A. Mejias (2018) suggest that colonialism is still 
the lens through which we can make sense of the aggressive appropriation of data and 
quantification of the social. The authors see a continuum – i.e. a global process of 
extraction – between the forms of the dispossession of land, resources, and bodies, 
associated with historical colonialism ( and, more broadly, capitalism and modernity), and 
the extensive datafication/commodification of life through digital platforms, which we 
experience today. However, Couldry and Mejias (2018) clearly state their divergence 
from the Marxist/Autonomist lines of analysis that I mentioned above (Terranova, 2000; 
Fumagalli, 2011, 2015; Fuchs, 2016), which focuses on the ways in which capitalism was 
exploiting new forms of labour by means of data and platforms. For Couldry and Mejias 
(2018), the dynamics of data colonialism are more similar to the capitalist appropriation 
of physical nature, than they are to an expansion of the labour process, because life is 
appropriated “as raw material whether or not it is actually labor, or even labor-like” (2018, 
p. 4). Although social relationships are being excavated and commodified to an 
unprecedented level through digital platforms, data extractivism has not replaced other 
extractive practices, but rather it is intimately linked to and dependent on them, including 
mining and drilling for rare minerals, oil, and gas, which the digital industry consumes 
voraciously. 
Smart cities are made up of sensors, servers, and computers, which are made up of 
plastic and minerals. The damage caused by mining, drilling, and fracking is massive and 
ranges from the erosion of the earth’s crust to the poisoning of water, air, soil, and humans. 
However, less is heard about the impact of logistics, for example the Co2 emissions 
caused by the container shipping companies that move resources from suppliers to buyers 
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(Crawford & Joler 2018, drawing on Schlanger 2018). Sensors, chips, and batteries 
contain toxic minerals; such as mercury, cadmium, beryllium, lithium, and lead; minerals, 
like copper and gold, which can be recycled; and, of course, plastic. According to the UN, 
only about 20 per cent (roughly 8.9 million metric tonnes) of the 44.7 million metric 
tonnes of e-waste that was generated in 2016, was recycled. E-waste is increasing rapidly 
and is estimated to reach approximately 52.2 million metric tonnes by 2021. (UN News, 
2017). Vincent Mosco notes (2015, p. 113, drawing on Acaroglu, 2013) that a large part 
of the e-waste produced in the Global North is dumped in the poorer areas of Africa, 
China, Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, and Latin America. Here, an informal recycling 
industry has workers (often children) scraping garbage in highly unsafe conditions, 
searching for components that they can sell for a few dollars. 
In January 2018, China launched Operation National Sword, which banned the import 
of most plastics and other materials, which had been processed in the country’s recycling 
facilities, in the past two decades. This move rapidly triggered a crisis in the Global 
North’s recycling industry and exposed the limits and precariousness of the former global 
order of waste. Since National Sword came into effect, cities in the US, Europe and 
Australia are struggling to maintain their recycling programs and growing amounts of 
waste, including e-waste, are being incinerated, buried in landfills and/or simply dumped 
(Katz, 2019). Concurrently, the servers that compose the backbone of cloud computing 
and smart cities require an incessant and enormous supply of electricity, most of which is 
provided through carbon plus additional diesel backup generators. 
Notwithstanding the supernal aura that still surrounds the digital industry, these 
landscapes of brutal exploitation of the earth and human resources alike, are an 
inextricable part of the so-called smart world. The making of smart cities might be 
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packaged with the rhetoric of sustainability, but is deeply connected to the planetary 
processes of extraction and environmental degradation. 
 
 
Extraction before Data: Land Grabbing, Gentrification and Financialisation 
 
Inside Candor Techspace, a young crowd flows between the white buildings, flower 
beds, and fountains. They wear badges and look at their smartphones. There are plenty of 
open sitting areas, shops, and restaurants inside the complex, but many head outside the 
gates, to the informal food stalls that are lined up along the road. Just over the fence, a 
couple of cows graze peacefully on the well-maintained lawn. Candor is a 45,40-acre 
campus in New Town Kolkata that hosts multinational tech firms, such as Accenture, 
Capgemini, Tata Consultancy Services, and Cognisant. It is one of the first IT Special 
Economic Zone established in Rajarhat, and it sits on land that once belonged to the 
farmers of the nearby village of Chack Pachuria, and which was forcibly acquired by the 
government in the early 2000s. In their account of the making of New Town, Dey et al. 
(2013) detail how the dispossessed owners of the land now support themselves by running 
food shops around the SEZ gates, under the threat of imminent displacement. Previously 
known as Infospace, the IT campus was developed by Indian firm Unitech, and opened 
for business in 2005. In 2014, Candor was acquired by global investment firm, Brookfield, 
reportedly in a USD900 million deal (Srivastava, 2018), together with other IT parks in 
Gurugram and Noida. The acquisition was completed at an ideal time: soon after the 
newly elected Modi government had announced the introduction of real estate investment 
trusts (REIT) in the country and just a few months before the launch of the Smart City 
Mission funding scheme. Brookfield is a major player in global finance and manages a 
portfolio of more than USD285 billion assets. According to market analysts, the group 
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holds investments, in India, of more than USD5 billion in infrastructures, office parks, 
and private equity. 
The story of Candor SEZ says much about the story of New Town Kolkata. It lays 
out a path that begins with land grabbing, the imposition of new enclosures, and the 
dispossession of local communities, and leads to the speculations of global finance capital 
on the smart city to come. The next few pages will chart the various extractive dynamics, 
which anticipate and prepare the smart city, as well as the forms of valorisation which 
come with it. Moving across different examples from Cape Town and Kolkata, I will 
explore the instruments and processes – SEZs and gentrification, financial ventures, and 
start ups – that have set the conditions for smart city projects and forms of data 
extractivism. 
The creation of IT SEZs, in Rajarhat, preceded the smart city by about ten years, but 
they are still key factor in the development of the township. The New Town Smart City 
Proposal strongly leveraged the presence of tech hubs as an indicator of the city’s 
economic potential and technological advancement. Companies have been consulted as 
stakeholders in the planning of infrastructures and policies. Candor Techspace tenants 
Accenture and TCS, as well as other firms quartered in New Town such as Wipro, Intel, 
SAP, Oracle, and IBM, have obtained contracts for the implementation, operations, and 
maintenance of single components of the Pan City solution. The smart city may still be 
more narrative than reality, but a new wave of speculation is already in motion in New 
Town. One of my interlocutors, RS, a senior executive in a major Indian property 
development company, made some interesting observations about this point. The 
company has a broad portfolio, across West Bengal and the country, and had already 
invested considerably in the creation of New Town, well before the smart city plans had 
been made public. When I first spoke to RS, in 2015, the smart city was still very much 
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an abstract idea. He welcomed me into his office, inside one of New Town’s semi-fortified 
business enclaves, where several layers of security filter the contacts between the 
corporate world and the informal economies around it. At that time, RS’s main 
professional concern was, understandably, how to attract new investors to complete the 
construction of New Town and how to drag it out of the purgatory in which it was stuck. 
The company RS works for had managed to complete three properties in the area – one 
business park and two residential developments – of which only one, the one we were 
sitting in, was almost entirely rented. He expressed cautious optimism about the idea of 
building a smart city. He said he wouldn’t buy the hype, and didn’t believe it was likely 
that “they will build a new Singapore here in four or five years” (Personal conversation, 
May 2015). However, he thought that the smart city project could be useful in giving the 
place “a vision, an identity” that he felt were missing, and that it would help New Town 
fit into global trends of investment. In RS’s words, “This place has failed so far because 
it was never top-tier. It wanted to be top-tier, but it was always second, third-tier” This 
related to what RS saw as poor choices, made by planners and politicians, who never 
adequately analysed the real market opportunities in the area; or who deliberately pursued 
what they knew was an enterprise bound to fail, because they were corrupt. Against this 
background, and in RS’s view, the smart city was possibly the last chance for companies 
that had invested in the area to reposition themselves within new, more appealing 
marketing strategies. 
In truth, the inclusion of New Town Kolkata in the Smart City Mission program in 
2015 quickly mobilised a wide range of investors. Remaining plots of lands are in high 
demand and selling quickly. In 2017, there were over 4,000 applicants for the 100 
residential plots put up for sale by HIDCO (“HIDCO starts lottery”, 2017). Luxury car 
brands, such as Jaguar, Lexus and Lamborghini also made offers for space in the dedicated 
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retail hub, a seven-acre plot in Action Area II. IT giants Infosys and Wipro bought 
government land for 50 acres each, in 2009, on the promise that the Left Front, in power 
at the time, would grant them SEZ status as well. The initiative stalled thereafter, when 
Mamata Banerjee’s Trinamool Congress came to power in West Bengal, in 2011, on a 
strong anti-SEZ position. Progress resumed, however, in 2017, when the government 
decided to offer fiscal benefits to compensate for the SEZ status denial, in the wake of the 
smart city project. Nevertheless, in August 2018 and not long after ditching SEZ policies, 
Banerjee’s government laid the foundational stone for the Bengal Silicon Valley Hub. 
In an attempt to attract major tech companies, HIDCO – the government agency in 
charge of the project – has set a minimum average annual turnover of Rs. 500 crore (about 
USD75 million) as a requirement of land plot applications. In return, ninety-nine-year 
leases are offered at discounted prices and with fiscal incentives, including an extra 15% 
Floor Area Ratio for IT buildings and 50% exemption on property tax for twelve years 
(HIDCO, 2019). In addition, the government promises to support venture capital funds 
and to promote tech entrepreneurship in the state. According to market analysts (Gupta, 
2019), the project will boost residential real estate in New Town, where realtors are 
already competing to sell mortgages and captivating investment funds to complete new 
gated communities. 
When I heard from RS again, in 2018 and soon after the formal announcement of the 
Bengal Silicon Valley, he substantially confirmed the remarks he had made when we first 
spoke. Three years after New Town was officially included in the Smart City Mission, RS 
was still sceptical about the project’s chances of ever becoming reality. In his view, the 
township still looked very distant from the utopic smart city renderings and the progress 
of new infrastructures was hardly noticeable in urban life. What he felt was already 
tangible however, was a renewed financial enthusiasm about New Town. 'All the talk” 
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about the smart city to come and the government’s commitment to large investments had 
brought back firms and families, interested in investing there. After long years of crisis, 
now “it seems that everyone wants to live or work in one of the 100 smart cities of India” 
and people were rushing into buying or renting properties, out of the fear that prices would 
rise even more in the future. RS has his doubts that the Bengal Silicon Valley’s ever 
succeeding, as the new Asian tech hub, but for now, he thinks it is certainly proving itself 
a real estate success (Personal conversation, October 2018). 
As the examples above reveal, smart city narratives and projects are strongly 
performative, in that they have immediate material effects on the economic and social 
environment, regardless of the actual construction progresses. Gabrys (2015; 2016) 
observes that planning documents are not mere discourses or representations of a future 
city, but are part of a computational apparatus that materialises the future into the present 
(2016, p. 187). This may sound paradoxical, as most of these documents are analogue – 
New Town’s Smart City proposal consists of hundreds and hundreds of printed pages. 
Nevertheless, the agglomeration of white papers, designs, letters of agreement, and 
slideshows lay out new objects of calculations, calculative techniques, goals, and 
parameters – the computational apparatus – that begin to articulate spatial and material 
relations and reconfigure governance strategies, as well as mundane practices, well before 
the projects presented are actually implemented. Here, I have indicated how projects and 
designs may as well carry out economic relations insofar as they prompt investments and 
financial operations that bet on the smart city despite its uncertain realisation. Well before 
the smart city or the Bengal Silicon Valley, become real – if they ever do – they are already 




The chain of financialisation, speculation, and dispossession intersects the making of 
smart Cape Town as well, albeit in a different configuration. A joint publication by global 
consultancy firm, PWC, the official agency for tourism and marketing in Cape Town, 
Wesgro, and the City of Cape Town describes the Mother City as the “Digital Gateway” 
to Africa (2013). It reviews the local IT industry thoroughly, from large companies to 
emerging start ups, as well as a number of initiatives designed to attract investors and 
boost the growth of this sector even more. The document clearly lays out the convergence 
between local government, corporate circles, and investors in promoting the smart city 
project. Public investments in broadband and the digitalisation of urban services run 
parallel with the growth of big tech companies, from Amazon Web Services to Uber, and 
the mushrooming of tech incubators, apps, platforms, and devices. 
Walking through the sun-filled open workspaces of Workshop 17, a co-working 
facility, the geek business ferment is tangible. We are inside a converted warehouse, the 
Watershed building, now a mix of post-industrial design and Silicon Valley minimalism 
with an African twist, on the popular (and heavily securitised) Victoria and Albert 
Waterfront. The mission of Workshop 17 – which has four other locations across the Cape 
Town central area and which is only one of 25 co-working spaces in the city– is to act as 
a platform for the new, code-crunching business ecosystem. In addition to providing 
workspaces, meeting rooms and lounges, high-speed internet and good coffee, Workshop 
17 promotes networking between its members and relevant partners, including investors 
and business incubators, such as the Silicon Cape Initiative. Silicon Cape, which was 
founded in 2009, by South African entrepreneurs, Vinny Lingham and Justin Stanford, is 
one of the most prominent among the more than 20 incubators, accelerators, and catalysts 
for tech business in town. The organisation borrows heavily from the Silicon Valley 
narrative of the “ecosystem” and plays into the similarities between the San Francisco 
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Bay Area and Cape Town – beautiful nature, great universities, and relaxed lifestyle – to 
articulate a discursive and aesthetic framework for their initiatives. The parallel between 
the Western Cape and the Silicon Valley is constantly reiterated across media outlets and 
everyday conversations, and is reinforced by examples of notable, home-grown, 
entrepreneurial success; such as, Mark Shuttleworth, founder of Thwate and promoter of 
Ubuntu; Chris Pinkham, among the creators of the first internet service provider (ISP) in 
Cape Town and, many years later, of Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2), Amazon’s cloud 
computing architecture; or the already mentioned Lingham and Stanford, who came back 
home from California, to create Silicon Cape. 
The representation of Cape Town as an ideal location for tech start ups, as well as the 
celebration of past successes and present achievements has been pivotal in laying out a 
smart city storyline. However, in his research into the making of a tech start up ecosystem 
in Cape Town, Andrea Pollio (2019b) charts how the strategies pursued by incubators and 
accelerators, etc. were informed by more than one genealogy, not all of which were 
equally popular. Pollio (2019b) considers the fact that Cape Town had become a 
destination for business service offshoring, in the early 2000s, as another meaningful 
explanation for the concentration of entrepreneurial energies and infrastructural 
investments in the area. Many major companies, including IBM, Shell and Lufthansa, 
moved their call centres to the city, attracted by what Pollio describes as “two important 
colonial legacies: the multilingualism of the Cape and the low labour cost” (2019b, para. 
1). The offshoring process generated “not only a hunger for a specialised, entrepreneurial 
workforce but also developmental infrastructural investments, which resulted in a 
decently sized and relatively cheap broadband connectivity” (2019b, p. 5). This 
alternative genealogy of the development of Cape Town as a tech cluster moves the focus 
from mythologies of individual success to a more comprehensive account of economic 
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and technological processes, which helps to position the extractive dynamics at issue 
therein. Business offshoring that takes advantage of cheap labour can be seen as one of 
the multiple frontiers of extraction (Mezzadra & Neilson, 2017) that mark the 
globalisation of capital. The fact that large companies, including tech giant IBM, moved 
part of their operations to Cape Town, almost two decades ago, not only stimulated an 
entrepreneurial culture, but also put the city on the map of global finance. I believe that it 
is also particularly important to reference the formation of a specific type of workforce in 
the outsourcing industry, because it links to the relationships between higher education 
institutions, incubators, and industries today. Indeed, the other side of the widely-narrated 
boom of a few start ups and young entrepreneurs is a large cohort of tech graduates, who 
fuel the industry at any level. Part of the role of organisations, such as Silicon Cape, is to 
channel the fresh workforce from Cape Town and Stellenbosch universities towards 
companies, while seeking to match new entrepreneurs with investors. 
For now, the ecosystem thrives: tech start ups are increasingly colonising the private 
and working life of Capetonians. Since 2016, four apps for car-pooling or car-sharing – 
Jumping Rides, Findalift, CarTrip, and UGoMyWay – have been launched in Cape Town. 
Platforms such as Domestly, GetTod, and Prim-U connect clients to cleaners, electricians, 
plumbers, hair stylists, pet sitters, and other services. HouseMe and Ekaya present 
themselves as “AirBnB for long-term rentals,” matching landlords and potential tenants 
at a nominal fee. Mobile and wireless payment systems proliferate, from the SnapScan 
QR box to the YOCO mini box. 
Write tech start-ups, read finance. Venture capital (VC) or growth equity funds are 
behind each of the above examples. Over the past ten years, South African investment 
firms have increasingly targeted the tech sector. A survey conducted by the South African 
Venture Capital Association (SAVCA, 2017) showed that the value of venture capital 
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investments, made during 2016 was R872 million (approximately USD61 million), 134% 
more than in 2015, when it amounted to R372 million (USD26 million). Forty-one per 
cent of investments were in the Cape Town region, and 30% of the whole was directed to 
the ICT sector (SAVCA, 2017). To give just a few examples, Knife Capital, a Cape Town- 
based growth equity firm, is helping companies such as Data Prophet, a start up 
specialised in machine learning systems for business; Quicket, a cloud-based ticketing 
solution; and OrderTalk, a software for online ordering for restaurants, to scale up their 
business from South Africa to larger markets in UK and US. 4Di Capital is behind the 
growth of Lukmani, a fire detection system for informal communities; LifeQ, which 
provides insurance and wearable devices companies with a platform for health monitoring 
and personalised risk analytics; Sensor Networks, a home IoT platform business with a 
focus on the insurance industry; and many others. 
The entanglement between start ups and finance can also be observed in New Town, 
albeit to slightly weaker degree, and with less aesthetic and rhetoric investment. Despite 
its IT hubs and the efforts of the smart city promoters, Kolkata is not a start up capital. In 
India, this title sits firmly in the hands of Bangalore, followed by Hyderabad, Noida and 
Gurugram. According to Dey et al. (2013) and Rossiter (2016), New Town lies in a 
subordinate position, in the geography of the tech industry, where companies mostly 
perform repetitive and standard tasks such as business process outsourcing (BPO) or beta 
testing. More than innovation, the core of New Town tech campuses seems to be the 
exploitation of the young, cheap workforce from nearby colleges such as St. Xavier and 
Techno India. Graduates in information technology, computer science, and software 
engineering programs are increasingly competing for internships and jobs at companies, 
such as Wipro, Accenture, Infosys and TCS, etc.; only to find themselves stuck in 
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positions they are overqualified for, and carrying out repetitive tasks in highly-pressured 
working conditions, with low prospects of further learning or career advancement. 
Along with this digital-savvy population, however, tech start ups have found a fertile 
market in New Town, especially in the transport and food delivery sectors. The market of 
food delivery is dominated by aggregators such as Zomato, Swiggy, Uber Eats, and 
Foodpanda. The smart residents of New Town, who work long hours and have to make 
long trips to buy groceries, rely increasingly on these platforms for their meals. Zomato 
targeted New Town, as one of the broader metropolitan areas of Kolkata, in 2011, for the 
first stage of its expansion, which included five other major Indian cities: Delhi, Pune, 
Chennai, Mumbai, and Bangalore. Between 2010 and 2013, the platform raised 
approximately USD16.7 million from Info Edge India, giving them a 57.9% stake in 
Zomato. From 2013 to 2018, the company raised about another USD500 million from 
various investors, including Sequoia Capital, Info Edge India, Vy Capital, Temasek and 
Alibaba’s affiliate, Ant Financial, which owns now 10% of the company. Since 2012, 
Zomato has expanded into 24 countries outside India and acquired 12 start ups around the 
world, mostly in the food-tech sector, including American food portal, Urbanspoon. In 
2018, Zomato acquired TechEagle Innovations, a company that works on drones, with the 
aim of introducing drone-based food delivery in India (“Zomato buys Techeagle”, 2018). 
Between 2010 and 2018, Zomato’s first competitor, Swiggy, raised more than USD50 
millions, through several rounds of investment from global VC firms, but mostly from 
South African tech giant, Naspers. By 2018, Naspers had poured USD1 billion into 
Swiggy with the aim of outdoing rival, Zomato, by investing in an AI-driven platform 
(Chanchan, 2018). 
At the same time as financial investors are injecting capital into these emerging firms, 
they are dictating strategies to them and giving them directions, in order to maximise their 
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future exits. Start ups are “helped,” that is to say, compelled, to grow quickly and to inflate 
short-term returns in the form of exit or shares value, at the expense of sustainable growth, 
innovation, and profitability (Lazonick, 2014; Kenney & Zysman, 2019). For example, 
streams of cash have – notoriously – kept Uber running at a loss for years, at the same 
time as it strives to dominate the market by chasing an attractive Initial Public Offer (IPO). 
The costs of this crusade for monopoly are largely born by the workers. To reconcile their 
relentless expansion and their lack of profitability, platforms cut costs as an attempt to 
reduce losses (Srnicek, 2016). Part of these strategies, as we will see in more detail shortly, 
consist of cropping workers’ wages and squeezing as much value as possible out of them 
through algorithmic forms of discipline and control. Clearly, this dynamic is unhealthy in 
the long-term, and leaves behind destitute workers, broken entrepreneurs and a disrupted 
economic system. 
The smart city/finance nexus has significant effects not only on the tech industry, but 
on the urban environment at a broader level. Scholars have argued, in the wake of the 
2008 global crisis and later, (Marazzi, Lebedeva, & Gimsey, 2011; Lazzarato, 2015; 
Fields, 2017), that financialisation carries disciplinary, performative and often destructive 
effects that extend well beyond the entrepreneurial domain. With its extensive penetration 
into every aspect of life, finance capital has the power to reshape not only the 
entrepreneurial scene but neighbourhoods, cities, individual behaviours, and family life, 
and to affect emotions, through the binomials of debt and speculation. The abandoned 
suburbs and rows of houses for sale that nobody wants to buy, following the 2008 sub- 
prime crisis in the US, have become an iconic and tragic portrait of the impact that 
financialisation can have on urban life (and life in general). A number of studies (for 
example, Fainstein, 2016; Rouanet & Halbert, 2016; Weber, 2010) document how a 
variety of financial instruments and relations are increasingly affecting urban production 
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– i.e. “the design, construction, exploitation and ownership of the urban built 
environment” (Halbert & Attuyer, 2016, p. 1) – triggering and feeding on, enclosing and 
expulsion processes. In New Town, the incomplete construction sites, empty buildings, 
abandoned land plots, and slums are sobering manifestations of the impact of 
financialisation. The real estate initiatives and the SEZs of the early 2000s have never 
fulfilled their promise of creating a leading IT hub, an exclusive residential suburb or “a 
new Singapore.” Instead, the township has moved on from speculation to speculation – 
the smart city and the Bengal Silicon Valley are the latest ones – in an attempt to amend 
previous failures. New investors buy the debts of older investors, while banks and equity 
funds step in every time, to fuel the chain of loans, rate interests, and derivatives. On the 
other side of this chain remain the destructions of the livelihoods of thousands of local 
households and masses of dispossessed people who struggle to make a living in the 
informal sector. 
In Chapter 2, I introduced Woodstock, a formerly industrial suburb, several few 
kilometres west of Cape Town CBD, and described how smart city-making entails 
bordering processes and securitisation. The price of properties has increased by 100% in 
Woodstock since 2010. If Cape Town is the start up capital of South Africa, Woodstock 
is the start up hub of Cape Town. Converted mills and warehouses host co-working 
spaces, offices, gourmet restaurants, and designer boutiques. A group of property 
developers and private equity shareholders that suggestively call themselves “Daddy’s 
World” are behind two of the most remarkable redevelopments, The Woodstock 
Exchange and The Old Biscuit Mill. Although the history of this working class, ethnically- 
mixed community, which resisted apartheid segregation, is still visible in the handful of 
second-hand shops, workshops (real ones), and not yet redeveloped housing blocks, a 
large portion of the residents has been kicked out by aggressive real estate politics. 
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Exemplar in this sense is the story of Bromwell Street’s residents: ten families who have 
been fighting against eviction in court since in 2016, after property developers, 
Woodstock Hub, bought the cottages they had been renting for decades. As tech 
companies, affluent crowds and extensive surveillance have moved in, Woodstock has 
become one of the symbols of gentrification in Cape Town. However, if we look beyond 
this popular label, it is possible to see how finance capital is running the show – pumping 
money into young companies and real estate speculation; waiting for the right time to sell 
their shares and seize the highest profit. 
Jathan Sadowski (2019) notes that financialisation and datafication share some 
important traits; namely, they are both driven by the imperative to maximise value 
extraction through technologies that remain opaque and largely unaccountable; they both 
affect how space, corporate governance, accumulation and everyday life are produced; 
and they both engage in exploitative and predatory practices. Apart from that, the two 
regimes often overlap, as practices such as credit-scoring or “high frequency trading” 
algorithms make clear. With some appropriate caveats, these remarks help to make sense 
of the relationship between the financialisation and datafication of the urban environment. 
In Cape Town and Kolkata, for example, the “direct overlap between the two regimes” 
(Sadowski, 2019, p. 9) can be found in venture capital, hedge fund, and real estate driving 
start ups and urban (re)development, and literally making, at least, some of the critical 
infrastructure that enables data extractivism in smart cities.The painful, start up driven 
transformation of Woodstock and the IT enclaves and half-empty gated communities of 
New Town might be geographically, aesthetically, and socially very distant, but have 
more in common than meets the eye. In both cases, extractive dynamics are at work, which 
have nothing of the idyllic smart city vision. Dispossession, expulsion, and aggressive 
rent-extraction from the urban fabric emerge here, albeit along different paths – 
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“traditional” land grabbing in Kolkata, gentrification in Cape Town – which are similarly 




Platforms and Slaves 
 
On the morning of June 26 2018, a long convoy of shiny sedans was parked in the 
middle of busy Somerset Road in Green Point, Cape Town, blocking the traffic in a 
strategic area of the city centre. Drivers from Uber and its main rival in South Africa, 
Taxify, were protesting against exploitation from their “bosses” – the platforms – and 
asking for labour regulations and protection in their sector. The police fired stun grenades 
to break up the blockade and two drivers were arrested. Later that year, in November, the 
app drivers went on strike again, for several days. This time they released a statement 
which compared their conditions to slavery, accusing government officers of corruption. 
They announced the end of negotiations with Uber and Taxify because “slavery is a 




Uber and Taxify Drivers Launch a Strike in Cape Town. 
 
 





Only a few days earlier, their Uber and Ola colleagues in Kolkata had put their apps 
offline and blocked the streets, raising similar claims. Faced with a surge in fuel prices, 
e-hailing companies had cut off minimum fares for passengers, while increasing the fees 
that drivers had to pay to them. Additionally, some drivers had their accounts unilaterally 
blocked by Uber. Company officials explained this was because the drivers had received 
negative feedback, as well as because the “in-built processes” of the platform identified 
the profiles of drivers as “not suited to provide the best service” (Chakraborty & Ghosh, 
2018). 
Uber is a pioneer of e-hailing services and had opened up the field for a number of 
competitors around the world, such as Lyft, Waze, the above-mentioned Ola and Taxify. 
It has become an icon of the new, digitally-mediated service business, commonly termed 
the “sharing” or “gig” economy. The notion of a “sharing” economy emphasises the 
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technologically-enabled practices of the renting, lending, and swapping of services and 
goods that take place within networks of customers and providers, which are considered 
something of an alternative to capitalist forms of accumulation and exchange (Rifkin, 
2014). The term “gig” economy reveals more about the casual, precarious labour upon 
which these new markets rely (Prassl, 2018). Nick Srnicek (2017) takes a more critical 
perspective, in his analysis of these phenomena, viewing it through the category of 
platform capitalism. Here, the focus is on the new modalities of business organisation that 
have emerged in response to the financial crisis of 2008, and, more broadly, have been 
determined by earlier critical phases such as the 1970s’ industrial downturn and the 1990s’ 
“new economy” bubble. As Srnicek (2017) writes: 
Platforms, in sum, are a new type of firm; they are characterised by providing the 
infrastructure to intermediate between different user groups, by displaying 
monopoly tendencies driven by network effects, by employing cross-subsidisation 
to draw in different user groups, and by having a designed core architecture that 
governs the interaction possibilities. Platform ownership, in turn, is essentially 
ownership of software (the 2 billion lines of code for Google or the 20 million 
lines of code for Facebook) and hardware (servers, data centres, smartphones, 
etc.), built upon open-source material (e.g. Hadoop’s data management system is 
used by Facebook). (2017, p. 48) 
 
 
Crucially, platforms work as an apparatus for the extraction of data, which are then 
used in various ways: to control workers, improve algorithms, offer new services and 
products or sold to other companies. In this context, Uber is a relevant example of a “lean” 
platform: a business organisation, which minimises the fixed costs of workforce and 
infrastructures and maximises the outsourcing of labour and fixed capital, while retaining 
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control over the software that enables transactions between workers and customers. It also 
controls the multiple types of data extracted concerning traffic, clients’ habits, route 
patterns, car performances and more. Importantly, Srnicek observes, lean platforms base 
their revenue strategies on large pools of surplus labour, wherein unemployed or 
precarious workers, both presented and formally registered as independent contractors, 
are actually forced into self-employment. They work for low wages and without any 
protection or benefits. Srnicek’s remarks echo the conditions revealed by the Uber drivers 
in Kolkata and Cape Town. 
Uber started its operations in Cape Town in 2013, and in Kolkata, in 2014. In both 
cities, success was quick and remarkable. During my fieldwork, I was able to experience 
how the service was becoming more and more a staple of urban life and was being 
incorporated into both formal and informal smart city narratives, albeit with some 
differences between the two cities. In Cape Town, Uber rides were definitely part of my 
daily routine, as well as of the routines of many others who lived in the central or wealthy 
areas of the city. Cheap, reliable, and smooth, Uber was the preferred way to travel to 
work, go out at night, reach beaches, and even to do the school drop-off. Yet, as explained 
in Chapter 2, the townships – areas of poverty, low access to technology, and high crime 
rates – were clearly off the platform’s map. In Kolkata, Uber was also increasingly 
popular, especially among young professionals, but competition with traditional taxis and 
autos remained strong. Additionally, adjusting its procedures to local habits was not 
always smooth for the platform. For example, the frequent absence of street names and 
civic numbers in the city required some form of outside-the-platform communication 
between the driver and rider. This was a barrier to non-Bengali speakers, such as myself, 
because most drivers did not speak English. In addition to this, the obligation to pay 
online, via credit card, was so at odds with the common habit of negotiating and paying 
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cash for taxi rides, that eventually the company allowed Indian drivers to accept cash. 
Nevertheless, Uber was probably the easiest way to and around New Town Kolkata, and 
the young IT workers made great use of it. Despite the different levels of diffusion and 
efficiency, in Kolkata and Cape Town, Uber regularly came up during almost every 
interview or informal conversation that I had with informants and local acquaintances, as 
an unquestionable sign that the city was becoming smarter. The fact that a mere click 
would materialise a car and a driver within minutes seemed to synthesise the many 
different elements of the smart city vision, including the extensive distribution of 
technologies throughout the population, job opportunities and economic development, 
efficient transport, and, last but not least, a certain aesthetic. 
The reference to slavery made by the Capetonians Uber drivers is strikingly at odds 
with the types of discourses that Uber has mobilised in his marketing campaigns around 
the world, and that drivers and customers seemed to absorb, at least in the early stage. As 
Pollio notes in his research into Uber drivers in Cape Town (2019a), the e-hailing 
company packaged its entry into the South African market with narratives of 
empowerment and emancipation through entrepreneurship, at the intersection between 
development and neoliberalism. Drivers, Pollio reported, were highly motivated by the 
aspects of self-management and independence, despite facing hardships such as debts, 
long shifts and low incomes. Uber worked its way through Cape Town by incorporating 
and leveraging tropes that were rooted in the postapartheid developmental politics and 
social imaginary. The company successfully marketed itself as a key player for the 
promotion of the city’s world-class status and attractiveness in the touristic market. At the 
same time, Uber aligned itself with specific “ethics of care” (Pollio, 2019, p. 766) by 
partnering with NGOs and supporting firefighters and residents affected by the fires of 
the summer of 2015. In addition, Uber drew upon the increasingly influential idea in the 
199 
 
country’s political debate that structural poverty and segregation could be overcome 
through (self, in this case) entrepreneurship (Pollio, 2019). 
When it started business in Kolkata, in 2014, Uber recruited a pool of driving partners 
by aggressively campaigning on a narrative of individual empowerment and upward 
mobility. The idea of an entrepreneurial way out of poverty was not new, as microfinance 
institutions had been in business since the early 2000s, but had coexisted with the long- 
standing strategies of poverty relief, ministered through networks of patronage linked to 
political parties and by a large NGO industry. However, after the BJP party came to power 
in 2014, with a strongly pro-market agenda, discourses and programs to promote 
individual entrepreneurship - such as the Start up India funding scheme - gained more 
momentum. The marketing strategies that Uber deployed focused on the promise of an 
attractive, reliable source of income, which could lift drivers out of poverty and the 
informal sector, enabling them to pursue their own ambitions, such as starting a family or 
paying for higher education. Potential drivers were also offered a social upgrade to the 
middle class and the status of entrepreneur; symbolised by self-management and the 
ownership of a car. The stories of successful drivers featured on the company’s blog 
(Uber, 2016) depict joining the platform as a game-changer that would allow individuals 
to unlock their self-entrepreneurial potential and begin to climb up the socioeconomic 
ladder, through their unique skills and hard work. 
Both in Cape Town and Kolkata, Uber marketed itself by adjusting its storyline and 
appropriating situated tropes and values. In Cape Town the campaign largely insisted on 
branding Uber as a force for good development, conciliating market and social justice. In 
Kolkata the narrative focused on individual ascent through entrepreneurship or, in other 
words, on selling drivers the middle class dream. Beyond the advertising, however, Uber 
had, to some extent, to fabricate its own labour supply. In cities in the US or Europe, Uber 
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can rely on a segment of people who own a car and who are willing to mobilise this asset 
for extra money, or to make a living out of it in absence of better options. However, in 
Kolkata and Cape Town, Uber has integrated existing circuits of informal economies, 
where cars are anything but idle assets and potential drivers must be put in a condition to 
drive in the first place. For example, the drivers that I met in India came from lowly- 
skilled, low-wage, and unregulated jobs, such as cooking in street food stalls and driving 
trucks. As part of its efforts to “bring entrepreneurship to the Indian grassroots” (Uber, 
2014) and to introduce individual entrepreneurs into the formal workforce and formal 
finance (Uber, 2016), Uber partnered with several Indian lending companies, as well as 
with Tata Motors, to launch a financing scheme that would enable drivers to buy their 
own cars. Hoping for a quick improvement of their working and living conditions, many 
drivers took out loans, but mostly through informal networks (despite Uber’s financial 
schemes). In Cape Town, as the platform recruits drivers, it also incorporates networks of 
kinship or patronage through which “cars are sourced, officials are bribed to release 
driving permits, neighbourhoods are “assigned,” circuits of protection are brokered and 
other jobs are made sustainable” (Pollio, 2019a, p. 7). Pollio also draws attention to the 
multiple transactions that drivers activate across, around, and against the platform in the 
attempt to maximise their revenues and somehow to reverse their asymmetric power 
relationship with the algorithm. 
However, the contrast between Uber’s marketing campaigns and the real working 
conditions of the drivers became explosive, at one point. A report from 2016 describes 
Cape Town drivers working 24-hour shifts and sleeping in their cars in a parking lot near 
the airport while waiting for long trips, yet still struggling to make a living (De Greef, 
2016). Similar conditions are lamented by Indian drivers, many of whom are trapped by 
loans they can’t repay (Dhillon, 2018). It is no surprise, then, that drivers have collectively 
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come to identify Uber as an exploitative force and the self-employment narrative as a trap. 
In both protests, drivers were clearly trying to humanise and personify their counterpart 
in every possible way: by addressing their bosses – unresponsive – or by marching to the 
company offices – closed. This comes as no surprise, as it is well-known that in Uber, 
there are no bosses and no offices. In fact, drivers were fighting against decisions and 
procedures that were far beyond labour negotiations in the traditional sense; the bosses 
are the algorithms. These algorithms perform functions of tracking, ranking, profiling, 
and anticipation that are not dissimilar from those examined in Chapter 3. 
In the past few years, Uber workers have striven to decipher the formulas and strings 
of code, responsible for their long working hours and poor incomes. According to official 
Uber sources, which are generous in detailing their technological developments, the 
machine learning system that connects riders and drivers calculates several factors, 
including driver rating, customer rating, destination, expected surge pricing, and traffic, 
in its attempts to optimise the service for both parties. However, in a post from 2017, on 
the forum uberpeople.net – an independent community for drivers – a member from San 
Francisco shared a different mathematical explanation of how Uber matches drivers and 
riders. In his view, the company has refined the algorithms, over time, to maximise its 
gains at the expense of drivers. As we read on the forum, this driver suggests that 
UBER will assign the trips in a way that they can pay less. Experienced drivers 
will always be more expensive, and new drivers are cheaper to UBER, because 
over time, one learns to maximise earnings, however, this will also run against the 
experienced drivers eventually, as they get assigned less profitable trips or less 
trips overall. (...) Basically, getting UBER rides is no longer a “fair and random” 
affair, where once upon a time the closest driver is paired to a request, instead, 
they dispatch them in a way that they will pay less while fulfilling the rides. It's 
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hard to beat the algorithm – the longer hours for less money is not an accident, not 




There is no evidence, of course, that this hypothesis of a malign algorithm is correct, 
and Uber firmly denies it. What is evident, however, is the increasing frustration and 
perceived unfairness that Uber drivers across the globe are experiencing from their 
algorithmic boss. 
The Uber workers’ protest leads back to finance’s role in the booming of tech 
companies, discussed in the previous paragraph. Uber is preparing for its IPO, set for May 
2019, and which experts expect to be the largest in history. Despite its global expansion 
and tremendous estimated value, the company is famous for never having generated 
revenues. Corporate management has presented this as a specific market strategy, aimed 
at achieving a hegemonic position in the market. Yet investors, which include several 
funds, such as Benchmark Capital, Softbank, Google Ventures, and Lowercase Capital, 
potentially have an interest to reduce the company’s losses, in view of the imminent IPO. 
Consequently, investors might have pushed the company to adjust its business model and 
reduce costs. This would explain the abrupt cut in drivers’ wages. In other words, it might 
merely be the command of finance that is behind the (malign, for some) algorithms and 
the loss of revenues for drivers. 
Platform capitalism is deeply intertwined with the making of smart cities in terms of 
narratives, infrastructures, and practices. As shown in the previous chapters, smart cities 
are made of platforms. Their sensing networks and algorithmic protocols operate 
according to the logic of speculative security, based on the anticipation of future 
possibilities. Modelling – from now-casting to long term tendencies – is as vital to Uber 
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(and to other business platforms) as it is to control rooms and government platforms. The 
proliferation of digital infrastructures and start ups corresponds to the multiplication of 
platform labour, such as Uber of course, but also food delivery, cleaners on demand, and 
other types of informal jobs that have “gone digital” and whose income and working hours 
are algorithmically determined. The experiences reported above, also echoed in scholarly 
research (Munn, 2017), indicate that these algorithms are forces of labour control, which 
actively seek to monitor, profile, discipline, manipulate, discriminate, and punish workers. 
However, surveillance and computing strategies include not only drivers but also riders 
and the urban environment. 
Uber operations are based on an incessant series of algorithmic speculations – of 
rides’ demand, price surges, traffic, best routes, and drivers’ behaviours – which aim to 
extract the maximum possible value from all the involved elements. Michelangelo, Uber’s 
machine learning platform, crunches petabytes of data from numerous different sources, 
including users’ apps; GPS; cars; cameras; sensors; maps; business partners, such as 
Google, Facebook, and Spotify; weather forecasts; news; and financial institutions. These 
data are processed to generate models for car dispatching, dynamic pricing, anomaly 
detection, extreme event forecasting, and other business operations. Overall, Uber acts as 
a private, extensive platform of surveillance and preemption, not only for its drivers but 
also for customers and, more broadly, for the city. This strongly resonates with the 
functioning of government platforms, described earlier in this dissertation. The Uber 
example clearly signals a key element of this research: that there is a convergence of 
instruments and logics in smart cities that cuts across security and economics. Urban 
government and value extraction are increasingly organised through similar architectures 
of speculative calculations and anticipatory action. 
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Urban Mining and Data Extractivism 
 
In their work on the mega-smart city of Songdo, which CISCO is building in South 
Korea, Halpern et al. (2013) argue that the project is driven by a logic that seeks to 
manipulate and monetise every bit of human attention, arguing that “The developers, 
financiers and media boosters of this city argue for a speculative space ahead of its time 
that operates at the synaptic level of its inhabitants” (p. 279). The city is planned as a 
totalising sensory environment, where every movement is monitored, and every 
infrastructural component can double as an interface for service provisioning – i.e. 
domestic walls turn into screens for weather reports or telemedicine. Songdo is an 
experiment in new technologies and business models, concerning how to turn data into 
profit to the fullest extent; but, perhaps more importantly, to create solutions that can be 
exported and sold to other cities. As Halpern et al. summarise, “Songdo is a test bed for a 
form of urban life that is itself the product” (2013, p. 290), as the whole development is 
informed by the speculative logic of analytics, which continuously seek to unearth new 
patterns, information, and market opportunities. 
The case of Songdo – an entirely-planned smart city, built from scratch by a single 
actor – is an extreme that may never even be completed. As already argued earlier in this 
thesis, in most cases, smart city projects develop in piecemeal, layered and fragmented 
ways; they build on, integrate, and (often) conflict with existing infrastructure. Yet, the 
attempts to manipulate and monetise the attention, interactions, and emotions of urban 
residents, as identified by Halpern et al. (2013), actually drive, or work through, the smart 
projects in New Town and Cape Town. The previous paragraph described how one of the 
major business platforms, Uber, is using its computing procedures to maximise the 
extraction of value from data, at the expense of drivers. Moreover, Uber is only one among 
a continually-growing myriad of applications that compose the fabric of smart cities. The 
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increasing datafication of the urban environment provides immense opportunities for 
those who are in a position to capture and process information. 
Successful platforms turn their names into verbs. In both Kolkata and Cape Town, it 
is becoming more and more common to uber somewhere and to zomato restaurants – at 
least for those who own a smartphone and can afford to eat out. I mentioned Zomato, a 
major food tech company, earlier in this chapter, as an example of the articulation of 
finance capital and tech start ups. Zomato started in India in 2008, as a restaurant finder: 
a catalogue featuring details, menus, photos, reviews, and other information about 
restaurants in a given area. Since then, the app has added many more services, including 
online booking, food delivery, and membership programs. Zomato has expanded to 24 
countries around the world and, more importantly, is present in more than 1000 cities. 
Similar to Uber, cities with a high concentration of technology and lively economies are 
the business backbone of Zomato. In major Indian cities, including Kolkata and New 
Town, Zomato is one of the go-to apps, when it comes to choosing a restaurant and, more 
recently, to book and order food online – although Swiggy is a powerful rival in the 
delivery business. The latest addition on the Zomato platform is the Gold membership, 
which provides perks and discounts in selected restaurants to those who subscribe to the 
program for six or twelve months. In Cape Town, where Zomato landed in 2015, it 
engages thousands of users a day as a restaurant aggregator, but does not operate the 
booking and delivery services, as yet. 
First thing as a user opens the app, her location is registered. Then, the “For You” 
page displays a list of restaurants, selected on the basis of the user’s previous searches, 
ratings, and reviews. The list is organised into categories, such as “Takeaway” or “Drinks 
and Nightlife.” Alternatively, the user can browse a list of “Collections,” which suggests 
different themes such as “Trending this Week,” “Hidden Gems,” “Romantic,” “Best 
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Breakfast,” and “Sunset,” etc. If the recommendations don’t suit the user, she can make 
her own search, using filters such as distance, rating, type of cuisine and occasion, etc. In 
the profile’s section, users can post reviews and photos of their meals; and follow, and be 
followed by, other “foodies.” All of these operations are built around the algorithmic 
procedures of identification, recognition, validation, authorisation, tracking, monitoring, 
and profiling. In Chapter 2, I described these procedures as (micro) border techniques and 
described how they permeate smart urban environments through infrastructure, devices, 
and applications. Zomato users must provide personal details in order to be identified. 
Their credentials are re-validated on any new access. When using the platform’s services, 
all activities – searches, reviews, and transactions, etc. – are monitored and tracked. 
These border techniques apply even more to delivery riders, who undergo strict 
procedures of surveillance and assessment through their app supervisor, similarly to those 
of Uber drivers. On Zomato, border techniques are instrumental in the collection and 
structuring of data, and are increasingly automated via ML. In an interview with an Indian 
online magazine, the leader of the Data Science and Analytics team at Zomato, Naresh 
Mehta, describes how the company has powerfully leveraged ML analytics to boost its 
business (Bathia, 2018). Metha explains that ML applications range from logistics 
optimisation: call centre and driver fleet capacity planning, delivery time prediction, and 
supply prioritisation, to user experience: User Generated Content (UGC) moderation, 
aesthetic scoring of photos and image classification, NLP of reviews to extract key 
information from text, payment fraud prediction, search and listing, etc. These 
applications build a modelling network that is oriented towards extracting as much value 
as possible from each interaction on and with the platform. Advertising – the main revenue 
stream for Zomato, since 2008 – relies heavily on predictive models, to deliver hyper- 
targeted results on the basis of keywords, location, availability, rating and prices, etc. Data 
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scientists are developing algorithms, to improve the quality of images displayed on the 
app with the aim of increasing the click-through rate and, therefore, refining advertising 
strategies even further. In this respect, Zomato takes up much of the Google model: a 
platform that starts by offering free information and services, conquers a large proportion 
of users and data, and then monetises this through tailored advertising and other for-a-fee 
services. Similar to Google, Zomato has leveraged the huge amount of data, accumulated 
in its ten years of operation, to add layers of services, gain control of the entire supply 
chain, and manage restaurants – including bookings, online ordering, and food supply – 
throughout the platform. 
In New Town, restaurant owners have grown increasingly sceptical of the app and its 
hidden strategies. In 2015, I had the chance to speak with several restaurant owners in the 
area that regularly came up on the Zomato app. Back then, the platform had been active 
for four years already, but was still perceived as a relative novelty. Two restaurant owners 
in particular, M and S, were very collaborative and happy to share their thoughts with me, 
on a few occasions, after lunch service was over. Both their restaurants were located in 
New Town shopping malls – the epicentres of middle class social life – and were striving 
to attract the young professionals working in the area and their families, as well as the 
business people that visited New Town for meetings and other engagements. In our 
conversations they generally expressed enthusiasm about the new digital showcase 
provided by Zomato; they felt as if they had more visibility, and more opportunities to 
attract new clients through deals, promotions, reviews, and pictures. More interestingly, 
both M and S repeatedly expressed the feeling that their relationship with the Zomato 
platform was one of equal terms and mutual convenience. By joining the app, they felt 
they were taking part in a horizontal network; somehow sharing their work and 
improvements and helping each other (Interview, June 2015). It is important to remember 
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that at the time of these conversations, Zomato was basically still a restaurant aggregator 
 
– an app that would find you a place to eat based on location, time of the day, type of 
food, and customers reviews. 
In the first months of 2018, when I got in touch with my interlocutors again, things 
had changed considerably. Although restaurants were still restaurants, Zomato had turned 
into a transnational company and had changed its business model. Because the platform’s 
core business – at least in India – had shifted to food delivery and Gold membership, the 
app was no longer seen as a partner in a relationship of mutual support, but as a sort of 
opaque parasite. In the words of M: “You can’t stay out of it, or you are invisible; but if 
you are in, you have to work twice to keep up” (Personal conversation, March 2018). M 
was talking about the accelerated pace of work imposed by food delivery, the ever-present 
threat of bad reviews or obscuration on the platform, and the complimentary food and 
drinks that Zomato’s Gold members were entitled to. The feelings of horizontality and 
mutuality had dissolved, and had been replaced by a clear perception of the asymmetry of 
capital and computing power. The initial cooperation (albeit real or perceived) between 
the platform and its partners has evolved into a one-way extractive relationship. 
Zomato echoes much of the Uber methods of labour management in its delivery 
component. Online forums, such as Quora and job search engines such as Indeed.com – 
where workers rate their employers and share their experiences – open a window onto the 
working conditions of Zomato riders. Riders are legally classified as independent partners, 
are paid piecework, and bear all the costs for fuel and vehicle maintenance. Formally, they 
are free to work as much or as little as they want, but many report that they are in fact 
expected to log in the app (that is, to work) for at least 50 hours per week and 25 hours 
during the weekend. Those who fail to comply with this unwritten rule, commonly face 
some sort of consequence, ranging from a “motivational speech” (or scolding) from their 
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supervisors to an algorithmic punishment, such as being assigned fewer deliveries. Orders 
and bonuses depend on performance, and a “good performance” consists of being fast and 
not getting complaints from customers. The algorithms that are entrusted to optimise 
delivery are, in fact, designed to exploit the workforce to the full, by imposing delivery 
time, routes, daily targets, and ratings. The costs that Zomato and customers save on 
delivery, thanks to ML, are actually borne by a fleet of precarious workers, who are 
continually pushed to go faster and without complaints. 
The working conditions of Zomato riders are not a unique case, but reflect the patterns 
of labour exploitation imposed by food delivery platforms such as Foodora, Just Eat and 
Deliveroo, in many cities around the world. For instance, Ugo Rossi (2019) documented 
the struggles and strategies of resistance of a group of bikers working for German 
platform, Foodora, in Turin, Italy. In 2016, Foodora bikers went on a spontaneous strike, 
reclaiming less vexing working conditions and exposing the predatory strategies of their 
platform employer. In August and September 2019, Zomato riders started a protest in 
many cities across India, including Kolkata, as the company increasingly cut incentives, 
forcing delivery staff to work much longer shifts to earn the same amount of money. Much 
interestingly however, in Howrah (near Kolkata), the protest brought together Hindu and 
Muslim workers complaining about being forced to deliver food against their religious 
beliefs – respectively, beef for the Hindus and pork for the Muslims. This happened at a 
time when tensions between Hindu and Muslim communities across India had been rising 
for years, and which were particularly fomented by the Hindu far-right BJP, in power 
since 2014. In response to the protest, Zomato explained that it would be impossible to 
factor these kinds of religious preferences into the software that runs delivery logistics. 
This episode raises questions about the limits of algorithmic labour management as it 
shows how contingencies and subjectivities can never be completely calculated. While 
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the platform continuously refines techniques to discipline and maximise the surplus 
extracted from the bodies and minds of workers, challenges to corporate command might 
come from improbable alliances on unexpected terrains, such as Hindu riders going on 
strike alongside their Muslim “brothers” to defend each other’s religious beliefs, and their 
common rights as workers (Srinivasan, 2019). 
Another component of Zomato works as a social network, where “foodies” share their 
experiences, and follow each other. This supply of spontaneous self-profiling is of 
immense value to the platform. Users are encouraged to share their thoughts and pictures, 
and “experts” – users who have posted several reviews and gained many followers – are 
rewarded with discounts, free meals, and invitations to private events. The more users 
interact, the better able the analytics is to customise ads and promotions, and to refine 
predictive models. However, some policing is required, to make this flood of data 
productive. Users’ content and behavioural patterns are analysed by an algorithm that is 
specifically designed to detect biased reviews and spam, so as to preserve the 
trustworthiness of the app, on which the entire advertising business depends. Foodie 
profiles are assigned a (hidden) credibility score, which affects their visibility and weight 
on the platform (Ruchikanarang, 2017). At the same time, users represent a continuous 
supply of free labour to Zomato. As it is the case with Facebook and other social networks, 
the platform is literally built by User Generated Content (UGC) – pictures, posts, 
comments, and reviews, etc. – which means time, thoughts, emotions, and energy. 
Moreover, users (often unwittingly) train and test new ML applications every time they 
give feedback on the content displayed, thus saving the platform considerable amounts of 
money. These forms of digital labour (Terranova, 2000; 2012), on which tech companies 
capitalise heavily, are obviously not remunerated. ML turns opinions, emotions, and the 
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mutual trust between users in the platform, into actionable information for advertising and 
marketing purposes. 
The case of Zomato depicts the twofold character of data extractivism. On one hand, 
is the imperative to collect as much data as possible, through what I understand as a 
dissemination of micro-borders – points of identification, validation, and authorisation; 
and techniques of tracking, monitoring, and profiling – across the platform. On the other 
hand, are the ever-evolving algorithmic strategies, designed to extract as much value as 
possible from the collected data; customised advertising, full exploitation of the 
workforce, and free labour provided by users. Data scientists, such as the Zomato teams, 
have embraced the performative power of analytics and are eager to push techniques that 
predict the tastes, cravings, and plans of users, or that put pressure on delivery riders in 
order to increasingly reduce logistics costs, even forward. 
As seen earlier in this section, techniques that actively seek to induce, prevent or 
affect actions, through a combination of data and sensing devices, can be described as 
examples of behavioural or synaptic manipulation (Degli Esposti, 2014; Halpern et al. 
2013). One might argue that if this has always been the goal of the advertising industry, 
contemporary technology has the potential to bring these conditioning strategies to an 
unprecedented depth and ubiquity. As observed earlier, within the contemporary 
organisation of production under biocognitive capitalism, life as a whole – from our 
biological and reproductive features to our cognitive capabilities – is inscribed in the 
process of valorisation, far beyond the boundaries of formal working time, contracts, and 
salary. Today, big data and analytics seem capable of accomplishing this tendency as 
never before. Where Uber drivers drive themselves to sleep deprivation, to see their score 
rising on the app, or when Zomato users spend their off-work time writing reviews, in the 
hope of becoming a “Leaderboard,” data extractivism shows all of its material grip on 
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life, and the forms of corporeal exploitation it relies on. Thus, the idea that smart cities- 
testbeds are trying to craft “a new form of life that is itself the product” (Halpern et al., 
2013, p. 290) sounds anything but rhetorical, with the exception that, perhaps, the testbed 
is not just Songdo, but every city that is experimenting with ubiquitous computation. 
 
 
Extractive Urbanism/Urban Extractivism 
 
Algorithmic sorting and modelling have powerful material effects, not only on 
individuals but also on the urban environment. By leveraging data, Zomato has evolved 
in ten years from a restaurant finder into a powerhouse capable of orientating, and in many 
ways controlling, the market of dining and food delivery. Zomato’s ranking and reviews 
impact the chances for restaurants to succeed or fail and, therefore, the livelihoods of their 
owners and employees. Correspondingly, as the platform sorts the city into zones and 
cartographies based on budget, type of food, and occasion, it orientates social habits, flows 
of people, and money. Ratings and classifications such as “Trending this week,” “Hidden 
gem,” “Legendary outlets,” and “Newly opened,” etc., match specific categories of people 
(i.e. families, tourists, couples, business groups, and bachelor parties) with certain places, 
and create poles of attraction in areas that might previously have had none, or different 
ones. Similar comments apply to Uber that has, for its own part, the power to reshape 
patterns of urban circulation, to incite mobility (at least for those who own a smartphone 
and a credit card) and to connect areas of the city that were previously barely accessible 
(whilst at the same time keeping other areas disconnected). For example, in the cities 
where Uber expands, property developers begin to plan alternative investments in 
redundant parking lots or to offer Uber credits as part of rental/sales deals. 
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During my fieldwork, I was able to observe a sort of spontaneous synergy between 
the two platforms – despite fierce competition in the delivery market, at least in India – in 
(re)making urban itineraries of leisure and consumption. In New Town, which is a huge, 
sprawling area with insufficient public transport, and where restaurants and bars are for 
the most part concentrated inside hotels and shopping malls, the simultaneous presence 
of Zomato and Uber is vital for ensuring a minimum of social nightlife for young 
residents, and for giving non-residents a reason and a way to stay or go there after office 
hours. Zomato gives visibility to outlets that would be otherwise hard to notice, and Uber 
makes them accessible, when walking is impossible and other forms of transport are not 
available. In Cape Town, where walking long distances at night is highly discouraged and 
public transport is often unavailable, Uber makes it possible to reach the areas of the city 
that are presented as emerging hubs for dining and nightlife – one of them is, again, 
Woodstock – and to toggle between venues safely. At the same time, Zomato indexes its 
leisure offers by providing updated lists of the nearest restaurants, bars, and clubs, some 
of which are given priority and more visibility based on their ranking, position, and/or 
other customised predictions. These processes potentially impact not only the business of 
the restaurants but, more broadly, the marketability of certain streets and suburbs, at many 
levels. When urban areas become popular destinations for dining and nightlife, investors 
are often drawn in and, typically, the commercial value of properties rises, as does the 
cost of life. Basically, my observations point to the ways in which platforms can more or 
less directly influence the processes of urban transformation, such as the gentrification or 
decay of specific zones. Once again, this suggests that data extractivism should always be 
analysed within its relationship with the processes of resource extraction, financialisation, 




Extractive processes of various natures and scale – from digital labour to minerals – 
are taking place across global, interconnected networks, to which cities are not necessarily 
central. As Neil Brenner and Christian Schmid (2012; 2014) argue, the planetary 
dimension of capitalist urbanisation (including infrastructures, logistic corridors, sites of 
production, commerce, entertainment, and settlements) disrupt the assumption that is 
largely established in many traditions of urban studies, of cities as distinct, bounded units 
that somehow lead socio-economic processes. Today, the accumulation of data is 
evidently taking place everywhere the internet reaches. Mega-platforms, such as Google 
and Facebook, wearables and IoT systems don’t need cities to capture and monetise 
information. This does not mean that cities have ceased to exist or that they do not matter 
anymore. Brenner and Schmid (2014) make it clear that the processes of agglomeration 
are a constitutive dimension of planetary urbanisation. Cities, and, I suggest, supposedly 
smart ones in particular, are nodes where infrastructure, users, experiments, and 
investments concentrate in always-dynamic relations with planetary extractive networks. 
Rossi (2017) proposes that there is a distinct nexus between urban environments and 
global capitalism, the different forces of which – including financialisation, 
entrepreneurship, real estate, consumption, technology, and the cultural economy – 
materialise and predate on cities with particular intensity. 
For the sake of this research, and as the examples of Zomato and Uber indicate, smart 
cities are sites where the extraction of data/value concentrate and accelerate, with strong 
socio-spatial effects. Joshua D. Kirshner and Marcus Power (2015) propose the notion of 
extractive urbanism to describe the ways in which the booming industry of coal extraction 
had dramatically impacted urban spaces and processes of urbanisation in the province of 
Tete, Mozambique. Here, the emphasis is on the spatial formations or transformations of 
enclaves, infrastructures, and new enclosures. Extractive urbanism has been also used in 
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a broader, almost metaphorical sense, to describe strategies of urban development which 
reflect a “gold mine mentality,” in their aim to maximise profit from the presence of 
students in some US University cities (Foote, 2016). The notion of urban extraction is also 
found in the work of Gabriela Massuh (2014, 55–60, quoted by Gago & Mezzadra, 2017, 
p. 580), where she defines the “plunder” of Buenos Aires, where rent became one of the 
extractive instruments that increasingly pushed away low-income residents. Clearly, 
within this context, the focus is on specific forms of extraction, such as property or 
financial rent, which take place in an urban context and which reproduce the violence and 
predation of the more typical extractive practices, to which they are also linked by the 
global circulation of capital. 
The categories of extractive urbanism and urban extractivism place their emphases 
on either side of the process – urban development or extractive practices – but, I argue 
that the range of phenomena they describe are deeply linked and indissociable. This 
becomes very clear when we look at smart city projects. Smart cities are literally made of 
extractive processes; think of the mining of minerals required for smart devices and 
infrastructures, and the sources of electric power to support data centres, clouds and large 
computing systems, etc. This chapter has presented multiple examples from Kolkata and 
Cape Town; e.g., the dispossession of Rajarhat’s farmers and the eviction of Woodstocks’ 
residents; the real estate speculation of the Bengal Silicon Valley and the Silicon Cape 
start ups. These examples indicate how land, neighbourhoods, people, and data are seen 
as gold mines, from which profit is extracted in multiple forms; land grabbing, 
financialisation, and gentrification precede and complement data extractivism. Therefore, 
I suggest that the binomy of extractive urbanism/urban extractivism is valuable, for 
making sense of smart cities in economic terms. 
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If we look at smart cities from the angle of urbanism, we can see that the range of 
possibilities for extracting as much data as possible – not only from the people but also 
from the environment in general – is paramount in the ways in which spaces and 
infrastructures are planned and materialise. The planning documents and existing 
platforms that I have examined so far clearly testify to the extent to which the design of 
pieces of the built environment or device, as well as the computing networks underpinning 
it, is aimed at maximising the capture of information about everyone or everything 
involved. Of course, this applies only to the designated smart areas of the city, and 
excludes bustees and townships, as detailed in Chapter 2 of this thesis. The idea of 
extractive urbanism also comprehends the other types of processes that come before, or 
with, smart city plans. From the SEZs of Rajarhat to the start up districts of Cape Town, 
financial operations, real estate, and rent are part of the fabric of which smart cities are 
made. 
If we look at smart cities through the lens of value, we see that they provide a setting 
where the extractive processes, described thus far, concentrate, and magnify. As John 
Stehlin (2018) puts it, cities are “the theater of platform capitalism,” where all the 
components of these economic formations – producers and consumers of digital products, 
capital, workforce, and infrastructure – concentrate. For Stehlin (2018), what ultimately 
defines the relationship between the platform and the urban is that they share the logic of 
rent. By providing a digital intermediation of locally available services, such as car rides 
or meal delivery, platforms operate as infrastructures of rent extraction, which capture 
what Stehlin calls “place-based value.” In doing so, platforms show tendencies that are 
similar to the long-standing processes of rent extraction that are linked to real estate 
operations and gentrification in urban economies. Yet rent, albeit crucial, does not exhaust 
the definition of urban extractivism. As explained in my earlier chapters, the extraction of 
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rent through platforms is intimately linked to, and enabled by, a range of other extractive 
practices. Ugo Rossi observes that platforms “are interested in exploiting the 
commonwealth of metropolitan environments (in terms of codified and socially diffused 
knowledge, entrepreneurial life forms and relational abilities)” (2019, p. 1429). This is 
clear, for example, in the strategies that control and maximise the extraction of time and 
energy from the bodies of the workers, as seen in the interactions between Uber drivers, 
Zomato riders, and their algorithmic supervisors. At the same time, platforms create and 
maintain their products by appropriating the free labour users provide, for example, the 
creation of content, such as ratings and reviews or training ML applications. Furthermore, 
the continuously fine-tuned predictive analytics seek to monetise and manipulate the 
users’ emotions and attention, turning personal data into a customised offer of services. 
 
 
Speculation and Extraction 
 
I have dedicated the last few pages to showing how value extraction, in different 
facets, is embedded in the making of smart cities. At the same time, as I have observed in 
Chapter 3, smart cities are also engraved into the speculative calculations of computing 
infrastructure. What then is the relationship, between speculation and extraction, at a 
logical and practical level? 
In her recent book, The Time of Money, Lisa Adkins (2018) argues that in today’s 
world speculation has become a hegemonic logic, which no longer organises only the 
domain of finance, but also other economic exchanges and social life. Adkins describes 
how speculation extends beyond the domain of “specialised” finance and governs what 
she calls the “more mundane forms of money,” meaning that household bills, personal 
loans, mortgages, and wages are leveraged to generate surplus. In this way, Adkins goes 
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on to say, speculation replaces extraction, i.e. specifically the extraction of value from 
labour and activities distributed across the social body, as theorised in the Autonomist 
Marxism line of thinking (among others, Lazzarato, 1997; Morini & Fumagalli, 2010), 
because value is no longer extracted from human activities, but rather from the flow and 
movement of money throughout society. 
I believe Adkins’ thesis also casts much light on the economies of smart cities. Smart 
cities are indeed shaped by a speculative rationality that manifests itself in multiple forms 
– from the financial operations behind start ups, real estate and infrastructures, to the 
preemptive platforms of urban government, to the use of predictive algorithms in 
commercial platforms. Speculation can be seen as the logical and material backbone that 
keeps the different components of these urban experiments together. As already noted in 
this thesis, de Goede, Simon and Hoijtnik (2014) describe how security has become 
speculative, in ways that resemble the logic of financial speculation, as it seeks to turn 
“uncertain futures into commodities – in the form of action plans and government 
expenditure – while generating its own benchmarks of success” (2014, p. 413). Louise 
Amoore (2013) illustrates how it was only by inviting a speculative logic into algorithmic 
procedures that the infinite range of future possibilities, including the unlikely and the 
unexpected, could be drawn into security calculations and preemptive decisions. 
Interestingly, Adkins (2018, pp. 92–93) refers to Amoore’s discussion of speculative 
politics, to position the manner in which the calculus of securitised debt has progressively 
shifted – moving from the probability of repayment based on wage and life expectancy, 
to the possibility of payment or debt servicing. However, for Adkins, speculation is not 
only a modality for organising knowledge and decisions but also a socio-economic force 
that is driven by the imperatives of debt and (re)payment. Moreover, speculation is 
ingrained in the specific obligations and socio-technical devices – contracts, schedules, 
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and timetables – that govern everyday life. Thus, Adkins’s argument offers a perspective 
that complements the analysis of speculative security and the operations of urban security 
platforms within this context. Adkins’ perspective can also be helpful in the analysis of 
smart cities, in order to make sense of the socio-technical devices – sensors, analytics, and 
platforms – that inscribe urban life into a calculation of future possibilities for both 
governmental and economic strategies. 
My intention is not to draw a flat parallel between the two mechanisms; however, 
Adkin’s definition of the notion of speculation, as a mode of social organisation, already 
contains the possibility of stretching speculation beyond the study of financialisation, in 
order to understand more of its facets. As Adkins explains, households and individuals 
are forced into a speculative framework by an endless cycle of payments that is essential 
for their survival. In smart cities, humans and non-humans inhabitants are captured into 
an incessant process of modelling, which speculates on their behaviours, performances, 
desires, and needs, and translates these speculations into security-related or commercial 
decisions. My point is not to demonstrate a resemblance between financial strategies and 
smart city platforms, nor to postulate that a single, overarching force is reshaping the 
entire world, from mortgages to smart cities. However, I do propose that it is valuable to 
examine how a speculative rationality and speculative practices activate different 
configurations of technology and decisions at different levels, from household or 
individual economies, to the life of a city. 
If we understand speculation as a logic of social organisation, does this mean that 
speculation completely replaces extraction, as Adkins suggests? Although a 
comprehensive discussion of the relationship between speculation and extraction is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation, I will present some remarks, based on my 
examination of smart city processes. I have already laid out several forms of value 
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extraction that are intertwined with the making of smart cities at different levels, from 
land grabbing and gentrification to data mining and modelling. I have also stressed the 
multiple meanings of extraction, in order to highlight how the new economic frameworks 
that are taking hold of smart cities (such as data extractivism and platform capitalism) are 
inseparable from older – literal and geographically distant – forms of extraction, such as 
mining or drilling. In all of these instances, speculation and extraction are present at the 
same time, and neither excludes the other. 
Take the example of an Uber driver. She may have taken out a loan to buy a car, to 
become a Uber driver or she may have resorted to Uber as a second job to pay pre-existing 
debts. A large part of the value that Uber extracts is from the rent – in the form of a fee 
for every transaction – that drivers and riders pay for the use of the platform’s services. 
However, and as Stehlin (2018) observes, not all of this rent is appropriated in the present. 
Part of it is potential rent, for example from the point of view of venture capitalists, who 
“effectively subsidises rapid expansion by trading present losses for the speculative value 
of a future monopoly” (Stehlin, 2018, para. 2). Thus, the role of rent, in the platform 
business model, appears to be extractive and speculative at the same time. Beyond rent, 
value is also extracted from paid and unpaid work. As shown earlier, the platform’s 
disciplinary algorithms seek to maximise any surplus taken from the driver’s body, time, 
and energy. Another pool of extraction is defined by the activity of users who keep 
training, for free, on Uber’s ML systems. These extractive strategies only make sense 
when we consider Uber’s long-term project of establishing hegemony on the market, and 
how this appeals to investors and the stock market. Then, the entire chain of Uber 
operations, from drivers to management to equity, reveals an interplay of speculation and 
extraction that can hardly be isolated, one from the other. Herein, speculation is, at once, 
a process that takes place through strictly financial instruments, and a broader operational 
221 
 
logic enacted through algorithms. Extraction takes the forms of rent, labour surplus and 
the appropriation of social cooperation. 
Speculation and extraction exist in a non-linear relationship, where different 
temporalities overlap. As Adkins (2018) explains, the logic of speculation concerns a 
specific form of time where the relations between past, present, and future is non- 
chronological. Speculative time, as in the calculus of the possibilities of debt servicing, 
preempts and pre-sets the future of debtors and appropriates their present (2018, p. 86). I 
suggest this should be set against the temporality of algorithms, which materially enact 
speculative operations in smart cities, and force what Adkins describes as the 
indeterminacy of speculative time into preemptive models. In both the governmental and 
commercial platforms, examined in this dissertation, algorithms arrange the unpredictable 
ways of the future into actionable configurations (discussed in detail in Chapter 3). The 
practices of now-casting, for example, compress past, present, and future into super-short- 
time models, which enable so-called real-time intervention. Longer-term predictive 
models also set out the array of future possibilities in ways that orientate security strategies 
and business decisions. If (algorithmic) speculation organises and shapes the future, while 
also appropriating the present, then extraction drills down (literally and metaphorically) 
in the present, while fuelling new appropriations of the future. Again, a good example of 
this comes from Uber. As the company prepares for its much-anticipated debut on the 
stock market, it is re-calibrating its algorithms in order to push drivers into longer hours 
of work and to squeeze as much revenue as possible from each transaction. 
As Mezzadra and Neilson observe (2017), finance pervasively organises and shapes 
the multiple chains of extraction, within contemporary capitalism, through debt and other 
financial products. The command over the future and the promise of future production, 
which characterises financial speculation (p. 199, drawing on Marx 1991, pp. 599 – 641), 
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drives extractive operations from the earth as well as from social life. For Adkins, the 
command exerted by speculation has not production as its object but the incessant 
activation and maximisation of the flows of money that come from a range of forms of 
debts, and which blur the boundaries between future and present. However, in the age of 
platform capitalism, command over the future and the present is no longer merely the 
spirit of finance but also the telos of the algorithmic machines that materially organise 
labour, logistics, information, and entertainment. Speculation generates value from the 
movement of money and, more broadly, across the platforms that pervade social life, as 
well as through the extensive modelling of future possibilities of extraction. 
Simultaneously, extraction fuels the machinery of capital, as it continually supplies data, 
money (literal or virtual), and work. 
 
 
Security and Value 
 
When Michelangelo, Uber’s ML platform, predicts weather events, to adjust its 
pricing and manage its fleet, it is using the same tools and procedures that the EPIC control 
room uses to plan the deployment of emergency services. When Xpresso algorithms scan 
social networks, to detect urban issues and preempt protests, they are actually applying 
the same techniques through which Zomato (and many other commercial platforms) 
analyse restaurants reviews. Increasingly security/government platforms and commercial 
platforms in smart cities are operating via the same methods and technologies. How do 
we make sense of this operational convergence? 
Sociologist, Shoshana Zuboff (2015; 2019), proposes the category of surveillance 
capitalism, to interpret the rise of data-driven business platforms. She takes the business 
model and computing network of Google as her main example. Zuboff defines 
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surveillance capitalism as a “new logic of accumulation” and argues that a “new form of 
information capitalism aims to predict and modify human behaviour as a means to 
produce revenue and market control” (2015, p. 75). This has become possible because of 
the expansion of a “ubiquitous networked institutional regime that records, modifies and 
commodifies everyday experience from toasters to bodies, communication to thought, all 
with a view to establishing new pathways to monetisation and profit” (p. 81). Zuboff calls 
this architecture Big Other, and suggests that it blurs the boundaries between private and 
public, and imposes a new form of “instrumentarian” power that exceeds the state and the 
rule of law. For Zuboff, the “behavioural surplus,” extracted through pervasive 
dataveillance and the manipulation of users is a new frontier of value extraction and a 
defining element of surveillance capitalism (2019). 
In his extended review of Zuboff’s latest book, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism, 
Evgeny Morozov (2019) defines surveillance capitalism as a self-explanatory paradigm, 
which ultimately fails to account for how value is actually generated in the digital 
economy. Morozov suggests that surveillance and behavioural manipulation, if they exist, 
are only secondary to the traditional capitalist strategy of appropriating surplus and 
dominating the market. Among the many criticisms that Morozov raises to Zuboff’s 
theory, the most relevant to this analysis is that the idea of behavioural surplus explains 
only a limited portion of contemporary value extraction. Morozov argues that behavioural 
surplus overlooks other forms of extraction in the “digitized social factory” that are by no 
means less predatory. I believe this point resonates with my discussion of extractive 
processes, developed over the last few pages. While I maintain that behavioural 
manipulation via algorithms is definitely engineered (or at least, deliberately attempted) 
by commercial platforms to some extent, I depart from Zuboff’s arguments in two major 
ways. Firstly, in my view behavioural surplus is not only extracted through advertising 
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(as Zuboff seems to suggest) but also from labour discipline (Uber) and free labour (AI 
training and UGC, Zomato). Secondly, I suggest that these forms of surplus are only 
possible because of a planet-wide chain of extraction, which connects mines in South 
America, hedge funds, tech start ups, and urban gentrification. 
Although Morozov painstakingly dissects the shortcomings and weaknesses of 
Zuboff’s arguments, his position is not always more enlightening. He counters the 
analytical framework of surveillance capitalism by sticking to the script of “just good, old 
capitalism,” thereby dismissing the issue of behavioural manipulation simply as 
something that has always been endemic to capitalism and that is not very different from 
what happened during the neoliberal turn of the 1980s. This is likely true, but, I believe 
this does not exempt us from addressing the specific forms wherein the conditioning of 
attention and affects is unfolding today, and the implications of this conditioning in terms 
of value extraction. Morozov returns again and again to the “capitalism as usual” 
argument throughout his essay, playing “standard” capitalist dynamics – such as keeping 
costs low, growing faster than competitors, using political power to gain favourable 
regulations, and ensuring long-term profitability – off against the (minor, for Morozov) 
“novelty” of value extraction from behavioural manipulation. 
In my view, if Zuboff’s analysis of value extraction is problematic, then the manner 
in which she defines surveillance (one aspect that seems to be of no concern to Morozov) 
and the relationship between surveillance and value extraction is equally problematic. 
Through Zuboff’s lens, the alignment between security and extractive strategies, which 
can be observed in smart cities, is based on surveillance, or better still, I suggest, on 
pervasive systems of automated dataveillance that reconfigure the economy and social life 
on a global scale. Earlier in this dissertation, I have argued that using surveillance as an 
overarching category to analyse smart cities is reductive and neglects an essential aspect: 
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the speculative rationality that informs computing systems. Here, I have similar concerns 
about surveillance capitalism. This category has the merit of drawing attention to very 
important aspects of the security/economy nexus, including the facts that data are captured 
and sold to advertisers, data brokers, and other companies; that users generate information 
that is monetised, in a form of labour that is not acknowledged, let alone remunerated; 
and that access to deeply personal and intimate information (including, for example, 
fitness and sleep trackers or fertility apps) may result into punitive policies or attempts to 
manipulate behaviour through hyper-targeted advertising. However, this framework 
overlooks what happens between the moment(s) of watching and data capture and the 
commercial outcomes, i.e. the techniques that turn data into actionable information and, 
therefore, value. 
Earlier in this dissertation, I have argued that smart cities are inherently security 
projects insofar as they are inscribed within a grid of preemptive models. I suggest that 
this mode of calculation links government and commercial operations and blurs the 
borders between security and value extraction. It is not the only the fact that the employed 
methods that make security decisions or money are the same; or that the technology 
providers are the same; but rather the fact that the logic that informs urban security 
platforms and capitalist platforms – a possibilistic, speculative logic of anticipation and 
preemption – is the same. The EPIC platform in Cape Town and the Uber platform in 
New Town are obviously different in content and scale, but not in their operational logic. 
Both platforms try to anticipate events and to make them actionable in the present. The 
Xpresso analytics for social media content, which the New Town-Kolkata municipality 
plans to adopt, has been developed and commercialised as a tool for marketing and 
customer management. The models through which products are commercialised, or urban 
policies are measured, are formally identical. 
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However, this contiguity of practices, protocols, and logics, between government and 
business platforms cannot be simplified, by arguing that one of the sectors has taken 
control of the other. To quote Louise Amoore (2013) once more, it is neither “the 
securitisation of the economy,” nor “the privatisation of security” (2013, p. 54) that we 
see here. Nor, I add, is it surveillance. Rather, it is a technical and logical shift towards 
speculation that informs the algorithmic tools in the first place, and articulates strategies 
of government and of value extraction, accordingly. This is not to suggest a temporal or 
causal priority of speculation over extraction; the connection between these two processes 
is more fluid and indeterminate. As explained in the previous section, speculation and 
extraction co-exist, overlapping and feeding each other by continually stretching the 
boundaries of present and future. Speculative calculations draw possible futures in the 
present, in the form of predictive models; e.g., risk alerts, customised ads, price surges, 
discount offers, etc. At the same time, urban extractivism takes many forms, digital and 
non-digital, which are prompted by, and prompt in turn, a calculus of the future (often the 
near present, and the very short-term future, as in now-casting) through specific 
mathematical tools. It is within these calculative practices that speculative security, as a 






This chapter has explored how value is extracted in and from smart cities, as well as 
how smart cities are immersed in, and inextricable from, pre-existing extractive networks 
on a global scale. While data extractivism is definitely a central process in smart cities, it 
relies on a wide range of processes that exceed the urban dimension. These include mining 
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and drilling for minerals, coal and gas; the logistic routes that transport materials across 
the planet; networks of waste disposal and recycling; the often violently exploited labour 
involved in all these industries; and the financial operations that fuel and govern them. 
The examples from Kolkata and Cape Town showed that urban mining and the 
monetisation of data can only take place when specific material and social conditions are 
created, which precede and march alongside digitalisation, such as enclosures, 
displacement, and dispossession; securitisation of assets, penetration of private equity, 
and venture capital. 
In Kolkata, the making of a smart city seems to be the last act of a three-decade 
process that Dey et al. (2013) have described as primitive accumulation conducted 
through land grabbing and the systematic dispossession of local residents. In a 
postcolonial context, where different regimes of time, economy, and rights are co-present, 
highly financialised smart developments and real estate speculation – as is happening in 
the Bengal Silicon valley – have engrafted on SEZs imposed-upon farmlands, and a large 
part of the local population is surviving in bustees and through informal economic 
networks. 
In Cape Town, smart city discourses are strongly informed by a highly influential 
postapartheid political framework, wherein poverty and structural inequalities could be 
overcome through entrepreneurialism and pro-market policies. However, the urban 
geography of digital infrastructures that has developed in recent years largely resembles 
the patterns of racialised segregation that were enforced during apartheid. Concurrently, 
the proliferation of tech start ups, linked to significant injections of venture and equity 
capital, has contributed to the gentrification of low-income, racially mixed areas of the 
city. As the much celebrated tech districts take shape, through the displacement of black 
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and coloured people from the central city, once again, a script of segregation is 
disturbingly being re-enacted right at the heart of the emerging smart city. 
When Uber made its way into the markets of Kolkata and Cape Town, it appropriated 
and reworked situated narratives; specifically, development and social justice through 
entrepreneurialism in Cape Town; and individual success and social uplifting in Kolkata. 
As the platform sourced its labour force from the pools of the informal economy, it also 
fabricated the conditions under which this workforce could fit into its business model. In 
both Cape Town and Kolkata, drivers who do not own a vehicle as an idle asset – as per 
the principles of the sharing economy – have been pushed into circuits of financialisation 
and debt to buy cars that they could then “share.” 
Commercial platforms, such as Uber and Zomato, deploy an ever-growing range of 
algorithmic instruments, to maximise their profits from every small element of their 
operations: from logistics and labour control, to customer profiling and tailored 
advertising. Predictive analytics and modelling also have effects on the urban 
environment, insofar as they are able to drive the movements of people and money. The 
notions of extractive urbanism and urban extractivism are helpful here in grasping the 
entanglement between the digital and non-digital forms of extraction that take place in 
smart city projects. 
In Chapter 3 of this thesis, I described how smart city projects are informed by the 
logic of speculative security, which operates through algorithmic modelling. In this 
chapter, I have showed how value is extracted through the same speculative techniques. 
Speculative strategies and extractive practices coexist, overlap, and fuel each other. 
Simultaneously, it is possible to chronicle an increasing exchange and co-implication of 
infrastructure, technologies, and data between the commercial sector and 
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security/government agencies. The making of smart cities offers a privileged perspective 










In their study of the new, smart city of Songdo, in South Korea, Halpern et al. (2013; 
2015) argue that a new rationality and epistemology arise from the pervasive system of 
urban computation, which affect all the categories of urban and human life. Notions of 
time and space change radically, as every aspect of human and non-human interaction – 
from the use of natural resources, to the education and medical conditions of residents – 
is captured in the form of data and processed by analytics. What is being tested in Songdo, 
and in digital cities projects at large, is a vision of technological self-government; one in 
which the future is made completely calculable, and the balancing of risks and 
opportunities can be achieved through algorithms. Importantly, Halpern et al. (2013; 
2015) note, these operations of prediction collapse into production, since Songdo is also 
the largest real-estate project in the world, and the entire system that is being tested there 
is meant to be sold and reproduced. 
The analytical framework, set up by Halpern et al., understands smart cities – or at 
least, a colossal greenfield project such as Songdo – as testbeds: sites where the 
experimentation of new computing infrastructures (aims to) reconfigures forms of life, of 
government, and of value extraction. While Halpern et al. have been criticised (Shelton, 
Zoog & Wiig, 2015), for seeing the smart city purely as the dystopian product of corporate 
strategies, their work frames an interpretative space, which links technological 
developments, preemptive governance and economy. This angle, which invites further 
exploration, has been crucial for the development of my research. 
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The purpose of this dissertation was to illustrate how smart city plans and experiments 
reconfigure not only the urban space, but also the logics and strategies of government and 
value extraction. Drawing on empirical material gathered in New Town Kolkata and Cape 
Town, the thesis showed how computing infrastructures 1) are entwined with zoning 
technologies and bordering processes; 2) inscribe the city within an apparatus of 
speculative security; 3) redefine at the same time how value is extracted from the urban 
environment. 
The scope of this research was never to conduct a comparative study of two sites or 
to fulfil a multi-sited ethnographic agenda. What I tried to do instead was to grasp the 
articulation and differentiation of processes of global relevance at the level of 
technological experimentation, organisation of security, and extraction of value, as they 
condense and unfold in urban environments. At the same time, in charting these relations 
in my two sites of research, specific conditions and configurations of elements emerged 
that do not necessarily translate into any global paradigm, but draw attention to 
contingencies and unique genealogies of the present. 
These two cities, so distant in many ways, can both be seen as landing points of a 
global model and narrative of smart cities; and also as nodes within planetary networks of 
extraction, logistics, and circulation of capital. But at the same time, what takes place in 
these cities complicate the scripts of these models, narratives, and networks. Kolkata and 
Cape Town are two cities of the Global South, very distant from the typical representation 
or parameters of smart cities. In both these cities, digitalisation is invested with a twofold 
significance, as an urban technology for development and (in Cape Town) social justice, 
and as a path for positioning among global circuits of capital. The ways in which this 
ambivalence is declined differ, however, as in each city smart projects hit the ground (or 
try to) through situated and irreducible tensions. In New Town Kolkata, the making of a 
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smart city follows more than ten years of processes of primitive accumulation through 
land grabbing (Dey et al., 2013) that has left thousands of dispossessed farmers. The 
development of digital infrastructures follows the zoning logic that has shaped the 
township in the past, leaving the informal sector outside or on the margins of the 
(supposed) smart city. In Cape Town, smart city projects are formally inscribed in a social 
justice agenda, which presents digitalisation as a strategy to overcome the legacy of 
apartheid. Yet here too, digitalisation disturbingly reflects the urban geography of 
segregation, as the townships and large part of the black population have very limited, if 
any, access to smart infrastructures. In the meantime, smart city projects are strongly led 
by capitalist initiatives, which seek to maximise the extraction of value from the urban 
environment. 
In the remainder of this chapter, I will revisit the key findings of this dissertation, 
remarking on the political implications that can be observed in the making of smart cities. 
I gather the findings around three key themes that emerged through my empirical 
discussion of this work. The first theme concerns how computing infrastructures are 
continually sorting and hierarchising the urban space and those who live in it through the 
proliferation of borders. The second theme is how a speculative logic informs, at once, 
security and commercial platforms, producing actionable futures for both governmental 
and extractive strategies. The third theme concerns the construction of potential 




Territories and Citizens 
 
The first finding of my research in New Town Kolkata and Cape Town is that smart 
cities are zoning and bordering processes. In contrast to the popular narratives of smart 
cities as closely interconnected, holistic spaces, this thesis has argued that urban 
digitalisation proceeds by creating (or grafting upon) zones and by distributing border 
techniques across infrastructures and mundane objects. In examining the planning 
documents, experiments, and early stages of implementation of smart projects in New 
Town Kolkata and Cape Town, I registered different bordering processes. 
Firstly, the making of smart cities has not progressed evenly, but through clusters and 
hubs. In New Town, smart technologies were first implemented inside highly securitised 
business and residential enclaves, whereas as of today the smart city plan only focuses on 
a specific zone of the city, called Area Based Development. In Cape Town, and in the 
absence of a single masterplan, the development of smart infrastructures was largely 
concentrated in the Central Business District (CBD), in the start up hubs, like Woodstock, 
and in the wealthiest, mostly white neighbourhoods of the city. In both cases, access to 
the smart zones and technologies was constrained in various ways for a large part of the 
urban population. The slums of Rajarhat and the townships of Cape Town are not 
considered in the maps of digitalisation. Security checkpoints surround the smart 
enclaves, but physical borders are part of more complex configurations of class, race, and 
labour control that filter and hierarchise the ways in which the smart city come into being. 
Smart devices or uncapped internet connectivity (or both) are often too expensive for 
people from the informal sector and lower income groups. Whereas part of the population 
is automatically entitled to smart citizenship, others are either kept on the margins of it, 
conditionally and differentially included as service workers – the cleaners, security 
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guards, and receptionists – or are the recipients of initiatives of neoliberal pedagogy – 
such as the township residents selected for the Start Up Weekends in Cape Town. 
If smart urbanism’s promise is to create an interconnected, harmonious, and inclusive 
urban environment, the actual materialisation of smart cities happens through the 
disjuncture between different dimensions of space, time, labour, lifestyle, access to 
technologies, and rights. This speaks to broader debates about global zoning processes 
and their implications on geopolitical formations of power, mobility, and citizenship. 
Territories are being increasingly reconfigured as corridors in the planetary circulation of 
capital, information, commodities, and labour. Infrastructures – in this case, digital 
infrastructures – are part of networks of power that transcend national boundaries, while 
reconfiguring and re-territorialising the exercise of sovereignty (Easterling, 2014; Cowen, 
2014; Grappi, 2018). From this perspective, smart cities appear as nodes of these planetary 
routes of urbanisation and logistics, rather than discrete, organic environments. Herein the 
space is organised and stratified according to technopolitical logics that exceed the urban 
dimension and have actually little to do with the idea of building a better city. Indeed, 
smart cities manifest and reproduce the contradictions that come with the global processes 
of urbanisation and circulation of capital. 
The smart enclaves of New Town and Cape Town are definitely more connected – at 
the infrastructural and social level – to similar zones in Mumbai or Johannesburg, London 
or Shanghai, than they are to the slums and townships around them. These zones are 
closely related, and in many cases partially coincident, with the logistical hubs and 
corridors that enable the distribution and the governance of commodities and labour on a 
global scale (Rossiter, 2016). Of course there are considerable differences between 
logistical spaces, such as warehouses and ports, and smart zones, such as the start up 
districts or business parks described in this thesis, and I do not intend to suggest that they 
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are homogeneous spaces or that they work in the same way. As Beverungen and Sprenger 
(2017) argue, however, smart cities are always already logistical cities, “in that they are 
not only deeply permeated by logistical media, but even spread their own logics in a 
protocological fashion as one smart city serves as blueprint for another, further enabling 
and reproducing logistical networks through infrastructures” (p. 2). 
In my research, I found even broader and deeper connections. As with logistical 
zones, smart enclaves are part of global supply chains of data and money. They are highly 
securitised, governed through sensors and algorithms, and apply different regimes of 
rights and citizenship to different working figures. However, these zones are not mere 
replicas or applications of a global standard. While smart zones share the logics, 
technologies and protocols of many other similar spaces across the globe, they are also 
shaped by narratives, strategies, and tensions that cannot be reduced to any model. This 
complicates the relations between – and our understanding of – the organisation of the 
urban space, the circulation of capital, and the productive forces involved. Consider, for 
example, how the informal economy and forms of advanced capitalism coexist within the 
smart developments of New Town; or the compresence of corporate interests and a social 
justice agenda in the smart city projects of Cape Town (Pollio, 2019). Rather than simply 
materialising a global paradigm, smart cities and the zones and the borders from which 
they are made, take shape as situated configurations of protocols, instruments, and 
narratives, which need to continually negotiate their limits and possibilities. 
Zones and the various barriers and bottlenecks around them are not the only 
manifestations of bordering processes in the smart city. As computing infrastructures of 
sensing proliferate, they distribute monitoring and profiling techniques throughout a 
number of everyday objects, places and devices. In short, smart infrastructures 
disseminate smart borders ubiquitously across the urban environment. As explained in 
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Chapter 2, smart borders are data-driven technologies that enact a preemptive logic and 
which seek to identify and classify subjects in virtually every domain of daily life. In the 
smart city, a growing range of ordinary activities – from getting on a bus to using tap 
water – is captured within these mechanisms. Every sensor or login becomes a checkpoint. 
I have argued that as borders become ubiquitous across the urban space they redefine the 
forms of perception and cognition – what Jacques Rancière (2004) called the partition (or 
distribution) of the sensible – and generate new relationships between the human and non- 
human inhabitants of the smart city (Gabrys, 2016). Although computing infrastructures 
connect urban elements, they also dissect them into discrete fragments of data, strings of 
code, numeric values, passwords, credentials, red flags, etc. Concurrently, the presence of 
sensors and checkpoints dictates new forms of attention and movement. 
The relations that computing infrastructures produce in the urban environment are 
relations of power. Once again, as with zoning processes, urban smart borders redefine 
behaviours and mobility, access to services, and rights: in one word, citizenship. A rich 
body of literature (among others, Balibar 1992, 2001, 2002, 2010, 2015; Isin, 2002; 
Mezzadra, 2004) demonstrates how citizenship, far from being a universal, given 
condition, is always a field of tensions and contestations – Balibar calls them antinomies 
– that continually stretches or restricts its boundaries to accommodate, filter or exclude 
different types of subjects at different times. Technopolitical experiments, such as smart 
cities, present new material for investigating how infrastructural transformations, zoning 
processes, and ubiquitous borders produce new patterns of (differential) inclusion and 
exclusion. In recent years, the idea of smart citizens was proposed, as part of a bottom-up 
approach and progressive agenda to urban digitalisation, as opposed to top-down 
strategies that were centred on big tech companies and non-participative master-planning 
(Hemment  & Townsend, 2013). However,  as the examples from New Town  and Cape 
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Town make clear, the opportunity for urban inhabitants to participate in and engage with 
smart technologies is precisely where various forms of hierarchisation come into play, 
creating different classes of more or less (or not at all) smart citizens. More generally, 
researchers have observed how the category of smart citizen automatically excludes “the 
technologically illiterate, the poor and, in general, those who are marginalised from the 
smart city discourse” (Vanolo, 2014, p. 893), while placing moral responsibility for the 
well-being of the city on individuals. If, as Vanolo argues, the smart city is a disciplinary 
strategy that seeks to impose a single technocratic vision of cities and to legitimise the 
involvement of commercial actors in urban management, the category of smart citizenship 
produces docile subjectivities that can be governed at a distance and whose behaviours 
can be shaped according to the goals and requirements of smartness. 
As Jennifer Gabrys (2016) observed, smart city projects are shifting the very 
definition of citizenship. As they are increasingly immersed in monitoring, data- 
harvesting and feedback practices, citizens become less fixed human figures, and more 
sensing nodes connected to a networks of similar operations. In this process, as Gabrys 
puts it, “citizenship is articulated environmentally through the distribution and feedback 
of monitoring and urban data practices, rather than as an individual subject to be 
governed” (2016, p. 187). This resonates strongly with this thesis’s examination of smart 
urban borders and the questions that this examination opens up. Citizenship is always 
defined by borders: but not only national borders. The dynamic articulation of class, 
labour, colour, religion, and gender is continually reconfiguring internal borders and the 
limits or possibilities of citizenship as well as the subjectivities that might claim it. 
This thesis also examined another angle of the relationship between borders and 
citizenship. When borders become ubiquitous and permeate the very sphere of cognition 
and emotions – or if, as Amoore claims, the border is inside us – what kind of (urban) 
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citizenship do they constitute? A number of studies suggest (Amoore, 2008; Andrejevic, 
2014; de Goede et al., 2014; Pötzsch, 2015) that borders are strongly performative: i.e. by 
dissecting bodies into digital information, and identifying and profiling, they do not 
merely measure but co-constitute subjects, identities, and patterns of life. Individuals are 
reduced to the normative identities attached to their biometrics and populations are 
disassembled into datasets and reassembled according to (risk) patterns, profiles, and red 
flags. As bordering processes become increasingly pervasive and automated, they call the 
relationship between human life and technology into question – what Pötzsch (2015) 
(quoting Stiegler (2009)) called our prosthetics beings. In smart cities, ubiquitous, 
automated bordering techniques are increasingly dissecting and directing bodies, 
attention, and emotions. Given this, what becomes of the subject of citizenship? Is there 
still a discrete individual to be granted rights, and to suffer control and discrimination: or, 
as Gabrys (2016) suggests, is citizenship more and more measured through a set of data 





Smart cities are speculative worlds. At the core of their projects and experiments lies 
the aspiration to anticipate and somehow manage the future. As this thesis has argued, 
speculation runs through the veins of smart cities at many levels. It runs through the 
projects and continuous experiments, which do not merely represent the future city but 
drag it into the present and shape its trajectories, by generating narratives, protocols, 
norms, and investments. Speculation runs through algorithms in the security and 
government platforms that incessantly model performances, behaviours, and events, and 
enable preemptive decisions. It runs through the financial operations that underpin the 
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proliferation of tech start ups, the development of smart enclaves, and the growth of 
commercial platforms. If, as Lisa Adkins (2018) suggests, speculation is increasingly a 
logic of social organisation, then smart cities are the laboratories, wherein the possibilities 
and limits of this logic are being explored with particular intensity. Smart cities are 
testbeds (Halpern et al., 2013; 2015) where not only new technologies but also new forms 
of government, valorisation, and life are being trialled; trials which are centred around the 
exploitation of possible futures, for security or economic purposes. In the following pages, 
I will briefly sum up some of the social and political effects that are at stake in the making 
of smart cities. 
This thesis has illustrated how the proliferation of smart borders, across urban 
environments, is linked to the creation of platforms for urban security and value- 
extraction. Ubiquitous micro-borders set up a grid for the collection of data, which are 
then modelled into predictions and decisions. Thus, the models do not merely represent 
but produce the future(s). I extensively detailed how the algorithmic operations of both 
security and commercial platforms are designed to generate configurations of future 
possibilities that are actionable in the present for governmental and valorisation strategies. 
As several other recent studies have shown (Amoore, 2013; Aradau, 2015; Pasquinelli, 
2017), these operations are contingent, often self-referential, and strongly imaginative. 
The rules of association of algorithms follow a logic of resemblance and correspondence 
that are, as Aradau (2015) suggests, closer to divination than to scientific evidence. 
Models work through criteria of proximity, similarity, and sympathy, not discovering 
patterns, but creating them. However, the results they produce are highly performative in, 
at least, two ways, because; firstly, they sort the city into normative categories that have 
material consequences and, secondly, these categories feed back into the data sets and 
thus become the basis for the next models. This thesis detailed several examples of 
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speculative mechanisms in action: risk alerts of crime incidents and criminal hot spots, 
scoring citizens with respect to their access to social services and benefits, rating the 
performances of Uber drivers or delivery riders, profiling customers, and personalising 
commercial offers. 
Environmental governance (Gabrys, 2016), which seeks to intervene on the 
conditions in which life unfolds, and targeted governance, which breaks individuals up 
into risk factors (Valverde & Mopas, 2004; Amoore & de Goede, 2005) are two methods 
of framing algorithmic politics, which only seem to be in opposition. Gabrys (2016) 
argues that computing infrastructures have an ontogenetic power that (re)creates the 
environment and the relations within it. This idea draws on Foucault’s notion of 
environmentality “not as the production of environmental subjects but as a spatial- 
material distribution and relationality of power through environments, technologies, and 
ways of life” (Gabrys, 2016, p. 187). However, I have argued throughout this thesis that 
this form of ontogenesis operates largely through models and speculative configurations, 
which apply quite indifferently to humans, machines, and natural elements. Thus, what is 
emerging from smart cities is a new frontier of biopolitics – what Gabrys calls biopolitics 
2.0 – where the boundaries between population and environment, humans and non- 
humans are becoming increasingly blurred. In the age of algorithmic power, the object of 
government is no longer individuals, populations, and things, and not even the 
environment as a set of living elements, but rather their models – their speculative doubles, 
projecting them into the future. 
Speculative platforms seek to shape, mould, direct or force the positioning of things 
and humans in time and space. This is the reason I insisted on moving beyond the 
surveillance/dataveillance framework, in my analysis of the social, economic, and 
political life of computing infrastructures. The category of surveillance does not 
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comprehend the productive character of the algorithms at work in security platforms, 
which are not merely concerned with acquiring and monitoring data but also with turning 
data into actionable models and preemptive strategies. In parallel, categories, such as 
surveillance capitalism (Zuboff, 2018), fail to consider how platforms do not simply 
accumulate and sell information, but actively produce their own workers, markets, and 
consumers, via a growing range of techniques that anticipate, direct, and discipline needs, 
desires, and behaviours. These specific modalities of value extraction, what Morozov 
(2017) called data extractivism, are clearly broader than smart cities – think of global 
colossuses, such as Google, Amazon or Netflix – yet they find the ideal sites for expanding 
their market and testing their strategies, in smart cities. 
This thesis analysed examples of two capitalist platforms, Uber and Zomato, in order 
to illustrate how a highly sophisticated and continuously-tuned apparatus of data mining 
and algorithmic modelling operates, to continually maximise and expand the extraction 
of value from workers, users, and the whole urban environment. It also drew attention to 
the conditions, which have allowed smart cities and capitalist platforms to emerge and 
grow, and which consist of planetary networks of resource extraction, labour, 
financialisation, and environmental degradation (Crawford & Joler, 2018; Mezzadra & 
Neilson, 2018). I specifically highlighted the urban processes of land grabbing, enclosing, 
and gentrification, which anticipate and advance the creation of start up ecosystems and 
platform economies. Given this perspective, I argue that smart cities can be seen through 
the categories of urban extractivism and extractive urbanism, which help to shed light on 
how platforms cannot be isolated from the other processes that affect the urban 
environment; i.e. real estate operations and financial investments, the cost of life and rent. 
For these reasons, smart cities can be viewed as outposts of biocapitalist tendencies, where 
platforms seek to capture every fragment of life into circuits of valorisation (Fumagalli, 
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2011; 2015). Moreover, this tendency extends beyond individuals, to subsume every other 
form of urban life, in a process where the urban environment, as a whole, becomes the 
object of extractive practices. 
This thesis’s examination of security and commercial platforms illustrated an 
increasing convergence of techniques and operations, between the domains of security 
and value extraction. As Louise Amoore (2013) note, following Deleuze and Guattari 
(1980), the relationship between government and economy is such that neither of them 
can be reduced to, or absorbed by, the other; rather, they resonate together and infiltrate 
each other in multiple ways, as they both play on the imagination and calculation of 
possible futures. De Goede et al. (2014) phrase it as speculative security “draws attention 
to the precise ways in which uncertain futures are commodified and is attentive to the 
tensions thus generated within commercial and professional practices” (p. 419). Security 
is increasingly driven by a logic of preemption which works “in a way that mirrors 
speculative finance.” Like finance, preemption is not about predicting the future, but about 
“acting on multiple possible futures by drawing them into the present as terrain of 
intervention” (p. 419). Speculative models of the urban future become the terrain where 
biopolitical interventions and strategies of value extraction come into play 




Is Another Smart City Possible? 
 
Is the future of smart cities already written? Are they bound to be laboratories of 
exploitation and manipulations of life in all its forms, or is there a chance to draw different 
trajectories? This thesis has drawn attention to a long series of problems and dangers, 
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without offering perspectives on alternatives or resistance. Quite frankly, this is because 
I came across very few cases of collective struggle against the specific issues brought on 
by smart city projects and computing infrastructures during my research in New Town 
and Cape Town. For example, the major claim of the #Datamustfall campaign in South 
Africa was for access to the internet as a service, as part of a long-standing series of battles 
for social justice in the country. The Uber drivers’ strikes that took place, coincidentally, 
in both of my sites of research, were only loosely directed against the platform as the 
master that was denying them a fair salary and sustainable working hours. The drivers 
were rather trying to reclaim their own humanity and humanise their counterpart as much 
as possible, when they blocked the roads and went after local managers and offices, 
seeking a personal, embodied negotiation. 
Nobody raised strikes against predictive analytics, geolocators or behavioural 
profiling, for obvious reasons: studies on labour struggles against algorithmic 
management, mostly in the field of logistics, indicate that the complexity and blackboxing 
of platform technologies makes the logic of the system opaque and inaccessible to 
workers. In turn, the workers find their space of political subjectivation and struggle in 
disrupting the external outputs of the managerial blackbox with strikes, pickets and 
blockades (Cuppini, Frapporti & Pirone, 2015). Smart cities can be viewed as large-scale 
black boxes, where urban life, in all its forms, is governed and monetised by speculative 
models, which are informed by rules and criteria that are inscrutable for most of the 
population. What then, are the spaces and strategies for politics? To conclude this 
dissertation, I would like to explore some of the potential alternatives and strategies of 




In the wake of smart urbanisation, a number of recent studies (de Lange & de Waal, 
2013; Shaw & Graham, 2017; Kitchin, Cardullo & Di Feliciantonio, 2018) have revisited 
Henri Lefebvre’s (1996) influential notion of “the right to city.” Notably, Lefebvre 
postulated that the right to the city consisted of a set of claims through which urban 
dwellers were able to take part in and shape urban processes, based on their needs and 
desires, rather than their being merely passive elements in the capitalist driven dynamics 
of speculation and profit extraction. Michiel De Lange and Martjin de Waal (2013) expand 
on this idea, suggesting that “the right to the digital city” is, firstly, a right of appropriation 
that redefines the forms of ownership of technologies and infrastructures. This right 
challenges privatisation and enables communities to share and make decision about the 
use of smart resources and data. In their discussion of the informational rights to the city, 
Joe Shaw and Mark Graham (2017) focus on the ways in which data are collected, 
organised, and made available by tech colossuses, such as Google, and on the political 
relevance of a digital representation of the urban space. The authors suggest that, because 
only a few monopolists control this information, it is imperative to imagine ways in which 
citizens can reclaim the production of urban information as part of “sustained autogestion” 
(Shaw & Graham, 2017, p. 921). Evgeny Morozov and Francesca Bria (2018) link the 
right to the city to a proposal of technological sovereignty for cities. That means defining 
legal and economic regimes for the collection and use of data and for the management of 
smart infrastructure, which are oriented to serve and empower local residents, rather than 
tech corporations or neoliberal urban governance. 
All of these positions point towards important elements in the construction of 
alternative smart cities, but all of them focus, in one way or another, on the outer layer of 
algorithmic power. Indeed, the concepts of transparency, collective ownership, and 
technological sovereignty, which have been mentioned above, are mostly linked to the 
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legal relations concerning urban technologies and urban dwellers. However, this thesis 
has consistently argued that the social and political issues of computing technologies are 
linked to power relations – i.e. who controls technologies – as much as to the inner logic 
of algorithms and their speculative, productive character. 
If the problem is more than just surveillance, then the (potential) solution is more than 
privacy, transparency, and public/collective management. The ways, in which algorithms 
are designed, the epistemic relationships between them, and the context of decisions are 
equally important. This entails very technical questions; such as, on what datasets are the 
algorithms trained? How are data prepared and cleaned up, and what is excluded from the 
calculation(s)? What are the exact rules of association in use, and how is their 
effectiveness measured? How is unsupervised machine learning kept under control and 
evaluated? How do we critically compare the models, generated by algorithms, with their 
living counterparts? I have engaged with these questions in Chapter 3 of this thesis, where 
I examined the urban platforms at work in New Town and Cape Town. Building on a 
body on critical work (among others, Apprich et al., 2018; boyd & Crawford, 2012; 
Amoore, 2013; Gillespie, 2014; Aradau, 2015; Pasquinelli, 2017), I drew attention to the 
critical aspects – the ways in which data are cleaned up and prepared; the fact that 
algorithmic speculations are presented and employed as predictions; the bias and flaws 
that become embedded and automated into procedures – that shape the practical 
operations of platforms. These aspects demand further research and might contribute to a 
“where to begin” agenda for developing alternatives. More ethical and political questions 
are on the line as well, such as, how much trust can be afforded to algorithmic decisions? 
How can we balance speculative models and actual interventions? How is the chain of 
decisions that connects sensors, algorithms, and humans organised? 
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In his recent article, Shintaro Miyazaki (2019) engages with some of these questions 
and launches the slogan “Take back the Algorithms.” Echoing the idea to “take back the 
economy” advanced by J.K. Gibson-Graham and their colleagues (2013), the core of 
Miyazaki’s proposal is to make algorithms more affordable in the direction of 
commonisation. Here, “making affordable,” refers to various levels of action, including 
making algorithms more open and transparent, taking them away from the control of tech 
capitalists and the dictates of immediate efficacy and profit, code-bending, opening up 
potential alternatives, and un-making their capitalist value. In essence, Miyazaki says that 
“making affordable, in this context, means to liberate such systems from the constraints 
of fully predetermined “mastery,” and instead enable users to become independent agents 
in their interactions with the systems in question” (2019, p. 274). The idea of commonistic 
algorithms signals some interesting pathways through which we might begin to rethink 
our collective relations with computing infrastructures. However, what seems to be 
missing in this account is a realistic analysis of the geometries of power, in which 
algorithms are immersed, and of what is actually at stake. 
Liberating algorithms from the firm grip of capitalist property and circuits of 
valorisation on a large scale is an undertaking that is likely to require a comprehensive re- 
organisation of economic and social relations. Some hypothesis and experiments in this 
direction have emerged over the past few years. For example, Robert Gehl (2014), outlines 
a manifesto for socialised media, that is, systems of social networking that are alternatives 
to the capitalist monopoly of Facebook, Twitter, Google, etc. Discussing some existing 
projects that share this vision, Gehl proposes media that are built through collaborative 
work between experts and “common users,” which run on decentralised, horizontal 
architectures and free hardware, operate in a regime of copyleft, and (un)archive data in 
modalities that undermine any form of monetisation and surveillance. The SenseLab in 
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Montreal and the Economic Space Agency are experimenting with the development of 
alternative cryptocurrencies, to support the processes of collective creation and to 
contribute to building postcapitalist economic networks (Senselab 3EI, n.d.; Virtanen, 
2019; Massumi, 2018). 
Tiziana Terranova (2014) suggests a perspective that is more grounded in 
(Autonomist) Marxist theory, and which looks towards “the constitution of a new political 
rationality, around the concept of the ‘common’” (para. 2). Here, the concept of common 
is developed from the relationship between production and the role that algorithms play 
within it. Within the current capitalist framework, algorithms are essentially fixed capital, 
developed and organised in order to produce exchange value. Yet algorithms, similar to 
every element of technology, can be much more than that; as the continual attempts by 
hackers, to keep coding independent from corporate rules, remind us. Terranova (2014) 
twists Benjamin Bratton’s (2012) idea of the stack as a new nomos of the earth, proposing 
a “red stack.” i.e. a new infrastructure for the “common,” which includes radically 
different relationships with, and appropriation of, money, social networks, and bio- 
hypermedia. This last term was first used by Giorgio Griziotti (2014) to define “the ever 
more intimate relation between bodies and devices which is part of the diffusion of 
smartphones, tablet computers and ubiquitous computation” (2014, para. 6). The red stack 
is a “process of re-coding network architectures and information technologies, based on 
values other than exchange and speculation” (para. 7), where what are now largely 
infrastructures of algorithmic capitalism and control – cryptocurrencies, social networks, 
wearables, smart devices, and apps – are turned into forms of cooperation and 
redistribution of wealth and power. 
In conclusion; the possible strategies for drawing different futures for smart cities, 
and ensure that urban dwellers may not only coexist but thrive with increasingly pervasive 
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and powerful computing technologies, involve a radical transformation of power 
relationships, as well as a deep reconfiguration of the rules and roles of algorithms. I do 
not intend to endorse any form of a priori techno-scepticism or, even less, anthropocentric 
nostalgia about the primacy of the human in an increasingly more-than-human world. 
Rather, I support Miyazaki’s invitation to “think about more in solidarity with algorithms, 
which might be considered as something akin to companions or co-species” (2019, p. 
280). This claim resonates clearly with the theoretical and ethico-political possibilities for 
human/non-human relations and hybrid ontologies devised in feminist philosophy. 
Notably, in the course of her more than thirty years of work, Donna Haraway (1985; 1997; 
2016) has proposed a configuration of relationships that unfolds beyond essentialist 
identities, between different species, and in intimate co-implication with machines. In 
parallel, Rosi Braidotti (1994; 2003) has built a Zoe-centric ethics that connects all forms 
of life in non-hierarchical relationships. Dethroning the Human from its centrality and 
priority over other species in an increasingly posthuman world, this ethics allows for non- 
hierarchical, playful relationships between humans and machines. 
In line with these suggestions, I also look towards non-oppressive and, possibly, 
joyful relationships that connect humans, machines, and other species, in creating and 
caring for a shared environment. As Jennifer Gabrys (2016) suggests, computing 
infrastructures are ontogenetic: they generate new modes of being, new relations and new 
worlds. Clearly, as this thesis, among many other studies, has illustrated, the concentration 
of technologies on the side of capital and governmental operations tends to shape these 
processes in ways that reproduce, reinforce, and expand the existing configurations of 
power. Yet, the directions and outcomes of ontogenesis are never pre-determined, but 
always remain open – for alternative engagements, experiments, and battles. The vision 
of an alternative smart city is only possible, I conclude, if we take the ontogenetic force 
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of computing infrastructures seriously, and orientate both our analysis and our practice 
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